The proliferation of international standards has triggered heated debates in recent years. From human rights to environmental protection, from the Internet to financial derivatives, from antitrust to missile technology, international standards govern some of the most important issues of our day. These standards are not legally binding, but scores of governments around the world have incorporated them wholesale in their national legal orders. The drafters of these standards are not political leaders, formal government representatives, or international organizations, but rather informal committees of ministry officials, regulators, or private experts. Labeled transnational regulatory networks, these informal bodies have puzzled legal scholars and international relations theorists. Why do states adopt these standards instead of producing their own laws? How do these new global standard setters come about, and what are their goals? Addressing these questions has been the source of both “euphoria” and “anxiety,” as a leading commentator has recognized.

Regional human rights courts in Europe and the Americas came into being in the wake of World War II. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) were established in order to adjudicate on alleged violations of the rights of individuals. Yet, since their inception these courts have also influenced other areas of international law. A part from their impact on general international law, their case law has had significant spill over effects on international criminal law, international refugee law, international environmental law, the law of armed conflicts, and the law of the sea.

At the 2010 Review Conference in Kampala, the states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) decided to adopt seven amendments to the Rome Statute that contemplate the possibility of the Court exercising jurisdiction over the crime of aggression subject to certain conditions. One condition was that the exercise of jurisdiction would be “subject to a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an amendment to the Statute,” and another was that such jurisdiction could be exercised “only with respect to crimes of aggression committed one year after the ratification or acceptance of the amendments by thirty States Parties.” As these dates approach, we—two lawyers who represented the United States at the Kampala conference and who worked many hours on the United States’ reengagement with the ICC during the Obama administration—thought it an appropriate moment to take stock of where we are, how we got here, and where we might or should be headed with respect to the crime of aggression.

At first blush, “comparative international law” might sound like an oxymoron. In principle, international law—at least when it arises from multilateral treaties or general custom—applies equally to all parties or states. As a result, international lawyers often resist emphasizing local, national, or regional approaches due to the field’s aspirations to universality and uniformity. Comparativists, meanwhile, frequently overlook the potential to apply comparative law insights to international law on the basis that “rules which are avowedly universal in character do not lend themselves to comparison.”

At the twentieth anniversary of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the WTO’s dispute settlement system is celebrated as one of the organization’s biggest achievements. Although powerful members such as China, the European Union (EU), and the United States are regularly on the losing side of WTO trade disputes, overall support for the system remains high. If anything, it has increased over time, with early criticism by civil society waning. Compare this situation to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), centered around the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). ISDS, which started in earnest around the same time that the WTO was created, is under fire not only in capital-importing countries ranging from Ecuador, Indonesia, and South Africa but also in capital-exporting nations such as Australia, Germany, and the United States. Indeed, in the ongoing EU-U.S. negotiations over a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), ISDS emerged as one of the biggest bones of contention.

To develop international law claims, it is often critical to compare different countries’ laws. This essay explores how methods drawn from comparative law and comparative politics research can help international lawyers make comparative inquiries more simply and straightforwardly.

International lawyers recognize three main sources of legal authority: treaties, custom, and general principles. Cross-national comparisons are deeply embedded in the very definitions of two of these three sources. To establish international custom, an international lawyer must show that a broad range of states consistently engage in a certain practice out of a sense of legal obligation. To establish a general principle, an international lawyer must show that it is “recognized by civilized nations”; in practice this requires that the principle be found in diverse legal families. Treaty interpretation does not necessitate cross-country comparison as a matter of definition: in theory, the text of the treaty itself could provide the requisite answers. However, in practice, international and domestic courts are typically faced with ambiguous treaty terms. To interpret them, they often turn to the jurisprudence of diverse states and to subsequent state practice, thus implicitly beginning a comparative inquiry. in sum, comparative international law is useful for identifying and applying international law, as this volume’s introduction explains.

Exigent circumstances can extinguish or suspend a wide range of legal obligations. They may empower governments to seize property or quarantine individuals. They may excuse the nonperformance of private or public contractual obligations. And, of especial interest here, they may permit governments to deviate from their obligations under treaties or customary international law (CIL).

Andy Lowenfeld, a member of the Board of Editors of this journal from 1978 to 1995, and an honorary editor thereafter, died on June 9, 2014, a few days after his eighty-fourth birthday, in New York City.

Everyone who knew him, as friend, or colleague, or student, or client, wondered at his sparkling intellect, infectious humor, imagination, and boundless curiosity. He always questioned. He never took anything for granted. He was no narrow specialist. His interests included aviation law, international economic law, private international law, public international law, and procedural law. More than any other author or practitioner in the United States, he decried “the unconvincing separation between public and private international law” and practiced what he preached.

The Russian Federation, by a municipal law act dated March 21, 2014, annexed Crimea, an area of Ukraine. This act followed armed intervention by forces of the Russian Federation, a referendum, and a declaration of independence in Crimea. Outside the context of decolonization, few claims of annexation following the use of force have been made during the United Nations era; this is the first by a permanent member of the Security Council against a United Nations member. The present article examines the annexation of Crimea in view of the legal arguments that the Russian Federation has articulated in defense of its actions. It then considers the international response and the possible consequences of nonrecognition.

For a significant period of time, the comparativist and the international lawyer were considered to inhabit different worlds: the former scrutinized similarities and differences between domestic legal systems while the latter focused on the universal realm of international law that overlays these systems. This comfortably segregated image has been conclusively shattered by numerous studies demonstrating the multiple areas of interaction between international and comparative law. of these, one of the ripest areas for further reflection is the “general principles of law” as a source of international law. Puzzlingly, given the traditional domestic law origins of the general principles of law, comparative law and methodology have rarely featured in the scholarship and jurisprudence on the general principles. Thus, the attempt of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Icty) to use the general principles as a freestanding source of international criminal law provides a particularly intriguing opportunity to study the interaction between international and comparative law.

Criticism of the Security Council tends to take one of two forms: first, that it does not act enough; and second, that it acts unwisely. Although these concerns are quite different, they both have partial causal roots in the Council’s voting process. Article 27 of the United Nations Charter provides that Council decisions on nonprocedural matters require “an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.” The ability of any of the five permanent member stove to a Council resolution makes it difficult for the Council both to act in the first place and to pass corrective resolutions when existing resolutions are criticized as problematic. Indeed, the difficulty of undoing resolutions can make Council members wary about allowing the passage of resolutions at the very outset.

The International Law Commission held its sixty-seventh session in Geneva from May 4 to June 5, and from July 6 to August 7, 2015, under the chairmanship of Narinder Singh (India). Notably, the Commission’s drafting committee completed a full set of sixteen draft conclusions on the topic of identification of customary international law, paving the way for those conclusions with commentaries to be approved by the Commission on first reading in 2016.

Public international law and comparative law have so far been regarded as largely distinct fields, with little to no overlap between them. The degree of separation between the two disciplines is rendered in particularly stark relief by the absence in practice or scholarship of any real inquiry into the relationship between comparative law on the one hand and customary international law and general principles of international law on the other. Some eminent international lawyers go so far as to claim that it would be both unnecessary and unrealistic to have recourse to comparative law in the context of the identification of customary international law and general principles of law, pointing to the case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, which, according to them, “show[s] a clear disinclination towards the use of the comparative method.”

One of the most important issues in the law of the World Trade Organization is the right of WTO members to adopt measures for nontrade purposes. In the WTO’s General Agreement. on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), this right is secured in general exceptions provisions, which permit WTO members to adopt measures to achieve certain objectives, notwithstanding any other provisions of these agreements and also, in some cases, other WTO agreements. These objectives include, most importantly, the protection of public morals, the maintenance of public order, the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health, the enforcement of certain domestic laws, and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.

International legal scholars have long recognized the importance of the rules and processes by which states adhere to international legal obligations and “translate” them into their domestic legal systems. Research by political scientists on specific issue areas likewise increasingly recognizes that domestic implementation is crucial to international law compliance and effectiveness. Yet the lack of systematic data makes it difficult to assemble an overall picture of the relationship between international law and domestic law around the world, let alone to document its evolution over time. Recent qualitative surveys of state practice have begun to fill that gap, but provide only a snapshot in time and are limited to relatively few countries. Some quantitative projects cover more countries, but address only a limited number of questions based solely on the text of national constitutions.

The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) has functioned in the Hague since 1981. To date, the Tribunal has completed its work in over thirty-nine hundred cases, making it one of the most significant claims settlement efforts in history. Remaining on the Tribunal’s docket are several very large and complex claims between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America.

On March 18, 2015, an arbitral tribunal (Tribunal) constituted in accordance with Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention) under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration handed down its award in a proceeding brought by Mauritius in 2010 challenging the United Kingdom’s establishment of a marine protected area (MPA) around the Chagos Islands in the Indian Ocean, which are claimed by Mauritius. The Tribunal held that it did not have jurisdiction under the Convention to address whether the United Kingdom or Mauritius has the rights of a coastal state regarding the Chagos Islands. Nevertheless, the Tribunal also held that, in creating the MPA by unilateral declaration, the United Kingdom had failed to take into account certain legitimate interests of Mauritius and had thereby breached its obligations under Articles 2(3), 56(2), and 194(4) of the Convention.

The International Law Commission held its sixty-sixth session in Geneva from May 5 to June 6, and from July 7 to August 8, 2014, under the chairmanship of Kirill Gevorgian (Russian Federation). Notably, the Commission revisited on second reading its work concerning the expulsion of aliens so as to finalize thirty-one draft articles, along with commentaries. The general thrust of this project has been to acknowledge the sovereign right of a state to expel an alien from its territory and to identify or propose rules—protective of the rights of the alien—that the state must follow when doing so.