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The United States Takes Actions to Secure Supply Chains for Critical Minerals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2025

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International Economic Law
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American Journal of International Law , Volume 119 , Issue 1 , January 2025 , pp. 168 - 174
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of American Society of International Law

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References

1 See White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Takes Further Action to Strengthen and Secure Critical Mineral Supply Chains (Sept. 20, 2024), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/09/20/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-takes-further-action-to-strengthen-and-secure-critical-mineral-supply-chains [https://perma.cc/6JTX-PJKC] [hereinafter Fact Sheet]; White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: Securing a Made in America Supply Chain for Critical Minerals (Feb. 22, 2022), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/02/22/fact-sheet-securing-a-made-in-america-supply-chain-for-critical-minerals [https://perma.cc/8VRF-C47Y].

2 White House Press Release, Remarks by President Biden at a Virtual Event on Securing Critical Minerals for a Future Made in America (Feb. 22, 2022), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/22/remarks-by-president-biden-at-a-virtual-event-on-securing-critical-minerals-for-a-future-made-in-america [https://perma.cc/34PJ-RBUR]. The administration's work on critical minerals has been part of a wider agenda aimed at securing supply chains. See, e.g., Exec. Order 14017, 86 Fed. Reg. 11849 (Feb. 24, 2021).

3 See Fact Sheet, supra note 1; Emont, Jon, China Is Winning the Minerals War, Wall St. J. (May 21, 2024)Google Scholar, at https://www.wsj.com/finance/commodities-futures/china-dominant-mineral-mining-global-supply-chain-e2b7840e.

4 See Bradsher, Keith, China's Critical Minerals Embargo Is Even Tougher Than Expected, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2024)Google Scholar, at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/09/business/china-critical-minerals.html.

5 Energy Act of 2020, § 7002(c)(4), Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182, 2564 (Dec. 27, 2020).

6 2022 Final List of Critical Minerals, 87 Fed. Reg. 10381 (Feb. 24, 2022). The Department of Defense “monitors more than 250 unique strategic and critical minerals.” White House, Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth, at 154 (June 2021), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-supply-chain-review-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAV7-K3ER]. Individual critical minerals often have a plethora of applications. Thus, in the list that follows, the examples given are not meant to be comprehensive.

7 See Areddy, James T. & Hua, Sha, China Restricts Exports of Two Minerals Used in High-Performance Chips, Wall St. J. (July 4, 2023)Google Scholar, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-restricts-exports-of-two-metals-used-in-high-performance-chips-a649402b.

8 See id.

9 See International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, at 5 (2022), at https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a-52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/EGE8-CRP7] [hereinafter IEA Report].

10 See Shane Lasley, Antimony Is High on DOD Mineral Concerns, Metal Tech News (Sept. 16, 2024), at https://www.metaltechnews.com/story/2024/09/16/critical-minerals-alliances-2024/antimony-is-high-on-dod-mineral-concerns/1914.html.

11 See IEA Report, supra note 9, at 28.

12 See id. at 8.

13 See Nicholas Bariyo, In Congo, China Hits Roadblock in Global Race for Cobalt, Wall St. J. (Mar. 12, 2022), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-congo-china-hits-roadblock-in-global-race-forcobalt-11647081180; Jon Emont, How China Came to Dominate the World's Largest Nickel Source for Electric Cars, Wall St. J. (July 5, 2023), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-came-to-dominate-the-worlds-largest-nickel-source-for-electric-cars-4c081a12; Jon Emont, China Harnesses a Technology That Vexed the West, Unlocking a Treasure Chest, Wall St. J. (Sept. 9, 2024), at https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/china-harnesses-a-technology-that-vexed-the-west-unlocking-a-treasure-chest-5d984585.

14 See U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024, at 35, 75, 84, 145 (Jan. 2024), at https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024.pdf [https://perma.cc/BTW6-5AXA]; Cobalt Institute, Cobalt Market Report 2023, at 31 (May 2024), at https://www.cobaltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Cobalt-Market-Report-2023_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7P9-SSKF].

15 See Fact Sheet, supra note 1.

16 See id.

17 See id.

18 See Notice of Modification: China's Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation, 89 Fed. Reg. 76581, 76591 (Sept. 18, 2024); Notice of Modification: China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 89 Fed. Reg. 101682 (Dec. 16, 2024); see also Jacob Katz Cogan, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 118 AJIL 717, 727 (2024).

19 See Inflation Reduction Act, § 13401, Pub. L. 117-169, 136 Stat. 1818, 1954 (Aug. 16, 2022) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 30D) [hereinafter IRA]. The statute uses the term “clean vehicle.” There is a corresponding $3,750 tax credit based on the incorporation of U.S.-sourced components in EV batteries. See id., § 13401(e)(1) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 30D(e)(2)). The IRA contained other provisions to encourage the domestic critical minerals industry, including adding Section 45X to the International Revenue Code to provide a credit for the production of critical minerals. See id., § 13502(a); see also Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit, 89 Fed. Reg. 85,798 (Oct. 28, 2024).

20 See id., § 13401(e)(1) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 30D(e)(1)). Eligibility is limited to taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income below specified thresholds, which vary according to filing status. See 26 U.S.C. § 30D(f)(10). It is also limited to vehicles below specified manufacturer's suggested retail price thresholds, which vary according to vehicle classification. See 26 U.S.C. § 30D(f)(11). Prior to the IRA, the credit was calculated based on the vehicle's battery capacity.

21 IRA, § 13401(e)(2) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 30D(d)(7)); 42 U.S.C. § 18741(a)(5)(C); 10 U.S.C. § 4872(d)(2) (formerly 10 U.S.C. § 2533c(d)); see also Interpretation of Foreign Entity of Concern, 89 Fed. Reg. 37079 (May 6, 2024); Clean Vehicle Credits Under Sections 25E and 30D; Transfer of Credits; Critical Minerals and Battery Components; Foreign Entities of Concern, 89 Fed. Reg. 37706, 37769 (May 6, 2024) (adding 26 C.F.R. § 1.30D–6) [hereinafter Clean Vehicle Credits Regulations]. A Treasury Department regulation extended the 2024 deadline to the end of 2026 for batteries that include graphite contained in anode materials and critical minerals contained in electrolyte salts, binders, or additives, giving U.S. automakers additional time to find new suppliers. See Clean Vehicle Credits Regulations, supra note 21, at 37758, 37770 (adding 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.30D–2(b)(25), 1.30D–6(b)(2)).

22 See Ana Swanson & Alan Rappeport, U.S. and Europe Angle for New Deal to Resolve Climate Spat, N.Y. Times (Mar. 8, 2023), at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/08/business/economy/us-europe-climate.html. Under applicable regulations, the secretary of the treasury identifies the “countr[ies] with which the United States has a free trade agreement in effect.” In making this determination, the secretary considers:

whether an agreement between the United States and that country, as to the critical minerals contained in clean vehicle batteries or more generally, and in the context of the overall commercial and economic relationship between that country and the United States:

  1. (A)

    (A) Reduces or eliminates trade barriers on a preferential basis,

  2. (B)

    (B) Commits the parties to refrain from imposing new trade barriers,

  3. (C)

    (C) Establishes high-standard disciplines in key areas affecting trade (such as core labor and environmental protections), and/or

  4. (D)

    (D) Reduces or eliminates restrictions on exports or commits the parties to refrain from imposing such restrictions. . . .

Clean Vehicle Credits Regulations, supra note 21, at 37758–59; see also U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Anticipated Direction of Forthcoming Proposed Guidance on Critical Mineral and Battery Component Value Calculations for the New Clean Vehicle Credit, at 3 (Dec. 2022), at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/30DWhite-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8RL-D4WV].

23 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan on Strengthening Critical Minerals Supply Chains (Mar. 28, 2023), at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/US%20Japan%20Critical%20Minerals%20Agreement%202023%2003%2028.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJV5-VS54]; Ana Swanson, Lawmakers Rebuke Biden for Bypassing Congress in Trade Deal with Japan, N.Y. Times (Mar. 28, 2023), at https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/28/business/economy/us-japan-battery-trade-deal.html.

24 See White House Press Release, U.S.-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council (Apr. 5, 2024), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/05/u-s-eu-joint-statement-of-the-trade-and-technology-council-3 [https://perma.cc/P7JQ-GYBJ]; White House Press Release, Readout of White House Meetings on the U.S.-UK Atlantic Declaration (May 22, 2024), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/05/22/readout-of-white-house-meetings-on-the-u-s-uk-atlantic-declaration [https://perma.cc/73DJ-F4KF].

25 See U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, The United States Releases Signed Memorandum of Understanding with the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia to Strengthen Electric Vehicle Battery Value Chain (Jan. 18, 2023), at https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-releases-signed-memorandum-of-understanding-with-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-and-zambia-to-strengthen-electric-vehicle-battery-value-chain [https://perma.cc/QPV5-ENK2]; White House Press Release, Australia-United States Climate, Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Transformation Compact (May 20, 2023), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/australia-united-states-climate-critical-minerals-and-clean-energy-transformation-compact [https://perma.cc/LJE3-943W]; U.S. Dep't of Commerce Press Release, Secretary Raimondo and Minister Goyal Convene 6th U.S.-India Commercial Dialogue Meeting (Oct. 3, 2024), at https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/10/secretary-raimondo-and-minister-goyal-convene-6th-us-india-commercial [https://perma.cc/JD6Z-UK33]; U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, The United States and Mongolia Sign MOU to Collaborate on Critical Minerals (June 26, 2023), at https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-mongolia-sign-mou-to-collaborate-on-critical-minerals [https://perma.cc/WV5B-K433]; U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, The United States of America and the Argentine Republic Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Strengthen Cooperation on Critical Minerals (Aug. 22, 2024), at https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-of-america-and-the-argentine-republic-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-to-strengthen-cooperation-on-critical-minerals [https://perma.cc/3JR9-YPJF]; U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, The United States of America and Peru Sign Memorandum of Understanding to Strengthen Cooperation on Critical Minerals (Aug. 29, 2024), at https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-of-america-and-peru-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-to-strengthen-cooperation-on-critical-minerals [https://perma.cc/R48K-X4UD]; U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, United States and Uzbekistan Sign MOU on Critical Minerals Partnership (Sept. 16, 2024), at https://www.state.gov/united-states-and-uzbekistan-sign-mou-on-critical-minerals-partnership [https://perma.cc/BR59-EFLK]; U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide at the Signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation on High-Standard, Market-Oriented Trade of Critical Minerals (Sept. 30, 2024), at https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-norwegian-foreign-minister-espen-barth-eide-at-the-signing-of-a-memorandum-of-cooperation-on-high-standard-market-oriented-trade-of-critical-minerals [https://perma.cc/37KQ-CAU5].

26 See White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: President Biden and Prime Minister Modi Host Leaders on the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (Sept. 9, 2023), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/09/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-prime-minister-modi-host-leaders-on-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment [https://perma.cc/36DB-B5NG]; White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment in the Lobito Trans-Africa Corridor (Dec. 3, 2024), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/12/03/fact-sheet-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-in-the-lobito-trans-africa-corridor [https://perma.cc/RN9Z-2T6R]; U.S. International Development Finance Corp. Press Release, Testimony by DFC CEO Scott Nathan to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (May 7, 2024), at https://www.dfc.gov/media/speeches-testimony/testimony-dfc-ceo-scott-nathan-house-committee-foreign-affairs-1 [https://perma.cc/MD9Q-WP8M]; Michael M. Phillips, How the U.S. Is Derailing China's Influence in Africa, Wall St. J. (Jan. 21, 2024), at https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/angola-africa-china-us-railroad-f0e23523; Alexandra Wexler & Julie Steinberg, How the U.S. Is Trying to Challenge China's Cobalt Chokehold, Wall St. J. (Oct. 15, 2024), at https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/american-companies-cobalt-mine-congo-china-ff5a1560.

27 See U.S. Dep't of State, Minerals Security Partnership, at https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership [https://perma.cc/BFM4-MTPN]; U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Joint Statement on Establishment of the Minerals Security Partnership Finance Network (Sept. 23, 2024), at https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-establishment-of-the-minerals-security-partnership-finance-network [https://perma.cc/U8U6-37CK]; Minerals Security Partnership, Principles for Responsible Critical Mineral Supply Chains (2023), at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/MSP-Principles-for-Responsible-Critical-Mineral-Supply-Chains-Accessible.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3TC-ABT6].

28 See Jamie Smyth, Myles McCormick & Harry Dempsey, Western Nations Join Forces to Break China's Grip on Critical Minerals, Fin. Times (Sept. 23, 2024), at https://www.ft.com/content/2984ae03-df15-420b-89cc-9ad8337014a9.

29 Id.

30 See Areddy & Hua, supra note 7; Siyi Liu & Dominique Patton, China, World's Top Graphite Producer, Tightens Exports of Key Battery Material, Reuters (Oct. 20, 2023), at https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-require-export-permits-some-graphite-products-dec-1-2023-10-20.

31 See Yusuf Khan, The Rare Earths Mine That Won't Need a Single Shovel, Wall St. J. (Jan. 17, 2024), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rare-earths-mine-that-wont-need-a-single-shovel-b962c661.

32 China to Limit Antimony Exports in Latest Critical Mineral Curbs, Reuters (Aug. 15, 2024), at https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-limit-antimony-exports-latest-critical-mineral-curbs-2024-08-15.

33 See Keith Bradsher, China Tightens Its Hold on Minerals Needed to Make Computer Chips, N.Y. Times (Oct. 26, 2024), at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/business/china-critical-minerals-semiconductors.html.

34 See Bradsher, Keith, Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan, N.Y. Times (Sept. 22, 2010)Google Scholar, at https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html.

35 See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China Press Release, 商务部公告 2024 年第 46 号 关于加强相关两用物项对美国出口管制的公告 (Dec. 3, 2024), at https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2024/art_3d5e990b43424e60828030f58a547b60.html [https://perma.cc/3N2L-6FKT].

36 See id.

37 Id. (translation by Google Translate). In November 2024, China announced updated Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items would go into effect on December 1. See Interesse, Giulia, China Issues New Export Control Regulations: What Businesses Need to Know?, China Briefing (Nov. 19, 2024)Google Scholar, at https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-issues-new-export-control-regulations [https://perma.cc/92Q5-2SWP].

38 See U.S. Geological Survey Press Release, USGS Critical Minerals Study: Bans on Gallium and Germanium Exports Could Cost the U.S. Billions (Nov. 19, 2024), at https://www.usgs.gov/news/national-news-release/usgs-critical-minerals-study-bans-gallium-and-germanium-exports-could [https://perma.cc/P8A6-C2KA].

39 See Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items, 89 Fed. Reg. 96790 (Dec. 5, 2024); Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals From the Validated End-User (VEU) Program, 89 Fed. Reg. 96830 (Dec. 5, 2024).

40 See Cogan, Jacob Katz, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 117 AJIL 128, 144 (2023)Google Scholar.

41 Update: China Tightens Control Over Dual-Use Items Export to U.S., Xinhua (Dec. 3, 2024), at https://english.news.cn/20241203/82640469de9b4334a8b896880720afda/c.html.