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Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Joseph Greenberg
Affiliation:
University of Haifa
Shlomo Weber
Affiliation:
University of Haifa

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to define and to prove formally the existence of an equilibrium under proportional representation, as well as partially to characterize it. Specifically, let m be the quota that represents the minimal number of voters necessary for a candidate to be elected. We show that there is a set of elected candidates, each choosing an alternative and each receiving at least m votes, such that no other potential candidate, by offering an additional alternative, can secure at least m votes for himself. We then investigate the structure, at equilibrium, of the set of individuals who support a given candidate, as well as study stability properties of the equilibrium. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to consist of a single candidate, thus generalizing Black's median-voter result.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1985

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References

Black, D. The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.Google Scholar
Downs, A. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row, 1957.Google Scholar
Hoag, C. & Hallett, G. Proportional representation. New York: Macmillan, 1926.Google Scholar
Wells, H. G. Westminster Gazette, 12 1, 1923.Google Scholar
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