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Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Roger B. Myerson
Roger B. Myerson
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
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Abstract

A simple model is used to compare, under different electoral systems, the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters. In this game model, each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate, subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1. Symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two-candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank-scoring rules, approval voting, and single transferable vote. Voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate, in this model, the most severely unequal campaign promises.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 87 , Issue 4 , December 1993 , pp. 856 - 869
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1993

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