By a joint resolution passed on April 30 Congress reënacted, with modifications in some cases, and made permanent the essential provisions of the temporary resolution of August 31,1935 (as amended February 29,1936), which by its own terms expired on May 1, 1937. With the exception of the new Section 6 dealing with restrictions on the exportation and transportation of commodities other than arms, ammunition and implements of war, the duration of which by its own terms is limited to two years, the present resolution is therefore intended to lay down a permanent neutrality policy for the United States.

Few problems raised by the Spanish civil war are more interesting than those growing out of the fact that a state of war, in the legal sense, does not exist; belligerent rights have been accorded to neither of the contestants by third Powers. Consequently, on January 8 of this year, Germany turned over to the rebel authorities two Spanish loyalist vessels captured in retaliation to an “act of piracy”—an indictment earned by the loyalist government for its seizure of the German freighter, Palos. One may feel justifiably surprised that a government almost universally recognized as legitimate can be charged with piratical activities. Further reflection reveals that the Spanish situation presents many more questions concerning the rights and duties of the contestants as against third parties. In the absence of the recognition of belligerency, what are the rights of loyalist and rebel ships on the high seas? In the territorial waters of Spain? May the fascist or socialistic factions establish blockades? What are the powers and validity of their prize courts? Who is answerable for the illegal acts of the rebels should they lose—or be victorious? What claims will the Spanish Government have as against third Powers should one or the other prove successful? May the loyalist authorities by simple decree close to neutral trade the ports held by the insurgents? Moreover, how would all of these matters be affected if the maritime Powers of the world were to recognize the existence of a state of war, i.e., belligerency, in Spain? And, finally, in view of the magnitude and duration of the struggle, is there any justification for withholding such recognition?

A difference of opinion of more than usual interest has recently developed with regard to the composition of the International Commission of the Danube. The question at issue turns upon the interpretation of certain articles of the Treaty of Versailles in the light of the important constitutional changes which have occurred within Germany since 1919. Under the Treaty of Versailles, the International Commission was to include “two representatives of German riparian States,” in addition to representatives of the other riparian and certain non-riparian States. Since the signature of the Treaty, there has been a gradual redistribution of powers within Germany, culminating in 1934 when the sovereign powers of the German states were transferred to the Reich. When the German representatives at the session of the International Commission in December, 1934, presented full powers issued in the name of the Reich alone, their eligibility was challenged, and they were allowed to take their seats only under a modus vivendi pending settlement of the issue. At the request of the British and French Governments, in which other States represented on the International Commission subsequently joined, the dispute was referred to the League of Nations Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit.

There are estimated to be 2,077,000,000 people now alive at a given moment on the 51,104,000 square miles of the continents, subcontinents and islands which constitute the earth’s inhabited land surface. They make extensive use of the 144,478,000 square miles of the world’s water area. Within the past century the living generations have come to control the entire surface of the earth with substantial completeness through the mechanisms of society which they have created; but they do not even yet utilize its land areas fully.

The protection of unhampered and free exercise of the diplomatic function was recognized as one of the fundamental purposes of the law of diplomatic immunity in the Havana Convention of 1928, and in the Draft Convention of the Harvard Research Committee, 1932. The idea is not a new one—it has long been considered necessary that the channels of intercourse between States be made secure. Even before the political institutions of man began to play an important role in the life of peoples, nations or tribes recognized that it was necessary to treat with each other and guarantee security to messengers in order to advance their mutual interests. The history of the juristic philosophy of diplomatic immunity indicates that there are three periods of development in which the protection of the diplomatic function was deemed to be the purpose of the law, viz., (a) in antiquity, particularly in the universal law of Greece and Rome; (b) in the philosophy of the law-of-nature school, from the twelfth century to the seventeenth; (c) in the precedents of the modern Statessystem and the views of positivist writers, especially since the seventeenth century