In theory, we may envisage five principal types of national arms policy,reflecting as many policy objectives:

(1) Arming to obtain the greatest possible weapons preponderance on the assumption that armed conflict is imminent. This policy of amassing military forces without regard for its effect on the other side results in an unrestrained arms race.

(2) Arming to deter. The idea of deterrence is familiar to lawyers since it figures so prominently in criminal law. According to Schelling, deterrence as a strategic concept “is concerned with influencing the choices that another party will make, and doing it by influencing his expectations of how we will behave.” Deterrence “requires that there be both conflict and common interest between the parties involved; it is as inapplicable to a situation of pure and complete antagonism of interest as it is to the case of pure and complete common interest.”

(3) Arms control. This policy envisages measures that aim at reducing the danger of war and at slowing down the arms race. Such measures may or may not involve actual restrictions upon military activities or reduction of armaments.

(4) Comprehensive, reciprocal disarmament (“general and complete disarmament”), usually seen as a scheme “embodied in a single grand treaty leading by stages from less to more drastic and radical measures.” In the final stage, the capabilities of national forces are reduced to those required for internal security only and a centralized international machinery is charged with peacekeeping.

(5) Unilateral disarmament, a concept that is self-explanatory.

Recent events in the international monetary system culminating in the decision of the United States, announced on August 15, 1971, to suspend the convertibility of the dollar induce the international lawyer to ask once again what contribution sanctions can make to respect for international law and the effectiveness of multilateral treaties. This question has been a practical problem at two stages in the development of the International Monetary Fund. It arose first during the negotiation and drafting of the original Articles of Agreement which were adopted at the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944. The second stage was the negotiation and drafting of the amendment of July 28, 1969, which dealt mainly with the legal structure of special drawing rights as a supplement to existing reserve assets. It is now apparent that there will be a third stage, in which a reform of the international monetary system, perhaps in some of its most fundamental aspects, will lead to a further amendment of the Fund's charter.

The stagnation in the functioning of the International Court of Justice is only one of several indicators of the neglect by Members of the United Nations of the development and modernization of adjective law. There has been gratifying progress in the codification and progressive development of substantive law through the International Law Commission and other bodies, but substantive law without an adequate adjective law is bound to lack in effectiveness and uniform and predictable application.

Few propositions about international law have enjoyed more support than the proposition that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force by way of reprisals is illegal. Although, indeed, the words “reprisals” and “retaliation ” are not to be found in the Charter, this proposition was generally regarded by writers2 and by the Security Council as the logical and necessary consequence of the prohibition of force in Article 2(4), the injunction to settle disputes peacefully in Article 2(3) and the limiting of permissible force by states to self-defense. The U.N. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) on October 24, 1970, contains the following categorical statement: “States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.”

In an era of expanding interest in international environmental problems,1 it is essential to examine the rapidly developing state practice concerning man's startling capability, through the use of technology without any hostile intent, adversely to alter not just the immediate environment of his neighbor but common resources shared by all. The present discussion does not attempt to deal with the practice of all states, but rather considers the extent to which legally relevant expectations of restraint, are being shaped by United States practice concerning the use of novel technology in the res communis? The focus on United States practice reflects the belief that, within the confines of a law journal article, considerable light may be shed on world community expectations by an examination of the practice of a state which has a major interest in the field and which is a significant participant in the international law-creating process.

Signs of inadequacy and crisis in general international law as to the economic ownership interests of aliens have been numerous since World War II. The pages o f the J ournal have recorded and analyzed a number of situations in which the existing legal order is not working well: ineffectual resorts to international adjudication; unilateral disregard of arbitral commitments; national decisions made in the name of international law but of dubious international acceptability; professional frustrations so intense as to have directed prime attention to happenstantial “salvage” operations. In a phase now apparently ended, groups in capital exporting countries have tried time after time to put forward normative formulations of investment codes as new positive law, only to have their efforts ignored in developing countries. Now we seem to be in a new phase, one in which direct investment-receiving, or host, countries, organized into groups or regional arrangements, compact among themselves that a comprehensive normative system shall prevail in each of them as to the legal relationships between foreign investors and each of those countries. Although foreign investment codes for particular states, including systems of prior restraints on entry in some developed countries, are not new, the Andean Foreign Investment Code is, indeed, a new juristic phenomenon. The Editors of the Journal have wished, therefore, to record and analyze preliminarily this new development in transnational investment law, one whose text has been carried in International Legal Materials and considered as to its possible impact in Research Panels organized by the American Society of International Law.

Public concern over the environmental crisis has begun to stimulate not only action on the local and national level but also proposals for new international efforts, mobilized especially by current preparations for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment scheduled to be held at Stockholm in June, 1972.1 Some of these proposals are being presented in the form of draft conventions, such as the Draft Convention on Conservation of the World Heritage, prepared by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN),2 and the Draft Convention for the Regulation of Transportation for Ocean Dumping, prepared by a U.N. inter-governmental working group on marine pollution.

It is seemingly easier to evoke aggression than to dispel it, and easier to commit aggression than to define it. What has been universally condemned as “the gravest of all crimes against peace and security throughout the world ” has yet to be consensually particularized. On the eve of its hundredth meeting, the U.N. Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, the fourth United Nations body to deal with the topic since 1952, adjourned without having carried out its instructions. It did conclude by irresolute acclamation that progress had been made and that it should continue its work in 1973. Despite the semblance of unanimity, both points were not free from doubt. Defining aggression has perplexed legal scholars for nearly half a century. Those who are dedicated to the rule of law and to a rational system of conflict management may wish to consider some of the current disputations aS well as the expectations and requirements of the days or years to come.

The following inquiry into the internal conflict in East Pakistan suggests that under special circumstances a claim to self-determination, even in a non–colonial setting, may be valid under international law. Although the inherent difficulty is realized in (1) defining self-determination and (2) laying down the precise guidelines for a decision-maker to determine “special” nature of the circumstances, nonetheless it is submitted that a contextual analysis of the East Pakistani conflict, which follows here, demonstrates that at this stage a tentative set of criteria can and should be developed to resolve the conflicting claims revolving around the principles of “territorial integrity,” “self-determination,” and “non-intervention.”

“Secrecy of the deliberation,” a term of art used widely in court procedure, is neither a universal principle nor one with a single meaning. Continuing an old Germanic tradition, courts in some Swiss cantons, as well as the Federal Court in Lausanne, deliberate in the presence of the parties. In most of the Western world, including the common law countries, Latin mAmerica, and Scandinavia, the principle of secret deliberations is accepted but does not cover the vote, that is, the position taken byeach judge. In all six Common Market states, however, the vote is secret and the individual judge is under an obligation not to reveal his position. Originally adopted under the regime of absolute government to protect the independence of the judge, this extended secrecy has come under attack recently, especially when applied to constitutional litigation. Legislation enacted in the German Federal Republic in December, 1970, giving members ofthe Federal Constitutional Court the right to reveal their vote, may be the precursor of changes in this matter.

The sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by Styx missiles from a naval platform during the 1967 hostilities between Israel and the United Arab Republic demonstrated that missile technology was sufficiently developed for this weapon to be effectively deployed. The appearance of the missile in naval armament has raised old questions of international law in a new form, and it seems appropriate that they should be discussed as an aspect of the search for a system of legal controls to limit the use of the sea for strategic and political purposes. The aim of this paper is to examine the question of protection of the innocent from injury both inside and outside the target area, and in times of war and local, limited hostilities.

It is widely agreed that Professor McDougal's impressive intellectual achievements can be traced, in part, to his efforts to expand the use of concepts and conclusions from the social sciences in the analysis of legal issues, especially in the realm of international law. Nevertheless, his concern with the links between the development of a policy-oriented jurisprudence on the one hand and the use of findings from the social sciences in legal analysis on the other has often led to confusion among his supporters and his opponents alike. Accordingly, my purpose in this essay is to examine critically this element of McDougal's thinking1 in the hopes of reaching a clearer understanding both of McDougal's contributions to the study of international law and of the relationship between legal analysis and the social sciences in general.2

The Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), contains a veritable tour d’horizon of contemporary international law and of the law of international organizations. It ranges over provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and over many articles of the Charter of the United Nations.

No recent issue has so divided lawyers and writers in the field of international law as the question whether courts of one nation should sit in judgment on the acts of other nations with respect to foreign held property—sometimes, always, or never. The United States Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cubav. Sabbatinosaid the answer was never—or at least hardly ever—thus upholding and reaffirming the “act of state doctrine”. The Congress in the Hickenlooper (or Sabbatino) Amendmentmade an effort to reverse that ruling, an effort that has proved largely unsuccessful. Now the State Department has taken its turn, arguing in a formal communication to the Supreme Court that when it perceives no objection to adjudication on foreign policy grounds, the courts should judge the validity of the foreign nation's acts under international law standards—at least as to counterclaims.

It may appear ungracious to respond questioningly to an appraisal so extensive and generous as that offered by Professor Young. The intellectual issues his statement raises transcend, however, ordinary considerations of reciprocal graciousness and generosity: innocent bystanders might be confused and misled. Professor Young purports to criticize our recommended policy-oriented jurisprudence without making explicit his own jurisprudence or the premises and assumptions which underlie his criticisms. Many of the difficulties and obscurities he finds in our work would appear to derive either from the inherent difficulties of inquiry and decision or from obscurities and incomplete notions in his own framework of inquiry. His conceptions, in particular, of “law,” “international law,” “world public order,” “values and norms,” “jurisprudence,” and “social science” are less than clear. We briefly illustrate

The nature, form and utility of conventional commitments which states make to other states concerning international law continue to invite consideration by foreign offices and by students of this law. Recent formulation of rules concerning treaties provides instructive reminder of the need for clarifying to the greatest extent that is practicable the nature, form and utility of public international commitments. One purpose of a conventional agreement may be to commit the party states to act in accordance with the standard which is international law. Recent United States practice reveals relatively frequent resort to this method.