Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2017
We are witnessing today a remarkable evolution toward organized international justice. Such an evolution is inevitable in any permanent society of states, just as much as the growth of law and the establishment of organs of justice are inevitable in any lasting society of individuals. Our immediate and pressing interest in relation to this great development of international justice is this: What should be the r61e of our country? Shall the United States, faithful to the liberal arbitration policy which characterized her earlier history, adopt obligatory arbitration for the peaceful settlement of international disputes? This question may soon be determined when the Senate comes to consider the new Pan American Arbitration Treaty.
1 Hereafter mentioned as the Pan American Arbitration Treaty.
2 Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Sixth International Conference of American States, Washington, 1928, p. 20 el seq.
3 Ralston, J. H., International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno, 1929, pp. 46, 240-245;Google Scholar Politis, N. S., La Justice International, 1924, pp. 139-155.Google Scholar
4 Report, supra, p. 26, Sec. 1.
5 Ibid., p. 26, Sec. 2.
6 Proceedings of the International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration, 1929, pp. 653 and 675.
7 U. S. Treaty Series No. 780.
8 The acceptance by Great Britain of the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice is striking proof of the present trend toward obligatory arbitration.
9 General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, this Journal, Supplement,Vol. 23, April, 1929, pp. >82-90, Art. 1.
10 General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, this JOURNAL, Supplement, Vol.23, April, 1929, pp. 82-90, Art. 1.
11 Institut de Droit International, Annuaire (hereafter referred to as “Annuaire”), 1922, Vol. 29, p. 23 et seq.
12 For discussion of the pre-war use of the term “vital interests.” etc., see Wehberg, H.,“Restrictive Clauses in International Arbitration Treaties,” this Journal, 1913, Vol. 7, p. 308 et seq.; Google Scholaralso Cavalcanti, A.,“Restrictive Clauses in International Arbitration Treaties,” ibid., 1914, Vol. 8, pp. 726-728.Google Scholar For a later view, see Hill, N. H., “International Jurisdiction and Domestic Questions,” Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly, 1929, Vol. 10, p. 22.Google Scholar
13 Article 1.
14 funk, and Wagnall's, , New Standard Dictionary, 1923. According to the New English Dictionary (Oxford), Vol. 5, 1901, “justiciable” means “liable to be tried in a court of justice; subject to jurisdiction.”Google Scholar
15 Fenwick, C. G., “The Distinction between Legal and Political Questions,” American Society of International Law Proceedings (hereafter cited as “Proceedings”), 1924, p. 45.Google Scholar
16 Annuaire, supra, p. 26.
17 Ralston, , op. cit., p. 31 et seq.; also his article “How Fundamental International Law Is to Be Discovered,” American Law Review, 1922, Vol. 56,p. 236 et seq.Google Scholar
18 Garner, J. W., Proceedings,supra, p. 74.Google Scholar
19 Annuaire, supra, p. 258. The quotation is a part of the final resolution of the Institut on the matter of the classification of justiciable disputes.
20 See the remarks of Kingsbury, H. T., et al., Proceedings, supra, p. 134 et seq.) Decamps, Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proèms Verbaux of the proceedings of the committee, 1920, pp. 46-48.Google Scholar
21 Brown, P. M., Proceedings, supra, p. 136. (See also his article “The Classification of Justiciable Disputes,” this JOURNAL, 1922, Vol. 16, p. 256.) This authority asserts that the Permanent Court of International Justice should confine itself strictly to matters of law. J. B. Scott, ibid., p. 140, thinks that if judges are allowed to decide questions ex aequo et bono, a confusion regarding their functions is likely to result. Google Scholar Jelf, E. A., “Justiciable Disputes,” Grotius Society Transactions, 1921, Vol. 7, p. 66, says: “No dispute is justiciable in/which the claimant can appeal to nothing but morality.” (Also ibid., 1922, Vol. 8, p. 67.)Google Scholar
22 Annuaire,supra, p.31: “La notion du conflit politique est essentiettement relative. . . . Elle est conditionke par les progrès de la légalité, comme par la nature des rapports établis entre les états en litige.” And see p.32: “Elle est sousifaite à la justice parce qu'il s'agit d'un do-maine ou la notion des droits et des devoirs des états n'a pas encore pénetrée.”
23 Giraud, E., “De la Valeur et des Rapports des Notions de Droit et de Politique dans l'Ordre International,” Revue Générale de Droit International Publique, 1922, Vol. 29, p. 502.Google Scholar
24 Annuaire, supra, p. 25 et seq., esp. p. 34. The test suggested is thatjusticiable disputes be classified according to the degree of objectivitywith which a state can regard the several problems presented by international law. It is apt to be great when there is a well-established rule on the matter in question, but it is small when the only solution is a compromise of interests.
25 Ibid., p. 259. If any state objected to the jurisdiction of the court,the latter was to be obliged to uphold, by a three-fourths majority, its right to decide the controversy in question before proceeding to examine it upon the merits.
26 Ibid., pp. 25 and 30.
27 Gahan, F., “The Codification of Law,” Grotius Society Transactions, 1922, Vol. 8, p. 109 et seq.Google Scholar
28 Annuaire, supra, p.25. See also Wehberg's discussion of the classification attempted at the Second Hague Conference, op. cit., p. 311.
29 Reeves, J. S., “International Society and International Law,” this JOURNAL 1921, Vol. 15, p. 372, says: “A justiciable controversy is one in which the external action of a state is challenged upon the ground that it does not conform to an established rule of action.”Google ScholarGiraud,supra, note 23. Hedges, R. Y., “Justiciable Disputes,” this JOURNAL, 1928, Vol. 22, pp. 564-565, says: “the range of justiciability is determined primarily by the extent to which international life may be brought within the legal order.”Google Scholar Chamberlain, J. P., >“The Settlement of Justiciable Disputes by Arbitration and International Courts,” Academy of Political Science, Proceedings, 1929, Vol. 13, p. 275, also p. 282 et seq.“The+Settlement+of+Justiciable+Disputes+by+Arbitration+and+International+Courts,”+Academy+of+Political+Science,+Proceedings,+1929,+Vol.+13,+p.+275,+also+p.+282+et+seq.>Google Scholar
30 Annuaire, supra, p. 25.
31 Advisory Opinions, Series B, No. 4. France protested that the question was domestic, and, therefore, outside the Council's jurisdiction; the court decided against the French contention.
32 Westlake, J., International Law, 1st ed., 1904, Vol. 1, pp. 339-340.Google Scholar
33 Hyde, C. C., International Law Chiefly as Applied and Interpreted by the United States, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 113.Google Scholar
34 Q. Wright, Proceedings, supra, p. 142; Gamer, ibid., p. 74.
35 Hedges, op. cit., p. 565; Jelf, op. cit., p. 69; Gahan, op. cit., p. 109, et seq.
36 Reeves, op. cit., p. 372, says: “the change from a dynamic [political]to a static [legal] relationship can come about only gradually and by theagreement of its members. . . .”
37 Statute, Art. 38, Sec. 4.
38 Brown, this JOURNAL, 1922, Vol. 16, p. 259;Hill, op. cit., pp.30-31.
39 Scott, Proceedings, supra, p. 139; Brown, ibid., p. 136.
40 Hill, op. cit., p. 23, says: “It is clear that a dispute involving either international law or a treaty is subject to international jurisdiction.” (See also p. 28.)
41 As, for example, the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees Cape. (Supra, note 31.)
42 Hyde, , op. tit., Vol. 2, p. 113, says: “That a dispute between states is justiciable ... is not dependent upon the magnitude of the issue, or upon the attachment of one state to a policy decisive of its conduct.” See also Jelf, op. tit., p.60; and Giraud, op. tit., p. 502.Google Scholar
43 Article 2.
44 Wehberg, op. tit., pp. 306-307, mentions: constitutional provisions, national honor, vital interests, independence, integrity of territory, autonomy, sovereignty, and rights of third states. Also, Merignhac, , Traité de l'Arbitrage International, 1895, p. 186 et seq.Google Scholar
45 Brierly, J. L., “Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction,” British Yearbook ofInternational Law, 1925, p. 8.Google Scholar
46 Fenwick, , “The Scope of Domestic Questions in International Law,” this JOURNAL, 1925, Vol. 19, p. 144; Accord:Google Scholar Oppenheim, L., International Law, 4th ed., 1926, Vol. 2, p. 71.Google Scholar
47 Supra, note 24. For example, although a question of immigration might be covered by a treaty, a state might have a subjective view of the problem, and so claim that it was domestic.
48 Gonsiorowski, M., Société des Nations et Problème de la Paix, 1927, Vol.2, p. 376;Google Scholar Sir Williams, J. F., “The Pan American and League of Nations Treaties of Arbitration and Conciliation”, British Yearbook of International Law, 1929, p. 17; Brierly, , op. tit., p. 10.Google Scholar
49 Gonsiorowski, op. cit., p. 368 et seq.
50 Brierly, Fenwick, supra, notes 45 and 46; Permanent Court of International Justice (hereafter cited as P. C. I. J.), Advisory Opinions, Series B, No. 4.
51 “Advisory Opinions”, supra, pp. 23-24.
52 Brierly, op. eit., p. 9, discusses the possible existence of a type ofproblem which is not inherently domestic, yet which is not covered by positive international law. Such problems, if any, would compose the “middleground.”
53 Giraud, , op. cit., p. 502; Hedges, , op. tit., p. 563.Google Scholar
54 Gonsiorowski, op. cit., p.368 el seq.; Brierly, op. cit., pp. 8-19.
55 The dangers inherent in such gaps are evident. States could evade the obligationto arbitrate merely by claiming that the dispute lay within some sacrosanct zone. The positive view would lessen this danger by compelling the state in each instance, in order to make good its position, to prove the absence of a rule of international law to cover the case. It must be admitted, however, that even if the positive conception be accepted, so long as no impartial body is provided to settle the preliminary question of jurisdiction, a signatory state, being final judge in its own cause in this matter (infra), may top readily find a loophole. The Pan American Arbitration Treaty, of course, contains no express provision for this matter.
56 Brierly, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
57 Fenwick, , “The Elimination of Loopholes in Arbitration Treaties”, this JOURNAL, 1927, Vol. 21, p. 502.Google Scholar
58 Harriman, Proceedings, supra, p. 71.
59 E.g., the arbitration treaty between the United States and France, which is typical of the so-called “Kellogg Treaties.” U. S. Treaty Series, No. 785.
60 P. C. I. J. Statute, Art. 36.
61 Hudson, , “The New Arbitration Treaty with France”, this JOURNAL, 1928, Vol. 22, p. 373.Google Scholar
62 Article 36.
63 Italics ours.
64 Borchard, E. M., The World Tomorrow, 1929, Vol. 12, p. 441.Google Scholar
65 Supra, note 3.
66 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264.
67 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137.
68 Advisory Opinions, Series B, No. 4.
69 P.C.I.J. Decisions, Series A, No. 8.
70 Article 1.
71 Article 2.
71a Supra, note 6, p. 670 et seq.
72 Williams, op. tit., p. 18; Hill, op. tit., p. 27.
73 In other words, the dispute over jurisdiction could at most be considered one of the ordinary justiciable questions of which the court might take jurisdiction because it required the interpretation of a treaty, viz.,the Pan American Arbitration Treaty itself, as explained infra.
74 Advisory Opinions, Series B, No. 4, p. 26.
75 See discussion of this quotation in The World Tomorrow, 1929, Vol. 12 ,p. 387.
76 Of course the Paris Pact contains no provision for arbitration, but that fact is not decisive, since, as we have shown, the general provision for arbitration in the Pan American Arbitration Treaty is of no weight in this matter.
77 Constitution of the United States, Art. 3, Sec. 2; Madison, Marbury v.,supra.Google Scholar
78 Statute, Art. 36.
79 Murdock, J. O., “Arbitration and Conciliation in Pan America”, this Journal, 1929, Vol. 23, p. 282.Google Scholar
80 Gamer, , The World Tomorrow, 1929, Vol. 12, p. 441.Google Scholar
81 N. Angell, ibid., p. 442.
82 Gamer, this JOURNAL, 1929, Vol. 23, p. 598.
83 Art. 2, Sec. 1.
84 Art. 2, Sec. 2.
85 Willoughby, W. W., The Constitutional Law of the United States, 2nd ed., 1929, Vol. 1, p. 537, says: “Not all agreements entered into by the United States with foreign powers are held to be treaties in the sense in which that term is used in the treaty clause of the Constitution.”Google Scholar
86 Wright, Q., The Control of American Foreign Relations, 1922, p. 236;Google Scholar Corwin, E.S., The President's Control of Foreign Relations, 1917, p. 116 et seq.Google Scholar
87 143 U. S. 649; Murdock, , op. cit., pp. 286-287.Google Scholar
88 Moore, J. B., “Treaties and Executive Agreements”, Political Science Quarterly, 1905, Vol. 20, p. 396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
89 Willoughby, , op. cit., pp. 539-540;Google Scholar Burdick, C. K., The Law of the American Constitution, Its Origin and Development, 1922, p. 78.Google Scholar
90 Willoughby, , op. cit., p. 539; Corwin, , op. cit., pp. 117-118.Google Scholar
91 Wright, , op. cit., p. 237.Google Scholar
92 Willoughby, op.cit., p. 543.
93 Wright, op. cit., p. 243.
94 See discussion of Hamilton's position in Corwin, op. cit., p. 7 et seq.
95 The Federalist, Nos. 46 and 75.
96 Corwin, op. cit., p. 92; Wright, op. cit., p. 253.
97 Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649; B. Altman v. U. S., 224 U. S. 583.
98 Article 4.
99 Hughes, C. E., “Pan American Peace”, Yale Review, Summer 1929, p. 657.Google Scholar
100 Stone, W. T., Foreign Policy Association, Information Service, 1929, Vol. 5, pp. 322-323.Google Scholar
101 Murdock, op. cit., pp. 285-286.
102 Ralston, , International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno, 1929, Sec.33; also p. 49.Google Scholar
103 Hughes, op. cit, p. 657, says: “it has been sought by the present treaty to limit this agreement to mere matters of detail.”
104 Hughes, ibid.; Article 2 of the treaty excepts from jurisdiction disputes which affect the interest or refer to the action of a state not a party to the treaty. Williams, op. cit., p. 17, says: “This reservation is in fact intended not to protect third States, but to safeguard the MonroeDoctrine.”
105 Article 3.
106 Murdock, op. cit., p. 288, says: “The treaties which ex-President Taft was discussing probably conferred broader jurisdictional powers on the tribunal than does the arbitration treaty signed at the recent conference.”
107 Taft, W. H., The Presidency, 1916, p. 102 et seq.Google Scholar
108 Unless, of course, we delayed the matter, thus giving the arbitral tribunal the right to draft the compromis. (Art. 4.)
109 Stone, op. cit., p. 323.
110 Art. 4, par. 2.
111 Stone, op. cit., p. 324.
112 U. S. Statutes at Large, 1925, Vol. 43, Part 2, p. 1761; this JOURNAL Supplement, 1924, Vol. 18, p. 127.
113 Article 4 of the treaty, loc. cit.
114 Murdock, op. cit., p.285.
115 Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1925, Vol. 2, p. 111.
116 Taft, op. cit., p. 102 et seq.
117 Hughes, op.cit., p. 657.
118 Hughes, ibid.