Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-tf8b9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T13:47:34.788Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Double-Edged Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentencing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 January 2021

Abram S. Barth
Abram S. Barth*
Affiliation:
Boston University School of Public Health, Boston University School of Law, Philosophy, University of Virginia
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

H.L.A. Hart has stated that certain mental conditions have an “excusing” effect on punishment, whereby “[t]he individual is not liable to punishment if at the time of his doing what would otherwise be a punishable act he is … the victim of certain types of mental disease.” The Supreme Court, however, upheld a state statute allowing for increased “punishment,” in the form of civil commitment, for sexually violent predators who suffer from a “mental abnormality.” Thus, American jurisprudence is faced with a paradoxical role of mental conditions: serving to both aggravate and mitigate sentences. This dual purpose of mental conditions becomes a pressing legal issue as mental conditions associated with brain structure or function become more detectable with the emergence of neuroimaging.

In federal capital sentencing, judges are obligated to consider aggravating and mitigating factors before imposing a death sentence. There are aggravating and mitigating factors that could be implicated by mental conditions, including future dangerousness, and impaired capacity, respectively.

Type
Article
Information
American Journal of Law & Medicine , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2007 , pp. 501 - 522
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics and Boston University 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See H. L. A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in Punishment and Responsibility 28, 28 (1968).

2 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 346 (1997).

3 The caution around the use of “punishment” arises from the Court's insistence on qualifying the commitment as “not punitive” and not implicating retribution or deterrence. Id. at 361-2. Although civil commitment is purported to be rehabilitative, its efficacy is questionable when it occurs in prison-like settings with an average of less than ten hours per week for treatment. See Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. Times, March 4, 2007, at A18-19.

4 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02 (1999) (defining a sexually violent predator as “any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.”).

5 See Kulynych, Jennifer, Comment, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1255-57 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (explaining brain-imaging techniques).

6 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)-(b) (2006).

7 See U.S. v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290, 304 (2001) (collecting cases for the proposition).

8 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (2006).

9 Grafman, J et al., Frontal Lobe Injuries, Violence, and Aggression: A Report of the Vietnam Head Injury Study, 46 Neurol. 1231, 1231 (1996).CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed But see Brower, M.C. & Price, B.H., Neuropsychiatry of Frontal Lobe Dysfunction in Violent and Criminal Behaviour: A Critical Review, 71 J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 720, 720 (2001)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed (criticizing the VHIS for not accounting for other contributory factors).

10 Grafman, supra note 9, at 1238 (“[L]esions to the prefrontal cortex would impair the ability to access and sustain … [knowledge used to control behavior]. This impairment would bias the regulation and expression of behavior away from plans … making spontaneously appearing or reactive aggressive and violent behavior more likely.”).

11 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)-(b) (2006). The federal statute also allows for the death penalty for drug offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2006); espionage, 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) & 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(1) (2006); and treason, 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006) & 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(1) (2006).

12 Amir Raz, Brain-imaging Data of ADHD, 21 Psychiatric Times 21:9 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/p040842.html.

13 Kulynych, supra note 5, at 1255.

14 Id. at 1256.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Seiden, Jessie A., The Criminal Brain: Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Evidence in Capital Proceedings, 16 Cap. Def. J. 395, 402 (2004).Google Scholar

18 Center for Neuro Skills, Frontal Lobes, TBI Resource Guide, http://www.neuroskills.com/index.shtml?main=/tbi/bfrontal.shtml (see illustration).

19 Raine, Adrian et al., Brain Abnormalities in Murderers Indicated by Positron Emission Tomography, 42 Biology & Psychiatry 495, 495 (1997).CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

20 Center for Neuro Skills, Frontal Lobes, supra note 18.

21 Ned Potter, Similar Patters Seen in Murderers’ Brains, ABC News, http://preventdisease.com/news/articles/unique_patterns_murders_brains.shtml (last visited May 16, 2007).

22 Seiden, supra note 17, at 402.

23 Michael H. Thimble, Psychopathology of Frontal Lobe Syndromes, Seminars in Neurol. 10:3 (Sept. 1990), available at http://www.ect.org/effects/lobe.html.

24 Anderson, Steven W. et al., Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefrontal Cortex, 2 Nature Neuroscience 1032, 1032 (1999).CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

25 Blair, R. J. R. & Cipolotti, L., Impaired Social Response Reversal: A Case of Acquired Sociopathy, 123 Brain 1122, 1122 (2000).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (2006).

27 Brower, supra note 9, at 723.

28 Id. at 724 (citing Raine, Adrian et al., Reduced Prefrontal and Increased Subcortical Brain Functioning Assessed Using Positron Emission Tomography in Predatory and Affective Murderers, 16 Behav. Sci. Law 319, 332 (1998)).3.0.CO;2-G>CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

29 Id.

30 Blair, supra note 25, at 1122.

31 Gasper v. Perry, No. 97-1542, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14933, at *3 (4th Cir. July 2, 1998).

32 Laura Mansnerus, Damaged Brains and the Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2001, at B9 (referring to Dr. Dorothy Otnow Lewis).

33 See supra Part II.

34 Seiden, supra note 17, at 400; Tarkka, Ina M. et al., Altered Frontal Lobe Function Suggested By Source Analysis of Event-Related Potentials In Impulsive Violent Alcoholics, 36 Alcohol & Alcoholism 323, 328 (2001), available at http://alcalc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/36/4/323.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

35 Brower, supra note 9, at 721.

36 Evidence of severe mental illness can result in a finding of no mens rea, not guilty by reason of insanity, or incompetence to stand trial. See Colb, Sherry F., Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category of Mentally Ill and Dangerous, 25 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 341, 350 (1999).Google Scholar

37 Subcommittee on Federal Death Penalty Cases of the Committee on Defender Services of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Federal Death Penalty Cases: Recommendations Concerning the Cost and Quality of Defense Representation, pt. I, § B (May 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/dpenalty/4REPORT.htm.

38 Id.

39 Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 §60002, 18 U.S.C. §§3591-3598 (2006).

40 18 U.S.C. §§ 3593(d)-(e) (2006).

41 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2006).

42 18 U.S.C.A. §3592(c)(1)-(16) (2006). The statutory list is: (1) Death during commission of another crime; (2) Previous conviction of violent felony involving firearm; (3) Previous conviction of offense for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment was authorized; (4) Previous conviction of other serious offenses; (5) Grave risk of death to additional persons; (6) Heinous, cruel, or depraved manner of committing offense; (7) Procurement of offense by payment; (8) Pecuniary gain; (9) Substantial planning and premeditation; (10) Conviction for two felony drug offenses; (11) Vulnerability of victim; (12) Conviction for serious Federal drug offenses; (13) Continuing criminal enterprise involving drug sales to minors; (14) High public officials; (15) Prior conviction of sexual assault or child molestation; (16) Multiple killings or attempted killings.

43 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (2006).

44 18 U.S.C. §§ 3593(d), 3593(e) (2006).

45 United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 298-299 (4th Cir. 2003).

46 18 U.S.C. §3593(c) (2006).

47 See United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F.Supp.2d 290, 303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (collecting cases for the proposition).

48 United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F.Supp.2d 464, 473 (E.D.Pa. 2001).

49 428 U.S. 262 (1976).

50 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983) (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976)), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2) (2006).

51 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-276.

52 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897 (quoting Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-76).

53 United States v. Sampson, 335 F.Supp.2d 166 (D. Mass. 2004).

54 Id. at 218.

55 Id. at 219 (quoting Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 463 (5th Cir. 2000)).

56 Id.

57 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

58 Id. at 592.

59 United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000).

60 Id.

61 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-594.

62 Id.

63 Flores, 210 F.3d at 464.

64 Id. at 463.

65 Bruce A. Arrigo, Introduction to Forensic Psychology 133 (2002).

66 See Brower, supra note 9, at 721.

67 Seiden, supra note 17, at 418.

68 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994).

69 United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F.Supp.2d 464, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2001).

70 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989).

71 438 U.S. 586 (1978).

72 Id. at 586.

73 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (2006).

74 United States v. Pineyro, 372 F. Supp.2d 133, 139 (D. Mass 2005).

75 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §5K2.13 (2004).

76 Id. at cmt. n.1.

77 Pineyro, 372 F. Supp.2d at 139.

78 18 U.S.C. §§ 3593(c)-(d) (2006).

79 Id.

80 Montgomery, John H. et. al., Expert Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Juror Responses, 33 J. of Am. Acad. of Psychiatry & L. 509, 517 (2005).Google ScholarPubMed

81 See Wilson v. Schomig, 234 F. Supp. 2d 851, 860 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that “[d]efendant has not demonstrated that, even if he suffers from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, he was under the influence of this disturbance when he committed the murders”).

82 Bower, Bruce, Teen Brains on Trial: The Science of Neural Development Tangles with the Juvenile Death Penalty, 165 Science News Online 19:299 (May 2004), available at http://www.sciencenews.org/articles/20040508/bob9.aspGoogle Scholar (setting the “biological age of maturity” between 21 and 26).

83 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-4 (1989).

84 Id. at 307.

85 Id. at 309.

86 Id. at 310.

87 Id. at 323.

88 Id. at 324.

89 Hood v. Cockrell, 72 Fed. Appx 171, 179 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003).

90 See Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2005); Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003); Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001).

91 See Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1218-22 (11th Cir. 2001).

92 See e.g., Martinez v. Dretke, 404 F.3d 878, 889 (5th Cir. 2005); Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 703 (5th Cir.1999).

93 U.S. Const. amend. VI.

94 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

95 Id. at 694.

96 Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354, 1364 (4th Cir.1991)).

97 See United States v. Zimmerman, 155 Fed. Appx. 821, 826 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that as “a general matter, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be brought pursuant to a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255”) (citing United States v. Daniel, 956 F.2d 540, 543 (6th Cir.1992); Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-505 (2003)).

98 Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 754-755 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that when mental health evidence is a double-edged sword, the “best course for a federal habeas court is to credit plausible strategic judgments”).

99 See, e.g., Foster v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 778-79 (5th Cir.2002) (“[A] tactical decision not to pursue and present potential mitigating evidence on the grounds that it is double-edged in nature is objectively reasonable“); Lamb v. Johnson, 179 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Informed strategic decisions of counsel are given a heavy measure of deference and will not be second guessed.“); Crane v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that trial counsel who decided that potentially mitigating evidence was more harmful than helpful could reasonably choose not to introduce same); Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 564 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that tactical decisions not to pursue and present potentially mitigating evidence on the grounds that it is double-edged in nature is objectively reasonable); Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1122 (5th Cir. 1997) (“A conscious and informed decision on trial tactics and strategy cannot be the basis for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so ill chosen that it permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness.“); Boyle v. Johnson, 93 F.3d 180, 187-88 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that an attorney's decision not to pursue a mental health defense or to present mitigating evidence concerning the defendant's possible mental illness was reasonable where counsel was concerned that such testimony would not be viewed as mitigating by the jury); Mann v. Scott, 41 F.3d 968, 984 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a tactical decision not to introduce double-edged sword mitigating evidence is entitled to great deference).

100 Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d 260, 383 (W.D. Penn. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1367 (11th Cir.1995)).

101 Id. at 382 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)).

102 Subcommittee on Federal Death Penalty Cases (1998), http://www.uscourts.gov/dpenalty/1COVER.htm (follow “Table of Contents” hyperlink; then follow “Factors Affecting the Availability, Cost and Quality of Counsel” hyperlink).

103 998 F.2d 269, 278 (5th Cir.1993).

104 Id. at 278; see also Zimmerman v. Cockrell, 2002 WL 32833097, at *7 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant with frontal lobe injury and resultant violent tendencies did not demonstrate that had the neurological evidence been presented to the jury, there would have been a “reasonable probability of a different outcome”).

105 Seiden, supra note 17, at 402-403.

106 Id. at 403.

107 Grant v. Dretke, 151 Fed. Appx. 344, 345 (5th Cir. 2005) (involving a defendant who suffered from frontal lobe dysfunction that was not manifested to counsel) (quoting Miniel v. Cockrell, 339 F.3d 331, 345 (5th Cir. 2003)).

108 Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995)).

109 See id. at 1256 (“A finding of deficient performance does not end our inquiry, however. We must also find that Caro was prejudiced by his attorney's incompetence.“).

110 Id. at 1257 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 397-398).

111 Id. at 1258 (citing Williams, 529 U.S at 398).

112 See e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 176 (2004) (noting that “prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel necessitat[es] a new trial”).

113 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(E)(1) (2006).

114 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 US 68, 83 (1985) (“[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.”).

115 James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 552 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999); Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995)).

116 Castro, 71 F.3d at 1516 (quoting Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1530 (10th Cir. 1995)).

117 See Walker v. Oklahoma, 167 F.3d 1339, 1348 (10th Cir. 1999).

118 James, 211 F.3d at 552 (citing Castro, 71 F.3d at 1513; Liles v. Saffle, 945 F.2d 333, 336 (10th Cir.1991)).

119 Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1109 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Liles, 945 F.2d at 336).

120 Id. (quoting Liles, 945 F.2d at 336).

121 United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1252 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998).

122 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish 22 (Alan Sheridan trans., Penguin Books 1991) (1977).

123 Nicholas Thompson, My Brain Made Me Do It: Breakthroughs in Neuroscience Are Changing Our Understanding of Criminal Culpability. That Worries a Leading Neuroscientist—But it Shouldn't Worry Lawyers or Judges, LEGAL AFF., JAN-FEB 2006, at 50, 53 (2006).

124 Id.

125 Brower, supra note 9, at 720 (emphasis added).

126 Id. at 725.

127 Arrigo, supra note 65, at 135.

128 Id.

129 John Monahan, Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 17 (1981).

130 Id. at 18.

131 Id. at 19.

132 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2002).

133 Id.

134 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

135 United States v. Sampson, 335 F.Supp.2d 166, 220 (D. Mass. 2004) (quoting La Fontaine, Eugenia T., Note, A Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 207, 228 (2002)).Google Scholar

136 Id. (quoting Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 2000).

137 Id.

138 Montgomery, supra note 80, at 516.

139 See discussion supra Part IV.A.

140 Montgomery, supra note 80, at 516.

141 See infra note 157 and accompanying text.

142 See infra note 154 and accompanying text.

143 See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1986) (finding civil commitment proceedings under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act “essentially civil in nature” because “the State has disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for the treatment of those it commits, and established a system under which committed persons may be released after the briefest time in confinement”).

144 Compare id. at 364 (noting the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act required that future “sexual dangerousness be proved beyond a reasonable doubt” prior to civil commitment), with Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1981) (“In Texas, capital cases require bifurcated proceedings-a guilt phase and a penalty phase. If the defendant is found guilty, a separate proceeding before the same jury is held to fix the punishment. At the penalty phase … the jury must assess the defendant's future dangerousness.“).

145 Goldstein, Joseph & Katz, Jay, Dangerousness and Mental Illness Some Observations on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 Yale L.J. 225, 229 (1960)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“Whether commitments to a mental institution be via a ‘civil’ or ‘criminal’ route their functions are substantially the same: that ‘mentally ill’ persons who evidence dangerousness to themselves or others be provided by the state with custody and care even if there is no known effective therapy or therapy is unavailable. Commitment procedures, however labeled, constitute a sanction, so far as the person confined is concerned, in the form of deprivation of liberty, at least to the extent that commitment is without regard to his ‘wishes.’”).

146 Thomas Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry, 142 (Collier Books 1963) (quoting David L. Bazelon: “The individual is confined in the hospital for the purpose of treatment, not punishment.”).

147 Bin Laden, supra note 47.

148 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (“A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a “mental illness” or “mental abnormality.”); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993) (sustaining Kentucky statute that permits commitment of “mentally retarded” or “mentally ill” and dangerous individual); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366 (1986) (sustaining Illinois statute that permits commitment of “mentally ill” and sexually dangerous individual); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cty., 309 U.S. 270, 271-72, (1940) (sustaining Minnesota statute that permits commitment of dangerous individual with “psychopathic personality”).

149 Id.

150 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the execution of juveniles to be cruel and unusual in violation of the Eigth Amendment).

151 Brief of American Medical Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14-16, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmons/ama.pdf.

152 Id. at 16 (stating that this finding was the result of brain-imaging studies).

153 Id. at 11.

154 Id. at 16 (quoting Paus, Tomas et al., Structural Maturation of Neural Pathways, Children and Adolescents: In Vivo Study, 283 SCI. 1908 (1999)).CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

155 Id. at 20.

156 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). Other possible theories of punishment include moral education, psychological rehabilitation, and restorative justice. See generally Hampton, Jean, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 Phil. & Public Aff. 208 (1984)Google Scholar.

157 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).

158 Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).

159 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 138-39 (John Ladd trans., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 2nd. ed. 1999) (1797).

160 Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and its Processes 102 (Aspen Publishers 6th ed. 2001) (quoting Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law (citation omitted)).

161 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 304 (1989).

162 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 571 (2005).

163 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976).

164 Piliavin, Irving et. al., Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice, 51 Am. Soc. Rev. 101, 115 (1986).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

165 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185.

166 Id. at 186.

167 Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)).

168 Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law 172 (1982).

169 Supra note 34.

170 Ernest S. Barratt, Impulsiveness and Aggression, in Violence and Mental Disorder 61, 75 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994).

171 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (2006).

172 Id.

173 438 U.S. 586 (1978).

174 Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).

175 Crook v. State, 813 So.2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2002).

176 Id. at 75-76.

177 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1) (2006).

178 Crook, 813 So.2d at 75.