International lawyers should help our political leaders, die media, and the electorate appreciate more adequately the implications for international law and order of the United States-led invasion of Iraq and its nearest precedent, the Kosovo intervention. At this point, mid-2003, those implications remain unclear.

Addressing accountability for human rights atrocities takes on particular significance in postconflict situations. To the extent that mechanisms for accountability facilitate the pursuit of justice against individual perpetrators, the reform of institutions staffed by perpetrators, and the initiation of reconciliation processes, identifying those who committed atrocities is a fundamental aspect of a peacekeeping mission.

The international community has established tribunals to try those who committed atrocities and will not be tried in domestic courts. Such tribunals, however, limit the scope of prosecutions to high-ranking officials, and do not command sufficient resources to pursue the multitude of individuals who participated in atrocities. Domestic courts have jurisdiction to try individuals who participated in atrocities, but judicial systems in postconflict. countries find themselves in disarray and generally unable to cope with sensitive cases, because of both the subject matter and the potential number of cases.

During 2002, countries from all regions, especially Africa, resorted to the International Court of Justice; only one of the Court's 2002 judgments involved an OECD countiy. The Court's work during the year also shows the continued importance of boundary issues for states and for the Court.

The Court again completed a substantial program of work, resolving three cases with final judgments. In February, it triggered substantial controversy by finding that a Belgian court's warrant for the arrest of the then foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“Congo”) violated international law. In October, it resolved a complex of boundary disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria, although by year-end Nigeria had not yet implemented the Court's key requirement—withdrawal from the Bakassi Peninsula. In December, comparing sparse effectivités, it concluded that Malaysia, and not Indonesia, had sovereignty over two small disputed islands.

What impact will the Iraq war of 2003 have on international law governing the use of force and on the future of the United Nations Security Council? Some commentators have proclaimed that the military intervention led by the United States amounted to the “death” of the UN Charter and the end of “the grand attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of law.” The Security Council’s failure to reach agreement—in die face of French-U.S. antagonisms—spells the end, they argue, of an effective Council role in addressing major threats to peace and security. My own view is that it is premature to pronounce the “death” of the UN Charter or to give up on future prospects for Security Council agreement on the use of force. We are, nevertheless, at a difficult and precarious transitional moment in the international legal system governing the use of force, and the stark tensions reflected in the differences over Iraq are symptomatic of hard problems that may persist for the foreseeable future. Both the rules and the system need refining and reform. Success in doing so will require imagination and much greater willingness by policy makers to consider law’s potential role, not as a barrier to necessary action, but as a means to enhance global security in the face of emerging threats. In seeking such reform, it will be important to build upon the realism of the Charter’s founders, who combined rules governing the use of force with a clear commitment to credible enforcement action in response to threats to peace and security.

The fifty-eighth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights opened with the United States in an observer seat for the first time ever. The Commission ultimately adopted ninety-two resolutions and eighteen decisions, thirty-nine of which were adopted by roll-call vote. Subsequently, at its July 2002 session, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC, the parent body of the Commission) approved nearly all of the Commission's decisions by similar votes. The United States was also reelected to the Commission for its fiftyninth session during a separate ECOSOC meeting.

The debate during the Commission's deliberations was more chaotic and fractious than in prior years, reflecting the membership of an increased number of repressive governments that sought to block international scrutiny of their human rights practices.

Goodwin v. United Kingdom. App. No. 28957/95. At <http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm>.

European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, July 11, 2002.

I. v. United Kingdom. App. No. 25680/94. At <http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm>. European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, July 11, 2002.

Under English law, people may change their names and use those new names for official purposes. At the same time, specified biological criteria determine the sex of individuals under the law for various purposes, including marriage and retirement pensions. In Goodwin v. United Kingdom and I. v. United Kingdom, the question presented was whether such biological criteria impermissibly operate to the prejudice of postoperative transsexuals. The grand chamber of the European Court of Human Rights unanimously concluded that the practice of restricting gender in national law to the one registered at birth infringed both the right to respect for private life and the right to marry, contrary to the guarantees of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.