Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T19:24:11.340Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

David Austen-Smith  and
Jeffrey Banks
David Austen-Smith
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
Jeffrey Banks
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 82 , Issue 2 , June 1988 , pp. 405 - 422
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1988

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Austen-Smith, David. 1981. Party Policy and Campaign Costs in a Multiconstituency Model of Electoral Competition. Public Choice 37:389–402.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austen-Smith, David. 1983. The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition: Instability, Institutions, and Information. Environment and Planning C 1:439–59.Google Scholar
Austen-Smith, David. 1984. Two-Party Competition with Many Constituencies. Mathematical Social Sciences 7:177–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austen-Smith, David. 1986. Legislative Coalitions and Electoral Equilibrium. Public Choice 50:185–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Austen-Smith, David. 1987. Sincere Voting in Models of Legislative Elections. Working Paper No. 637. California Institute of Technology.Google Scholar
Austen-Smith, David, and Banks, Jeffrey. 1987. Electoral Accountability and Incumbency. University of Rochester. Typescript.Google Scholar
Axelrod, Robert. 1970. Conflict of Interest. Chicago: Marham.Google Scholar
Calvert, Randall. 1985. Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence. American Journal of Political Science 29:69–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calvert, Randall. 1986. Models of Imperfect Information in Politics. London: Harwood Academic.Google Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Enelow, James, and Hinich, Melvin. 1984. The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Ferejohn, John and Krehbiel, Keith. 1987. Reconciliation and the Size of the Budget. American Journal of Political Science 31:296–320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greenberg, Joseph, and Weber, Shlomo. 1985. Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation. American Political Science Review 79:693–703.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greenberg, Joseph, and Shepsle, Kenneth. 1987. The Effect of Electoral Rewards in Multiparty Competition with Entry. American Political Science Review 81:525–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Inter-Parliamentary Union. 1986. Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Compendium. 2d ed. Vol. 2. London: Gower.Google Scholar
McKelvey, Richard, Ordeshook, Peter, and Winer, Mark. 1978. The Competitive Solution for n-Person Games without Transferable Utility. American Political Science Review 72:599–615.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, William. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Riker, William. 1982. The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science. American Political Science Review 76:753–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Robertson, David. 1976. A Theory of Party Competition. London: Wiley.Google Scholar
Rubinstein, Ariel. 1982. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50:97–109.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schofield, Norman. 1985. Bargaining in Weighted Majority Games, with an Application to Portfolio Distributions. California Institute of Technology. Typescript.Google Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1979. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. American Journal of Political Science 23:27–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth. 1986. The Positive Theory of Legislative Institutions: An Enrichment of Social Choice and Spatial Models. Public Choice 50:135–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sugden, Robert. 1984. Free Association and the Theory of Proportional Representation. American Political Science Review 78:31–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.