History is replete with examples where states have interfered with foreign exchange markets in order to influence exchange rates. The trade conflicts between the two world wars, for instance, were fought not only via the imposition of tariffs, but also via competitive devaluations. Since then, straightforward competitive devaluations have become a rare phenomenon; contemporary scenarios, in which exchange rate policies are criticized for their potentially protectionist impact, tend to be much more sophisticated. The exchange rate policy followed by China is certainly the outstanding, yet not exclusive, example. In recent years policymakers worldwide have criticized China for maintaining an undervalued real exchange rate as part of its strategy of export-led growth.

The International Court of Justice rendered two final decisions on the merits in 2010: in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) and Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo). The Court also issued an advisory opinion in Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo and an order finding Italy’s counterclaim inadmissible in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy).

The contemporary world is witnessing an interesting and seemingly contradictory phenomenon. At the same time that globalization continues to develop, the World Trade Organization (WTO), itself a direct result of globalization, can make no progress in the negotiations on its Doha Development Agenda—a perceived further step of globalization. Since deeper integration cannot be achieved at the multilateral level, regional and especially bilateral arrangements for liberalizing trade and investment, most of which are in the form of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), have become increasingly common. Notwithstanding their bilateral nature, FTAs are often referred to as regional arrangements (RTAs) since WTO members have an obligation to report such agreements to that multilateral system, where they are reviewed by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements.

At 12:20 in the morning on Saturday, June 12, 2010, the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in Kampala, Uganda, adopted by consensus a comprehensive package of amendments on the crime of aggression. States parties to the Rome Statute thereby delivered on their promise, reflected in Article 5 (2) of the Statute, to define the crime of aggression and to agree on the conditions for the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over that crime. Despite a thorough and more than decadelong preparatory process, few, if any, had predicted such a substantive outcome on the crime of aggression in light of the serious disagreements on major questions, which persisted until the last days of the conference. The key elements of the final package are a definition of the crime of aggression, which limits criminal responsibility to leaders who are responsible for the most serious forms of the illegal use of force between states, and a complicated set of conditions for exercising jurisdiction. Investigations would be based on either a Security Council referral or state consent.