Having examined the question of the casus foederìs of the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, we shall now inquire whether the use of Greek territory by the Entente Powers for the purpose of carrying on military and naval operations against their enemies and the other forcible measures resorted to against Greece were justified either by reason of rights resulting from treaties, or on account of unneutral acts or omissions of the Government of Constantine.

Before discussing the points at issue, it will be necessary to summarize seriatim the facts connected with each.

It should be remembered that from the very beginning of the present war the Entente Powers have utilized the territorial waters of some islands in the Ægean Sea which were either under the military occupation of Greece or form part of her territory, and which the Allies subsequently occupied in order to further their military enterprises against Turkey. Thus, during the autumn of the year 1914, shortly after the entrance (November 5th) of the latter Power into the war as an ally of Germany and Austria, the fleets of the Entente Powers utilized the harbors and territory of some of the islands in the vicinity of the Straits of the Dardanelles as bases for their naval and, subsequently, military operations. The islands thus used for the prosecution of the war were Tenedos, Imbros, and Lemnos, and particularly the latter, on account of its convenient and safe harbor.

The third part of the essay on the Hellenic Crisis, which has happily received a satisfactory solution, will deal with the incidents which are connected with the law of nations and inquire as to how far the European belligerents in their dealings with Greece, and the Greek Government in its relations with them, adhered to the tenets and usages of international law.

The points to be here discussed are of a manifold character.

First, it will be examined whether the serious charge made by the Entente Powers against Constantine, the ex-King of the Hellenes, that he violated the obligations arising out of the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia, by which the two states bound themselves to assist each other for the defense of their respective territories in case of attack by a third Power, and particularly by Bulgaria, is well founded according to the letter and spirit of the instrument of alliance.

Secondly, whether the military occupation of portions of the territory of the Hellenic Kingdom by both sets of belligerents, the seizure of its war material and other public property, and particularly the coercive measures employed by the Entente Powers against the Government and people of Greece and their forcible intervention in the internal affairs of that country, can be justified either by reason of treaty stipulations or on account of the unneutral conduct of the then King and his government towards the Entente Allies. The first point to be examined is the obligation arising out of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia.

The shade of distinction sought to be shown by the title of this paper may require explanation. Imperfect wording involves either carelessness or ignorance; bad faith indicates dishonesty; nonexecution or disregard implies laxness in the government, if not carelessness; adverse or hostile municipal or judicial action connotes lack of coordination between the internal and external affairs of the State. It follows that such adverse action may be considered from a practical point of view as almost a normal kind of violence against international contracts. It is not to be excused on that account, but it may be considered as a frictional incident almost inseparable under some conditions from the existence of a State. Given either a government of definitely separated elements, such as the United States, or a government without much stability, or a State founded on a type of civilization different from the European order, and this sort of violation of treaty may be forecasted with certainty. Fortunately, however, the instances that cause contractual friction of this sort are of the grosser kinds of personal violence, or are commercial; they are not of a political character, cannot be said to involve policy, and only by a stretch of the imagination involve the tweedledum and tweedledee of international relations, “national honor and vital interest.” They are consequently extremely susceptible to simple and orderly solution.