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Origin and Development of Denial of Justice*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2017

Hans W. Spiegel
Hans W. Spiegel*
Affiliation:
Doctor Juris Utriusque, University of Berlin; University of Wisconsin
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Extract

The legal aspects of denial of justice and its position in the framework of international law have been expounded in a number of important works.1 Regarding the history of the doctrine, however, there appears to be no work of any importance, apart from the excellent observations of Charles De Visscher.2 This is not in any way surprising in view of the fact that the history of international law is a subject which does not receive the attention it deserves, and more particularly in view of the legend, which has been disproved in a convincing manner by James Brown Scott, that there was no system of international law prior to the days of Grotius. Yet the history of denial of justice is not only extremely interesting, but it also throws light on some of the most important institutions of modern international law.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , January 1938 , pp. 63 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1938

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Footnotes

*

See the article entitled “The Meaning of Denial of Justice in International Law,” by Oliver J. Lissitzyn, this JOURNAL, Vol. 30 (1936), p. 632.—ED.

References

1 See, e.g., Dunn, The Protection of Nationals (1932), p. 147 et seq.

2 In Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours (1935), II, p. 369 et seq. For the history of legal responsibility in international law, as it affects the matter under discussion, see Goebel, “International Responsibility of States for Injuries Sustained by Aliens,” this JOURNAL, Vol. 8 (1914), p. 802 et seq.

3 Our thanks are due to Charles De Visscher, loc. cit., for having drawn our attention to the fact that the difficulties which we experience today in applying the appropriate terms is partly due to the lack of interest in the origin and historical importance of denial of justice. See also Stowell, International Law (1931), pp. 35, 161, 478 et seq. Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt that Holdsworth's assumption that special reprisals “have left hardly any trace in our modern law,” is wrong. Holdsworth, History of English Law (1924), V, p. 38. See Hindmarsh, Force in Peace (1933), pp. 45, 54, for other examples to the contrary.

4 Butler-Maccoby, The Development of International Law (1928), p. 175, give the beginning of such restricted application of reprisals as late as the 15th century.

5 “… et si minime ei juslitia fuerit facia (liceat) pignerare infra civitatem … ,” Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Leg. IV, p. 219, c. 8. The rules relating to procedure bear a certain resemblance to the law concerning letters of marque and to reprisals as they were used in the late Middle Ages. See G. Cohn, Die Verbrechen im öffentlichen Dienst nachaltdeuschem Recht, Karlsruhe (1876), I, p. 96.

6 Mon. Germ. Hist, Cap. Reg. Franc., II, p. 133. Cohn, op. cit.

7 See Romanin, Storia Documentata di Venezia, I, 1853, pp. 176, 351–361; Hodgson, F. C., The Early History of Venice, 1901, pp. 91–2.Google Scholar

8 “ … si … distulerit justitiam faciendam …“ Mon. Germ. Hist., Leg. Sect. II, Cap. Reg. Franc., I, 1, p. 192, cap. 6. Cohn, op. cit., p. 95.

9 E.g., Lex Salica, LVII, 1.

10 Codex Theodosianus, II, 1, 6.

11 Edictus Langobardorum, Liutprandi Leges de anno IX, cap. 27 (721).

12 Lex Visigothorum II, 2, 7. Since reprisals appear at first in the form of sanctions for the failure to accord justice to aliens and since this is their sole object in the Middle Ages, we may see in this law also the origin of reprisals as a distinct branch of international law. The fact that this origin is Germanic has often been mentioned by eminent writers, e.g., Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, 1899, p. 216. See also the suggestions in Mas Latrie, Du Droit de Marque, Bibiothéque de l'Ecole des Chartres, 1866, pp. 534–5.

13 “If justice is denied or delayed to a citizen of another district he may make reprisals against the fellows who are living in the same district as the debtor.” Eduardo de Hinojosa, El Elemento Germdnico en el Derecho Espafwl, Madrid, 1915.

14 Schaube, A., Handelsgeschichte der Romanischen Völker , 1906, sp. 552.Google Scholar

15 It is doubtful whether collective liability as laid down in the law of the Visigoths supports the thesis that the medieval Spanish guilds are of Gothic origin. See Julius Klein, in Facts and Factors in Economic History, 1932, p. 166.

16 Goebel, loc. cit., p. 803; Liebermann, Gesetze der Angelsaehsen, I, 377; III, 214, et seq.

17 Goebel, loc. cit., p. 804. Particulars regarding the importance of these institutions for present-day English law, i.e., Coroners and Circuit Courts, will be found in this writer’s article in Revue Pénale Suisse, 1936, p. 165.

18 “If one misdo, let all bear it, let all share the same lot.”

19 See Bateson, Borough Customs, I, 1904, pp. 115–121.

20 Cap. 97; Bateson, op. cit, p. 121; similarly Leicester, 1268 (Merewether and Stephens, History of the Boroughs, 1835, I, p. 225).

21 Ypres, Ghent, Douai, London. Hansa Teutonicorum, etc. See Hall, H., Select Cases concerning the Law Merchant, II, 1930, pp. XCI–XCII, 32–33, 84; Gross, Ch., Select Cases concerning the Law Merchant, I, 1908, pp. 9–10, etc.Google Scholar

22 A privilege granted by King Henry III to the burgesses of Amiens (1256) and AbbéVille (1269); Augustin Thierry, Recueil des Monuments inédits de l'histoire du Tiers État, I, 1850, pp. 219–20; IV, 1870, pp. 35–6.

23 Wynand Morant v. Andrew Papyng and partners, Hall, op. cit., pp. 81–83.

24 27 Edw. I l l , stat. 2, c. 17.

25 Cap. 51 (Bateson, op. cit., I, 117).

26 Preston, Grimsby (Bateson, op. cit, I, pp. 126–7).

27 Hereford, cap. 74, 1486 (interpolated; Bateson, op. cit, I, 118–119; also ibid., p. 119, n. 3; II, p. LVI).

28 Ughelli, Italia Sacra, 1717, V, 179.

29 See Doren, Italienische Wirtschaftsgeschichte, I, 1934, pp. 401–2, 413–14, 525–26, and the numerous treaties in Schaube, op. cit., pp. 149–50, 559, 570, 607, 609, 611, 635, 655, 680, 697, 700, 708, 753–7.

30 Schaube, op. cit., pp. 751–2.

31 Levasseur, Histoire de Commerce de la France, I, 1911, p. 165.

32 With the exception of “Defence of the Fairs” in matters relating to markets and fairs. See Huvelin, P., Droit des Marchés et des Foires, 1897, pp. 427–29, 448–86. Apart from that, reprisals were prohibited by a number of privileges without exceptions even in cases of denial of justice. See, e.g., Collinet, Études sur la Saisie Privée, 1893, pp. 106–11.Google Scholar

33 This rule of law may also be found in the municipal laws of numerous towns.

34 “…, illius loci mercatoribus, ubi negata est ei justitia, pignus auferat.” Planitz, in Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichie, Germanistische Abteilung, Vol. 40, 1919, p. 181.

35 Loc. cit, pp. 178–80; see also Collinet, op. cit., p. 109.

36 See Planitz, loc. cit., pp. 181–2.

Until the 18th century there were all over Europe treaties restricting reprisals to cases of denial of justice. As to this, see the quotations in Bynkershoek, Quaestiones Juris PubliciLibri Duo, Bk. I, chap. XXIV; Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations, new ed.,1875, pp. 148–150; Butler–Maccoby, op. cit., p. 176; Levasseur, op. cit., p. 264; Nys, Originesdu Droit International, 1894, p. 75; Mas Latrie, op. cit, p. 575; Poison, Principles of the Law of Nations, 2nd ed., 1859, pp. 36–37; Grover Clark, “English Practice with regard to Reprisals by Private Persons”, this JOUBNAL, Vol. 27 (1933), pp. 709–11, etc.

37 Cino de Pistoja, 1270–1337; see Alberto del Vecchio and Eugenio Casanova, Le rappresaglie nei communi medievali, 1894, pp. XXI–XXII.

38 The theory was not founded by Bynkershoek, as Butler–Maccoby, op. cit, p. 173, seem to assume.

39 Tractatus de bello, de represaliis et de duello, new ed. by James, Brown Scott, 1917; see also Breyne, A., Le Droit de Guerre selon Jean de Legnano (Thése), Louvain, 1932.Google Scholar

40 Died in 1450. Tractatus Uluslrium Jurisconsultorum, XII, 1584, pp. 279–81.

41 Died about 1494; ibid., pp. 275–9.

42 Heyron v. Proute and others; as to this, see Leadam and Baldwin, Select Cases before the King’s Council, 1918, pp. CXIV–VI, 110–14, 121–29.

43 Today, even international justice might commit a “denial of justice”; see, e.g., Castberg, F., Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cows, 1931, I, p. 381.Google Scholar

44 De Bello, On St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Secunda Secundae, Quest. 40, sect. 15. Translated in James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, Part I, 1933, p. CXXIII.

45 Op. cit., p. CXXII.

46 See also Frederico Puig Pefia, La influencia de Francisco de Vitoria en la Obra de Hugo Grocio, 1934, pp. 213–14; also Camilo Barcia Trelles, Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, 1927, II, pp. 309–311.

47 Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, p. cxxm.

48 Relection on the Law of War, s. 41, reprinted in Vitoria's De Jure Belli Relectiones, ed. by James Brown Scott, 1917; Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law, pp. 212–13, 232, 284; Spanish Conception of International Law and of Sanctions, 1934, p. 16.

49 Opera Omnia, Antwerp, 1638, I, p. 492; II, p. 148.

50 De Jure Belli Libri III, 1598, new ed. by James Brown, Scott, 1933, Bk. I, chap. XXI (Rolfe's translation).Google Scholar

51 De Jure el Officis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari Libri III, 1582, new ed. 1912, by Jamea Brown, Scott, Bk. I, chap. IV, § 10 (Bate's translation).Google Scholar

52 De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Bk. Ill, chap. 2.

53 Ibid., § 3.

54 Ibid., § 4.

55 Ibid., § 5.

56 Juris et Judicii Fecialis, sive Juris inter Gentes, et Quaestionum de eodem Explicatio (1650), new ed. by James Brown Scott, 1911, and translated by Briefly, Pt. II, sects. 5–6.

57 Qttaestionum Juris Publici Libri Duo (1737), ed. by Scott, 1930 (Frank's translation), Lib. I, cap. XXIV, p. 133 et seq.

58 “I believe that circumstances which permit a province to wage war, also permit it to issue letters of reprisal.”

59 Jus Gentium methodo seientifica perlractatum (1749, new ed. by James Brown Scott, 1934, with translation by Drake), cap. V, § 562 et seq.

60 Ibid., § 589.

61 Jus Gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (1749, new ed. by James Brown Scott, 1934, with translation by Drake), cap. V, § 603.

62 Ibid., § 606.

63 See, e.g., the well–known dispute between Great Britain and Prussia in 1745, after the taking of prizes by Great Britain. Charles de Martens, Causes Célébres du Droit des Gens (2nd ed. 1858), II, pp. 97–168.

64 Gradually the right of carrying out reprisals was taken away from individuals and given to the state.

65 E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, 1758, Bk. II, Chap. XVIII, sec. 350, ed. by Scott, 1916, Fenwick's translation. Albert de Lapradelle, in his preface to this edition, draws particular attention to the way in which Vattel deals with the question of denial of justice and says that it is one of the examples which disprove the assertion that Vattel is lacking in originality.

66 E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Prineipes de la Loi Naturelle, 1758, Bk. II, Chap. XVIII, sec. 349.

67 Ibid., § 354.

68 Collected Papers, 1914, p. 594.

69 E.g., if a nation has taken possession of that which belongs to another, if it refuses to pay a debt, etc. Vattel, op. oit., Chap. XVIII, § 342.

70 Ibid., § 343.

71 Ibid.

72 Gérard de Rayneval, Institutions du Droit de la Nature et des Gens, Vol. I, p. 312 (new ed., Paris, 1832).

73 Gérard de Rayneval, Institutions du Droit de la Nature et des Gens, Vol. II, p. 129. Rayneval, 1736–1812, a learned man of practice, took part in the negotiations, together with his brother, who was the first French ambassador to the United States. Parts of Rayneval's book are even today of considerable interest with regard to the diplomatic history of the treaty of alliance.

74 John Westlake, Collected Papers on Public International Law, ed. by L. Oppenheim, 1914, pp. 590–606; also Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law (Boston, 1922), II, p. 174.

75 We have seen that this development had been initiated by Gentili and Zouche.

76 For particulars, see Westlake, op. cit., pp. 594–5: “the object of such acts, i.e., hostile acts in time of peace, was clear, namely to enforce the negotiations by the advantage gained by the show of determination.“

77 This was not the case until the 19th century.

78 As to modern terminology, see Phillimore, Commentaries, 2nd ed., 1873, III, p. 18: reprisals are a reaction to “an injury done to the rights, stricti juris, of a State“; Kltiber, Droit des Gens, 2nd ed., 1874, §234; Heffter, Droit International, 3rd ed., 1873, pp. 211–12; Hall, International Law, 1880, 7th ed., 1917, pp. 379–83. On the other hand, the following still regard denial of justice as a condition precedent of reprisals: Manning, Commentaries, new ed., 1875, p. 147; Creasy, First Platform, 1876, pp. 401–403; Lawrence's Wheaton, 1863, p. 506; Halleck, International Law, new ed., 1878, I, p. 423. Even more remarkable is Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law, 5th ed., 1879, pp. 188–9: “Reprisals may be undertaken on account of any injury, but are chiefly confined to cases of refusal or even obstinate delay of justice.“ Similarly Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, 1896, II, pp. 191–2.

79 Oppenheim–Lauterpacht, International Law, 5th ed., 1935, II, § 34.

80 It is particularly the practice of states which have always regarded war as the sanction of illegal acts. (Métall, Revue Internationale de la Théorie du Droit, 1936, p. 327; also the instructive collection of declarations of war of the last eighty years, in Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, 1933, pp. 364–5.) See also Kunz, Kriegsrecht und Neutralitätsrecht, 1935, pp. 1–2 and observations in Oppenheim–Lauterpacht, op. cit, p. 184.

81 The term is sometimes regarded as having no practical value. On the other hand, see Les Fondateurs du Droit International, 1904, Pillet's introduction, pp. xxin–rv.

In particular, only a just war was an effective causa foederis; as to this, see a Swiss treaty of the year 1352 (Redslob, Histoire des Grands Principes du Droit des Gens, 1923, p. 151, n. 3; for the whole doctrine see Grotius, op. cit, II, 15, 23; Bynkershoek, op. cit., I, 9, etc.).

82 See Brierly, Law of Nations, 2nd ed., 1936, p. 26; Fischer Williams, Chapters on Current International Law, 1929, pp. 71–73; Kunz, “The Law of Nations, Static and Dynamic”, this JOURNAL, Vol. 27 (1933), p. 630 et seq.; le Fur, Pricis de Droit International, 2nd ed., 1933, pp. 275–76, 489–90.

83 See in particular the observations of Strupp in Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, 1934,1, p. 572

84 5 Rob, C.. 233. The case was decided in 1804. See James Brown, Scott, Cases on International Law, 1922, p. 497; Oppenheim–Lauterpacht, op. cit., pp. 120–21; Westlake, op. cit .Google Scholar

85 In particular, Nielsen. See his statement in the Neer Case, this JOURNAL, Vol. 21 (1927), p. 560.

86 See Fitzmaurice, British Year Book of International Law, 1932, p. 93 et seq.

87 Responsibility of a state in respect of acts done by administrative agents, judicial functionaries, private persons. Hall, International Law, 1880, § 65.

88 It is also omitted from Art. 9 of the preliminary draft of the third committee of the Hague Codification Conference; see Borchard, this JOUBNAL, Vol. 24 (1930), pp. 533–5.

89 Chevreau Claim. See Hudson, this JOURNAL, Vol. 26 (1932), p. 804.

90 Kaiser Case, General Claims Commission, TJ. S.–Mexico, Opinions of Commissioners, 1929, p. 84; see also Nielsen's statement in the Canahl Case, Opinions, p. 93.

91 Roper Case, General Claims Commission, TJ. S.–Mexico, this JOURNAL, Vol. 21 (1927),p. 777.

92 See Dunn, op. cit., p. 153 et seq.

93 In his commentary upon Art. 9, Harvard Research Draft, 1929, Responsibility of States, this JOURNAL, Spl. Supp., Vol. 23 (1929), p. 173.

94 Nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne pecceur. Seneca, De Ira, I, 16.