The place of law in the settlement of disputes by the Security Council is a topic which has already occasioned debate. Many lawyers contend that law plays a minimal rôle in the work of the Council. That organ is, they point out, essentially a political body. It operates in a different way from a judicial body such as the International Court of Justice, and frequently ignores the law of nations. Oscar Schachter, writing in this Journal in 1964, has offered another view, pointing to subtle ways in which the influence of law can still make itself felt in the work of the Security Council, by providing a common language, by applying principles to specific cases, and by determining new points of community interest. The purpose of this article is to examine, in the light of recent years, some of the limitations within which this legal endeavor takes place, and to see whether law has any real function in the settlement of disputes.

The recent trial in Pretoria of thirty-seven South West Africans on charges of “participation in terroristic activities” focused international attention yet again on the mandated territory of South West Africa. The trial, conviction and sentencing of the accused evoked protest and condemnation from the United Nations on the ground that, as a result of General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), South Africa had lost jurisdiction over the territory and hence the competence to try the accused at all. On December 16, 1967, while the trial was in progress, the General Assembly, by 110 votes to two (Portugal and South Africa), condemned the “illegal arrest, deportation, and trial” of the accused, and on the eve of the judgment in the case on January 25, 1968, the Security Council in a unanimous resolution called upon the Government of South Africa “to discontinue forthwith this illegal trial and to release and repatriate the South West Africans concerned,” a call which was converted into a “demand” by a further unanimous resolution on March 14, 1968, after many of the accused had been sentenced to long periods of imprisonment. The South African Government, however, arguing that Resolution 2145 (XXI) was invalid and that it was fully competent in law to prosecute the accused for offenses committed in South West Africa, declined to accept these “calls” and “demands.”

Professor Louis Henkin and the National Petroleum Council are well known for their disparate views regarding the present extent of national jurisdiction of the coastal states over their Continental Shelves under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and also regarding the desirability of amending that Convention.

Thought about the problems of economic growth has evolved in the space of two hundred years from the static models of Adam Smith and David Ricardo to the eclecticism of modern development economists. The current eclectic economic philosophy is increasingly reflected in operating policies of institutions concerned with international development. One result is the framing of a new set of issues which are best expressed in terms of the adaptability of development assistance mechanisms to meet varied and frequently changing needs. Thus the present discussion, after a look at experience since World War II, will examine issues which may be viewed as guideposts to development assistance flexibility: increased multilateralism in the transfer of resources; harmonization of the terms of resource transfer with debt service capabilities; the channeling of growth toward optimal goals, including the stimulation of capacity to earn foreign exchange; and the encouragement of balanced investment involving the private as well as the public sector.

The material for this section is compiled by Stephen L. Gibson, attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State.