The recent appearance of the Austrian Red Book and Servian Blue Book completes the history of the breaking out of the war, as told in the official diplomatic correspondence of the belligerent nations, so far as they have seen fit to make this correspondence public.

It is the purpose of this article to attempt to summarize the story told by this correspondence, and at the same time to indicate the conclusions which in the opinion of the writer may properly be drawn therefrom, with respect to the immediate causes of the war. The dispatches are so numerous, and the action they record was crowded into such a short space of time that it is difficult to keep this summary within reasonable limits. And this difficulty is increased by the fact that those who sympathize with the viewpoint of the belligerents on the one side or the other, are apt to differ radically as to which parts of the correspondence are important, therefore making it necessary for anyone desirous of summarizing the documents in a way to afford a basis for a fair consideration of the arguments advanced on either side, to go into the correspondence much more fully than would be necessary if there were a greater agreement as to the relative importance of the issues which it presents. It will be the effort of the writer, while confining himself—with such exceptions as are specifically noted—strictly to the diplomatic correspondence, to set out impartially the portions of the correspondence especially emphasized, on the one side and on the other, with full references to the original documents. If he is successful in this, his readers can be relied on to correct any errors in his comments and conclusions.

In discussing the relations between the United States and Porto Rico it would seem proper to state at the outset that prior to the Spanish-American War, which may be regarded as the starting point in these relations, they were, so to speak, non-existent, at least in a juridical sense. Before the war, Porto Rico was a Spanish province and as such had no political personality of its own outside of the Spanish dominion and, therefore, it could not as a political entity be regarded as standing in any other relation in respect to the United States than as an inseparable part of Spain, between which country and the United States there existed the relation of one sovereign country in respect to another sovereign country.

Balloons have been employed for more than a century for purposes of observation, signalling, transmission of dispatches and as a means of escape from besieged places. During the siege of Venice in 1849, two hundred small balloons charged with explosives were directed against the city, though without success. As is well known, they played an important part in the siege of Paris in 1870, and were employed by the Japanese in the battle of Liao-Yang in 1904. Aeroplanes, as contradistinguished from balloons, were employed in the recent Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars, though mainly for purposes of observation and signalling, transportation of dispatches and the location of mines. In the present war they are being used for the first time on an extensive scale for the purpose of dropping bombs on towns and cities of the enemy, and with so much effectiveness that Tennyson’s vision seems almost on the point of realization when he

Heard the heavens fill with shouting and there rained a ghastly dew

From the nations’ airy navies grappling in the central blue.

With the possible exception of the violation of Belgian neutrality, no acts have provoked wider criticism than the burning of Louvain with its university, its cathedral, its library, including its books, manuscripts and scientific collections, the partial destruction of the cathedrals of Rhcims and Soissons, the alleged “massacre” at Aerschot, the “sacking” of Senlis, including the partial destruction of its cathedral, and the “atrocities” at Linsmeau, Termonde and Orsmael. The British Prime Minister, in his Guildhall speech of September 4th, characterized the burning of Louvain as “the greatest crime committed against civilization and culture since the Thirty Years War—a shameless holocaust of irreparable treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance.” Sir Frederick Pollock also declared that “it exceeded in horror and calculated wickedness any military crime committed since the Thirty Years War.” The London Times denounced it as “an atrocious act without a parallel even in the Dark Ages and one which would turn the hands of every civilized nation against the Germans.” These expressions fairly represent the opinion of the English and, to a large degree, the American public in regard to the character of the act.

Any attempt to discuss the international responsibility of the State for injuries sustained by private individuals in time of war immediately encounters the difficulty of establishing any definite rules in the practice of awarding indemnities or compensation for private losses arising out of war. Nevertheless, an examination of the subject in the light of precedent and principle may not be without some useful results.

In a general way, this responsibility of the State may be measured by the State’s obligation as a belligerent or a neutral to observe the rules of international law and of war. As it is obviously, however, beyond present possibilities to undertake a detailed review of these rules—which indeed have been ably treated in numerous works on the subject—the discussion here will be confined to the more important classes of cases in which pecuniary claims have been or are likely to be brought for injuries sustained by individuals or private property in time of war.