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National Socialist Conceptions of International Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Lawrence Preuss
Lawrence Preuss
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
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Extract

When the German government announced on March 16 of this year that it no longer deemed itself bound by the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, a great step was taken toward the realization of the demand for Gleichberechtigung which has been the main objective of National Socialist foreign policy. In view of the forthcoming conversations which had been scheduled to take place at Berlin, the time chosen for this decision was unexpected. The act of denunciation itself had been foreshadowed, however, by the withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, and by her actual rearming in defiance of the limitations of the Treaty. It involved no sudden innovation in policy, but was merely a public acknowledgment of the fait accompli; it marked the final stroke in one stage of a long and bitter campaign against the “Diktat” of Versailles.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 29 , Issue 4 , August 1935 , pp. 594 - 609
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1935

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References

1 See, for example, Hitler's speech to the Reichstag, May 17, 1933. Schmidt, and Grabowsky, (ed.), Disarmament and Equal Rights (Berlin, 1934), p. 197 ff.Google Scholar

2 Proclamation to the German people, Oct. 14, 1933. Ibid., p. 217.

3 Speech of May 17, 1933. Ibid., p. 200.

4 Hitler has stated that “no German government will of its own account carry out the breach of an agreement which cannot be removed without being replaced by a better one. This acknowledgement of the legal character of such a treaty cannot but be general. Not only the conqueror, but also the conquered party, can claim the rights accorded in the Treaty. But the right to demand a revision of this Treaty finds its foundation in the Treaty itself.” Ibid., p. 201.

5 For discussions of the German case for equality as based upon the pre-Armistice agreement and Art. 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, see Viktor Bruns, “Deutschlands Gleichberechtigung als Rechtsproblem,” Beiträge zum ausländischen öffenllichen Recht und Völkerrecht, Heft 21 (Berlin, 1934); Egon Gottsohalk, “Der Rechtsbruch von Versailles,” Deutsche Jurislen-Zeitung, Vol. 38, pp. 1453–1459 (1933)Google Scholar; Graf Westarp, “Deutschlands Austritt aus dem Völkerbund im Lichte des Rechts,” ibid., pp. 1389–1394; and Heinrich Rogge, “Wehrmacht, Frieden, und Völkerrecht,” ibid., Vol. 40, pp. 387–391 (1935).

6 For the text of the proclamation of March 16, see International Conciliation, No. 310 (May, 1935), pp. 264–270Google Scholar. See also Hitler's address to the Reichstag, May 21, 1935. New York Times, May 22, 1935.

7 As a subsidiary legal ground for denunciation, the announcement of March 16 appeals to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, although not eo nomine. The recent increase in the strength of the Soviet army, it asserts, is “an element that at the time of the conclusion of the Versailles Treaty could not have been divined.” In reply to this contention, it may be pointed out that “the interpretation of a treaty, by reference to the express or implied intention of the parties, one of whom claims the change of circumstances as a reason for the dissolution of the treaty, is hardly applicable to treaties in which the contention of one of the contracting parties was of little consequence, i.e., to treaties imposed by force.” Lauterpacht, H., The Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford, 1933), p. 272Google Scholar.

8 Professor Bruns, for example, in urging Germany's right to equality within the League, asserts that “this equality in right and obligation is not a fortuitous, arbitrary creation of the Covenant of the League. International law and the society of states did not first come into existence on January 10, 1920.” Op. cit., p. 25. Also, “Der Beschluss des Völkerbundsrats vom 17. April 1935,” Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 5, p. 326 ff. (1935)Google Scholar.

9 Reichsjustizkommissar Dr. Hans Frank, for example, has stated in an address before the Academy of German Law that “the right of Germany to the Saar is the unconditional and perpetual natural right, unaffected by any treaty or exercise of force, of a mother to her child.” Völkischer Beobachter, Nov. 14, 1934.

10 See, for example, Westarp, Graf, “Die Rede des Reichskanzlers am 17. Mai 1933 im Lichte des Rechts,” Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, Vol. 38, pp. 708–718 (1933)Google Scholar. It is significant that the texts are uniformly chosen from the Leader's addresses on peace and equality, and not from his Mein Kampf.

11 Wolgast, Ernst, “Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht,” Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. 18, p. 130 (1934)Google Scholar. International law, the same writer elsewhere states, is not merely German external public law, “for every understanding for which the Chancellor of the Reich strives in the international field presupposes the other states as having the same right and share in international life as the German Reich, and cannot, therefore, lead to a conception of international law as valid for us alone and proceeding only from the German will.” Deutsches Recht, Vol. 4, p. 198 (1934)Google Scholar.

12 See Rühland, Curt, “Staatsverträge und nationalsozialistische Rechtsauffassung,” Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. 18, p. 133 ff. (1934)Google Scholar.

13 See Keller, Hans K. E. L., “Völkerreich und Völkerrecht,” Europäische Revue, Vol. 10, p. 425 (1934)Google Scholar.

14 Such doctrines of the positivist school as relate to the racial theory of international law are discussed below, p. 605 ff.

15 Tübingen, 1933.

16 Ibid., p. 226. “Sovereignty in the legal sense is the capacity of exclusive legal self-determination in its internal and external manifestations,” Ibid., p. 61.

17 Ibid., p. 227. The “reine Rechtslehre” of Kelsen and Verdross is dismissed as a system which is based upon a “non-political pacifism unrelated to reality,” “as fruitless as a non-political theory of the state.” Ibid., pp. 226, 227.

18 Ibid., pp. 229, 230.

19 “Interesse und zwischenstaatliche Ordnung,” Niemeyers Zeitschrift für internationales Recht, Vol. 49, p. 62 (1934)Google Scholar.

20 Ibid., p. 30.

21 Ibid., p. 63. See also Kraus, , “Das zwischenstaatliche Weltbild des Nationalsozialismus,” Juristische Wochenschrift, Vol. 62, pp. 2418–2423 (1933)Google Scholar.

22 Ibid., pp. 45, 46.

23 On the history of the doctrine of auto-limitation, see Sukiennicki, Wiktor, La souverainété des états en droit international moderne (Paris, 1927), p. 171 ff.Google Scholar

24 Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen (Vienna, 1882), p. 34Google Scholar.

25 Die rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge (Vienna, 1880), p. 39Google Scholar.

26 L'état moderne et son droit, I (trans, by Fardis, G., Paris, 1911), pp. 562, 564Google Scholar. Hegel expressed the same conception when he said: “The relation of states is one of independent entities which make stipulations, but stand above their stipulations.” Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 330.

27 Tübingen, 1911.

28 Ibid., p. 160.

29 Ibid., p. 153.

30 Ibid., p. 179.

31 Ibid., pp. 178 ff., 179 ff. For a critique of Kaufmann's Machttheorie, see Nelson, Leonard, Die Rechtswissenschaft ohne Recht (Leipzig, 1917), pp. 144–189Google Scholar.

That National Socialist jurists have not pursued their premises to their logical conclusions with the same temerity as did Kaufmann may be due to the fact that they feel impelled to keep within the ambit of the Führer's utterances, which, since January 30, 1933, have been of peace. Compare, for example, Mein Kampf (12th ed., Munich, 1933), p. 438Google Scholar, in which Hitler speaks of peace—not “a peace supported by the palm leaves of tearful, pacifistic, hired female-mourners, but resting upon the victorious sword of a people of rulers seizing the world in the service of a higher culture.” See also the remarks of Dr. Helmut Nicolai, who points out that “Tiu, the Germanic god of law, bore the sword and was at the same time the god of war. This is no inconsistency or contradiction if we correctly understand the old-Germanic conception of law.” War is “not a breach of law, but a legal action.” It is “a legal claim which two peoples make to life. … The strong has a right against the weak; he has a claim that the weak make room for him. … But honorable struggle decides as to strength, and Fate decides who the victor is, who the victor must be, if the life of the better and stronger is not to be stunted. Therein lies the divine justice which in the end claims the victory for the valiant and forceful. The German piously bows to the decision of Fate if the stronger opponent conquers him—if, however, the victor treats the honorably defeated foe in a chivalrous manner.” “Die Rassengesetzliche Rechtslehre,” Nationalsozialistische Bibliothek, Heft 39 (1st ed., Munich, 1932), p. 19Google Scholar.

32 See Verdross, Alfred, “Le fondement du droit international,” Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International, Vol. 16, p. 266 ff. (1927)Google Scholar.

33 Kelsen, Hans, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts (2d ed., Tübingen, 1928), pp. 171, 172Google Scholar. On international law as “äusseres Staatsrecht,” see Zorn, Philip, “Die deutschen Staatsverträge,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Vol. 36, p. 1 ff. (1880)Google Scholar; Zorn, Albert, Grundzüge des Völkerrechts (2d ed., Leipzig, 1903), p. 7ff.Google Scholar; and the recent revival of the doctrine by Schecher, Ludwig, Deutsches Aussensstaatsrecht (Berlin, 1933), p. 21ff.Google Scholar

34 Kraus, , in Juristische Wochenschrift, Vol. 62, p. 2420 (1933)Google Scholar; Wolgast, , in Zeitschrift fur Völkerrecht, Vol. 18, p. 129 (1934)Google Scholar; and Deutsches Recht, Vol. 4, p. 198 (1934)Google Scholar; Walz, G. A., Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. 18, p. 146 (1934)Google Scholar; and Völkerrecht und Völkerbund, Vol. 1, p. 476, (1934)Google Scholar; and E. Tatarin-Tarnheyden, ibid., pp. 295–299.

35 For a similar attempt at a theoretical construction of international law as “Koordinationsrecht,” see Hatschek, Julius, Völkerrecht als System rechtlich bedeutsamer Staatsakte (Leipzig, 1923), p. 1 ff.Google Scholar

36 “Das Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und staatlichem Recht nach nationalsozialistischer Rechtsauffassung,” Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. 18, pp. 148–149 (1934)Google Scholar; “Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht,” Volkerrecht und Volkerbund, Vol. 1, pp. 476–478 (1934)Google Scholar. Walz has developed his conception of international intercorporative law more fully in his “Wesen des Völkerrechts und Kritik der Völkerrechtsleugner,” in Stier-Somlo's, Handbuch des Völkerrechts, 1. Bd., 1. Abt. A, pp. 252–261Google Scholar.

37 Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. 18, pp. 150, 151 (1934)Google Scholar.

38 Ibid., pp. 152, 153.

39 Compare Kelsen, op. cit., pp. 187 ff., 198, note 3. Walz employs the pluralistic construction only as a means for determining the relation of international law to municipal law. As formulated by Heinrich Triepel, its principal exponent, this construction more closely approximated that of a binding system of international law superior to the will of individual states than did any other pre-war German theory. If his construction were deemed to conflict with the doctrine of state sovereignty, Triepel asserted, “then it is high time to embark upon an even more thorough revision of this notorious concept than that which it has recently met at the hands of competent persons.” Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (Leipzig, 1899), p. 76Google Scholar, note. Walz evidently does not share this conclusion, and, in fact, his view as to the obligations imposed by Article IV of the Weimar Constitution implicitly reject it.

40 See Sukiennicki, op. cit., p. 129. Herbert Kraus has emphasized the derivation of National Socialist principles from “universal, transcendental ideas and ideals,” i.e., from natural law, in Juristische Wochenschrift, Vol. 62, pp. 2418–2419 (1933)Google Scholar.

41 Op. cit., pp. 26–27. See also Bruns, , “Rechtsgemeinschaft oder Herrschaftsgemeinschaft?,” Völkerrecht und Volkerbund, Vol. 1, pp. 14, 17 (1934)Google Scholar, and Hans Keller, K. E. L., “Völkerrecht von Morgen,” Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. 17, pp. 342–372 (1933)Google Scholar.

42 “Zum Problem der Staatengleichheit im Völkerrecht,” Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Vol. 4, p. 485 (1934)Google Scholar.

43 Ibid., pp. 485–486. See also Bilfinger, , “Zur Lage des völkerrechtlichen Staatsbegriffs,” Völkerrecht und Völkerbund, Vol. 1, pp. 408–413 (1934)Google Scholar, and “Vertrag und Diktat,” Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung, Vol. 39, pp. 881–884 (1934)Google Scholar.

44 See Kelsen, op. cit., p. 216; and Nelson, op. cit., p. 78 ff.

45 The Law of Nations (Oxford, 1928), pp. 62, 64Google Scholar.

46 See Kunz, Josef L., “The ‘Vienna School’ and International Law,” New York University Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 11, pp. 399–400 (1934)Google Scholar; Verdross, op. cit., pp. 314–315; and Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 95–96.

47 See Preuss, L., “La théorie raciale et la doctrine politique du National-Socialisme,” Revue générale de droit international public, Vol. 41, pp. 661–674 (1934)Google Scholar, and “Germanic Law versus Roman Law in National Socialist Legal Theory,” Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Vol. 16, pp. 268–280 (1934)Google Scholar, and the literature there cited.

48 Op. cit., passim, esp. pp. 44–45. Nicolai's views as to the racial foundation of international law, which are substantially those described below, are accepted and expounded in greater detail by Kraaz, Gtinther, “Nationalsozialistische Völkerrechtsdenken,” ReichsverwaUungsblatt und Preussisches Verwaltungsblatt, Vol. 55, pp. 9–11 (1934)Google Scholar; Wolgast, , in Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. 18, p. 130 ff. (1934)Google Scholar; Walz, ibid., p. 146 ff.; Rühland, ibid., p. 134 ff.; Kraus, , Juristische Wochenschrift, Vol. 62, p. 2420 (1933)Google Scholar; Dr.Bumiller, , “Die nationalsozialistische Rechtsidee und das Problem des Völkerrechts,” Deutsches Recht, Vol. 4, pp. 201–206 (1934)Google Scholar; and Heinrich Richter, “Völkerrecht,” ibid., pp. 206–208.

49 According to the National Socialist conception, the state is not the source of law, but a creation of law; it is “the form of existence of the natural-spiritual unity which we call the Volk.” Binder, Julius, “Der deutsche Volksstaat,” Recht und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart, No. 110 (Tübingen, 1934), p. 21Google Scholar. See also Huber, Ernst Rudolf, “Die deutsche Staatswissenschaft,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Vol. 95, p. 31 ff. (1934)Google Scholar, and Göring, Hermann, “Rechtssicherheit als Grundlage der Völksgemeinschaft,” Völkischer Beobachter, Nov. 14, 1934Google Scholar.

50 Koellreutter, defines “Volk” as “eine biologische Lebenseinheit, als eine Naturgemeinsamkeit, für die Blut und Boden konstitutive Elemente sind.” Volk und Staat in der Weltanschauung des Nationalsozialismus (Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1935), p. 11Google Scholar.

51 Richter, op. cit., pp. 207–208. “It is not thereby asserted,” Dr. Richter states, ‘that the fundamental moral ideas of the German people are also to be considered as binding upon the so-called ‘international community. … “It should never, and shall never, be our function to convert by example to German legal notions the negro republic of Liberia, or Abyssinia, or Red Russia, in order to construct a genuine society of nations of a universal character.” German honor, he continues, requires the observance of the principle pacta sunt servanda: treaties legally concluded should be loyally carried out; however, the German Volk never consented to the Treaty of Versailles; its purported agents who signed it were ‘falsi procurators.’” Nicolai reaches the same conclusion as to acts of the “November traitors” and the “anti-national” legislation and treaties of the Weimar Republic. Op. cit., p. 50 ff.

52 National Socialist Germany, it is argued, cannot for this reason enter into general agreements; its international legal relations should be regulated by bilateral pacts. See Rühland, op. cit., p. 135 ff., and Rogge, Heinrich, “Das Prinzip der ‘unmittelbaren Verständigung,’” Völkerrecht und Völkerbund, Vol. 2, pp. 24–29 (1935)Google Scholar.

53 The racial theorists apparently find themselves at a loss to explain the singular lack of appreciation for National Socialism—by definition the purest expression of the Germanic spirit—shown by the Nordic Scandinavians. Kraaz admits some discouragement at the shocking breaches of racial solidarity, and hence of international law, which take place among Germanic peoples, as illustrated by the British seizure of the Danish fleet in 1807. He suggests that it may be due to the fact that the peoples involved are racially mixed. Op. cit., p. 10.

54 In such a reorganized international community, the German Volk, and, consequently, the German Staat, would have a population of at least eighty millions. It could be made still larger through the creation of a Germanic state.

55 Walz, , Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht, Vol. 18, p. 147 ff. (1934)Google Scholar; also Rogge, Heinrich, “Das Prinzip der unmittelbaren Verständigung in Friedenspolitik und Völkerrecht,” Hochschule und Ausland, Vol. 13, p. 19 (1935)Google Scholar; and Rühland, op. cit., p. 135.

56 Schmidt and Grabowsky, op. cit., p. 201. See also the speech of Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels before the Polish Cultural Union, June 13, 1934. Europäische Revue, Vol. 10, p. 415 (1934)Google Scholar. The National Socialist government does not admit that its activities in Austria constitute intervention in the affairs of a foreign people. See Preuss, L., “International Responsibility for Hostile Propaganda Against Foreign States,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, p. 664 ff. (1934)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 Compare the following statement as to “qualitative” and “quantitative” majorities, based on the race theory and applied to the question of national minorities: “In deciding the question as to the state condition of a determinate territory, not the quantity of the men living in this territory, but their quality, is to be considered. Let us assume that a million poverty-stricken men live in a territory by hunting and primitive agriculture; now one hundred thousand men standing upon a higher plane of culture wander in, take this land, and create for the original inhabitants new conditions of life. Who will be so unjust as to award this land to the million original inhabitants? Herein is revealed the inverted results to which the liberal idea of equality can lead.” Lehmann, Kurt, “Nationalsozialismus und Minderheitenpolitik,” Deutsches Recht, Vol. 4, p. 210 (1934)Google Scholar.

58 Laski, H. J., The State in Theory and Practice (New York, 1935), p. 195Google Scholar.

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