Various changes in the organization of the Permanent Court of International Justice, particularly in the arrangements for its sessions, were envisaged in the amendments to the Statute of the Court annexed to the Protocol for the Revision of the Statute, of September 14, 1929. This protocol failed to come into force in September, 1930, as planned. While it may yet come into force, that event may be postponed for several years. It would seem to require ratification by each of the forty-five states which have ratified the Protocol of Signature of December 16, 1920, as well as ratification by the United States of America. Only thirty-five states members of the League of Nations have now (May 1, 1931) ratified the protocol of September 14, 1929, and it may prove to be a difficult task to persuade the remaining eleven states to ratify promptly. Meanwhile, it has seemed desirable that the court itself should revise its rules in the direction of some of the changes which would have been effected by the amendments to the statute.

The announcement on November 4, 1929, that Great Britain intended to recommend Iraq for admission to membership in the League of Nations in 1932 has presented some interesting constitutional questions to the Permanent Mandates Commission, as well as the unusual spectacle of a great Power seeking to convince a skeptical outside body that its dependency is ripe for independence. Heretofore, dependencies that wanted independence have usually had to fight for it, as did the United States, the Latin American States, Belgium, and the various successors to the Ottoman, Romanoff and Hapsburg Empires. It is true, Colombia and Panama, Sweden and Norway, Denmark and Iceland have separated without war but with some heartburnings. British statesmen experienced in the loss of colonies by violence, talked freely in the mid-nineteenth century of the natural destiny of colonies to drop from the mother tree when ripe, and in the twentieth century they have acquiesced in a status of virtual independence for the dominions, soon to include India. They have rationalized this “ climbing process” as one “ common to all the communities which form part of the Empire. Each of them, whether the population is predominantly white or predominantly colored, is gradually, as it develops in strength and capacity, passing upward from the stage in which the community is wholly subject to control exercised from London to that in which the measure of control diminishes, and so on to that in which the control has ceased entirely.”But this was after the event. Before it, history records military episodes in Ireland, India, South Africa, and even Canada.

We are witnessing today a remarkable evolution toward organized international justice. Such an evolution is inevitable in any permanent society of states, just as much as the growth of law and the establishment of organs of justice are inevitable in any lasting society of individuals. Our immediate and pressing interest in relation to this great development of international justice is this: What should be the r61e of our country? Shall the United States, faithful to the liberal arbitration policy which characterized her earlier history, adopt obligatory arbitration for the peaceful settlement of international disputes? This question may soon be determined when the Senate comes to consider the new Pan American Arbitration Treaty.

The shaping of agreements which are to impose new obligations upon states requires regard for political experience as well as high technical skill. The record of past effort seems to show that this is particularly true of treaties for pacific settlement. Among the problems incident to the construction of treaties for the arbitral settlement of future disputes, perhaps none is more central than that of the form in which the right actually to initiate arbitral proceedings is set forth. It is obvious that academic schemes which would disregard the dignity of public entities and suddenly abolish the distinction between states and individuals as parties litigant, leave much to be desired. On the other hand, the object of a treaty may be defeated by subtle preservatives of the full freedom of ction by the parties, or by what has been called a “misguided passion for juristic definition” on the part of draftsmen. It has long been recognized that unless the part of a general agreement covering the method of referring disputes is adequate, a strict construction of the instrument may leave it little more than the expression of a noble wish. Evasion or frank disregard may easily follow.

The Statute and Rules of the Permanent Court of International Justice are only remotely analogous to the detailed codes of civil procedure with which lawyers practising before municipal courts are familiar. The instruments governing the procedure of the Permanent Court are sketch maps rather than meticulously detailed charts for the procedural voyage. Nor is the body of tradition of international arbitral procedure sufficiently developed to furnish reliable guides in all circumstances. Of necessity, the practice of the court must develop out of the cases which come before it. The method of growth of its procedural law finds typical illustration in the question of the treatment, and, in particular of the amendment, of the conclusions of the parties.

The complaint regarding damages in the State of Washington, caused by fumes from the smelter of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Trail, British Columbia, was referred to the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, on August 7,1928, for investigation, report and recommendation pursuant to Article 9 of the treaty of January 11, 1909, between the United States and Great Britain.

It is unnecessary to give any detailed consideration to the generalities of writers on international law who have repeatedly stated that consular officers are entitled to special protection.In the instant case the special protection is concerned with a situation in which there was a threat against the personal safety of the consul, an explicit warning of imminent danger promptly communicated by him to the proper authorities, some assurances of special protection were received by him upon which he was warranted to rely, but no such protection was given.

An error of fact in the compromis should not be an obstacle to the examination by the Arbitral Tribunal of all the different phases cf the case in accordance with the presumed intentions of the parties.