In a parable drawn from The Trial, Franz Kafka once etched the following chilling profile:

On November 29 and 30, 1971, Iran occupied three islands, which were nominally under British protection, in the Persian Gulf. As a result of Britain’s failure to prevent the occupation, the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, on December 7, 1971, announced the nationalization of all of the interests and properties in Libya of BP Exploration Company (Libya) Limited (BP), a subsidiary of British Petroleum Company Limited. On September 1, 1973, on the fourth anniversary of the military takeover of Libya led by Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Government of Libya announced the nationalization of 51 percent of the interests and properties in Libya of nine international oil companies. Approximately 5½ months later, on February 11, 1974, on the eve of the opening of the Washington conference of major oil-importing nations, the Government of Libya announced the nationalization of the remaining 49 percent of the interests and properties in Libya of three of those nine companies: Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company (TOPCO), a subsidiary of Texaco Inc.; California Asiatic Oil Company (CALASIATIC), a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company of California; and the Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO), a subsidiary of Atlantic Richfield Company.

The continuous stream of resolutions of the UN General Assembly and much academic writing on the subject notwithstanding, the present state of customary international law regarding expropriation of alien property has remained obscure in its basic aspects; this is true in particular for expropriations in the context of North-South (still better described as “West-South”) relations, to which this article is primarily, but not exclusively, addressed. International courts have had no occasion to rule on fundamental issues of expropriation law in the past decades, even though these issues have been relevant to various disputes settled out of court. Eventually, however, the courts will be confronted with cases involving expropriation of alien property: given the continuing and rising importance of foreign investment, the parties involved probably will not invariably prefer negotiated settlements. It must also be recalled here that customary law has occasionally served as a reference standard in treaties and contracts. If an expropriation case were brought before an international tribunal, it could not simply rule that the law governing expropriation of alien property is in dispute and therefore no law at all is applicable. The very notion of international law precludes an argument that acknowledges the existence of “gray areas” in that law: a court could not rule that some law exists, but that it cannot be identified by judicial means.

The United States and Canada agreed, by the Boundary Settlement Treaty of March 29, 1979, to submit their decade-long dispute over the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine area to a Chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to an ad hoc court of arbitration. The treaty, however, has not yet taken effect because the interrelated Fisheries Agreement, which was concluded on the same day and was to take effect simultaneously, was Unilaterally scrapped by the United States Government on March 6, 1981, on grounds of its allegedly unfair and inflexible provisions. On April 29, the United States Senate unanimously adopted a resolution supporting the Government's position to delink the two treaties and to settle the maritime boundary problem first by a third-party procedure. Whether or not a new fisheries agreement is concluded in the near future, it is expected that the maritime boundary dispute will ultimately be resolved by binding third-party settlement. The purpose of this article is to examine the legal position taken by each Government regarding the maritime boundary issues, and to suggest equitable principles that should govern their resolution.

At its session that ended in December 1980, the United Nations considered a subject that had been allowed to lie dormant for over a quarter of a century. It was first taken up in 1946, after President Truman called for the reaffirmation of “the principles of the Niirnberg Charter in the context of a general codification of offenses against the peace and security of mankind.” The General Assembly responded promptly by passing three resolutions in rapid succession on December 11, 1946, which created a Committee for the Progressive Development of International Law and its Codification, affirmed the Nuremberg principles, and declared that genocide was an international crime. The International Law Commission (ILC) was charged with preparing the desired Code of Offences after its establishment in 1947. Yet, 34 years after the General Assembly’s call for action, the refrain was still being heard: “The time is not yet ripe.” The question likely to face the United Nations when it reconvenes in 1981 will be: “If not now, when?”