Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 November 2020
Asymmetric information and diverse preferences for reform create an agency problem between opposition leaders and citizens. Dissatisfied citizens are unsure of how bad the current situation is but infer this information from the scale of the leader’s reform proposal. Because radical leaders have an incentive to exaggerate and mislead, to command credibility, they must paradoxically radicalize the proposal further as a way of signaling the necessity of change. Radicalism motivated by signaling is costly, as it reduces a movement’s chances of success. This mechanism also contributes to leadership radicalization when the leaders of movements arise as a compromise among diverse interests.
We thank Navin Kartik, Balazs Szentes, Xianwen Shi, and seminar participants at the Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (2019), Political Selection Workshop (2019) and Allied Social Sciences Association annual meeting (2020) for their comments. This research project is partly supported by the General Research Fund of the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (Project No. 17504718) and by the Seed Fund for Basic Research of Hong Kong University (Project No. 201811159002).
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