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International Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 April 2020

Armin von Bogdandy  and
René Urueña
Armin von Bogdandy
Affiliation:
Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, Germany, professor of public law at Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main. Email: [email protected].
René Urueña
Affiliation:
Associate Professor and Director of Research, Universidad de los Andes School of Law (Colombia). Email: [email protected]. The Article is the fruit of a Tandem Project, established in 2017 between the Law Faculty of the Universidad de los Andes and the Max Planck Institute. We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Leibniz Programme of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and by the Vice-Presidency of Research, Universidad de Los Andes (Colombia). We are indebted to the Dienstagsrunde for critique, and to Volker Daiber and Theodor Shulman for their editorial assistance. We are most grateful to the colleagues with whom we have developed the common law in Latin America approach (ICCAL) so far, in particular Eduardo Ferrer MacGregor, Manuel Góngora Mera, Flávia Piovesan, and Mariela Morales Antoniazzi.
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Abstract

This Article analyzes the rise of international transformative constitutionalism in Latin America and responds to some of the challenges to its legitimacy and effectiveness. It focuses on the practice of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), the decisions and procedures of which constitute a small, but vibrant and essential, part of a wider Latin American community of human rights—a diverse group of actors who confront violence, social exclusion, and weak institutions through legal means.

Type
Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 114 , Issue 3 , July 2020 , pp. 403 - 442
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 by The American Society of International Law

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References

1 See República Argentina, la República Federativa del Brasil, la República de Chile, la República de Colombia y la República del Paraguay [Republic of Argentina, Federal Republic of Brazil, Republic of Chile, Republic of Colombia, and Republic of Paraguay], Declaración Sobre el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos [Declaration on the Inter-American Human Rights System] (2019), available at https://www.mre.gov.py/index.php/noticias-de-embajadas-y-consulados/gobiernos-de-argentina-brasil-chile-colombia-y-paraguay-se-manifiestan-sobre-el-sistema-interamericano-de-derechos-humanos. On the backlash against the Inter-American tribunal, see Soley, Ximena & Steininger, Silvia, Parting Ways or Lashing Back? Withdrawals, Backlash and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 14 Int'l J. L. Context 237 (2018)Google Scholar.

2 See Center for Justice and International Law, Attacks on the Interamerican Human Rights System Violate the Regional Protection of Human Rights (May 3, 2019), at https://www.cejil.org/en/attacks-interamerican-human-rights-system-violate-regional-protection-human-rights.

3 Klare, Karl E., Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 146 (1998)Google Scholar. “By transformative constitutionalism,” says Klare, “I mean a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of conducive political developments) to transforming a country's political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through non-violent political processes grounded in law.” Id. at 150.

4 See Theunis Roux, A Brief Response to Professor Baxi, in Transformative Constitutionalism: Comparing the Apex Courts of Brazil, India and South Africa 40, 50, (Oscar Vilhena, Upendra Baxi & Frans Viljoen eds., 2013). For Francois Venter, by contrast, the notion of transformation in South Africa has become “pliable, and ideologically compromised.” See Venter, Francois, The Limits of Transformation in South Africa's Constitutional Democracy, 34 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 143, 165 (2018)Google Scholar.

5 See generally Paolo Comanducci, Formas de (neo)constitucionalismo: Un análisis metateórico [Forms of (Neo)constitutionalism: A Meta-theoretical Analysis], in Neoconstitucionalismo(s) [Neoconstitutionalism(s)] 75 (Miguel Carbonell ed., 2003). Roberto Gargarella, Piazzolla, Dworkin, y el Neoconstitucionalismo [Piazzolla, Dworkin and Neoconstitutionalism], Blog: Seminario de teoría constitucional y filosofía política [Constitutional Theory and Political Philosophy Seminar Blog] (Aug. 25, 2011), at http://seminariogargarella.blogspot.com/2011/08/piazzolla-dworkin-y-el.html.

6 Robert Muggah & Katherine Aguirre Tobón, Citizen Security in Latin America: Facts and Figures, Igarapé Inst., 2, 5 (2018), at https://igarape.org.br/en/citizen-security-in-latin-america-facts-and-figures. Moreover, it is one of the most unequal region in the world. Alicia Bárcena & Winnie Byanyima, Latin America Is the World's Most Unequal Region. Here's How to Fix It, Econ. Comm'n Latin Am. & The Caribbean (2016), at https://www.cepal.org/en/articulos/2016-america-latina-caribe-es-la-region-mas-desigual-mundo-como-solucionarlo.

7 See generally Hailbronner, Michaela, Transformative Constitutionalism: Not Only in the Global South, 65 Am. J. Comp. L. 527 (2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Sripati, Vijayashri, Constitutionalism in India and South Africa: A Comparative Study from a Human Rights Perspective, 16 Tulane J. Int'l Comp. L. 49, 92–103 (2007)Google Scholar.

9 Roux, Theunis, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Best Interpretation of the South African Constitution: Distinction Without a Difference, 20 Stellenbosch L. Rev. 258 (2009)Google Scholar.

10 For the global phenomenon, see Constitutionalism of the Global South. The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado ed., 2013)

11 Philippe Nonet & Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (1978). Making the explicit link of how Selznick's responsive law inspired some of the early thinking on new constitutionalism in Latin American in the 1990s, see Espinosa, Manuel José Cepeda, Responsive Constitutionalism, 15 Ann. Rev. L. Soc. Sci. 21 (2019)Google Scholar.

12 Nonet & Selznick, supra note 11, at 16.

13 Id. at 109.

14 van Marle, Karin, Transformative Constitutionalism as/and Critique, 20 Stellenbosch L. Rev. 286 (2009)Google Scholar.

15 Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Sentencia T-025 de 2004 [Decision T-025 of 2004) (per Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa), Apr. 27, 2004 (Colom.) See generally César Augusto Rodríguez Garavito & Diana Rodríguez Franco, Más allá del desplazamiento: Políticas, derechos y superación del desplazamiento forzado en Colombia [Beyond Displacement: Politics, Rights, and Overcoming Forced Displacement in Colombia] (2010).

16 Id. at 44–47

17 See René Urueña, Internally Displaced Population in Colombia: A Case Study on the Domestic Aspects of Indicators as Technologies of Global Governance, in Governance by Indicators: Global Power Through Quantification and Rankings 249 (Kevin Davis, Angelina Fisher, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2012).

18 Andrés Mauricio Mendoza Piñeros, El desplazamiento forzado en Colombia y la intervención del estado [Forced Displacement in Colombia and State Intervention], 14 Rev. Econ. Inst. (2012).

19 Paola Andrea Acosta Alvarado, Diálogo judicial y constitucionalismo multinivel: El caso interamericano [Judicial Dialogue and Multilevel Constitutionalism: The Inter-American Case] (2015) (ebook).

20 On global constitutionalism, see generally Anne Peters, Constitutionalization, in Concepts for International Law – Contributions to Disciplinary Thought 141 (Sahib Singh & Jean d'Aspremont eds., 2019); Peters, Anne, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures, 19 Leiden J. Int'l L. 579 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Wiener, Antje, Lang, Anthony F. Jr., Tully, James, Maduro, Miguel Poiares & Kumm, Mattias, Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, 1 Glob. Const. 1 (2012)Google Scholar.

21 von Bogdandy, Armin, Goldmann, Matthias & Venzke, Ingo, From Public International to International Public Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority, 28 Eur. J. Int'l L. 115 (2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; René Urueña, Global Administrative Law and the Global South, in Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law 392 (Sabino Cassese ed., 2016). Urueña, René, Espejismos constitucionales: La promesa incumplida del constitucionalismo global [Constitutional Mirages: The Unfulfilled Promise of Global Constitutionalism], 24 Rev. Derecho Público Univ. Los Andes (2010)Google Scholar.

22 Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, Nunca más [National Commission on the Disapparance of People, Never Again] (1984).

23 See generally Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, Protección supranacional de la democracia en Suramérica. [Supranational Protection of Democracy in South America] Un estudio sobre el acervo del ius constitutionale commune [A Study About the Acquis of Ius Constitutionale Commune] (2014).

24 República de Chile, Constituciones Políticas de la República de Chile 1810–2015 [Political Constitutions of the Republic of Chile 1810–2015] (Diario Oficial de la República de Chile [Official Diary of the Republic of Chile]), at 448–514 (2015). In November 2019, Chilean MPs and other political leadership reached an “Agreement for Social Peace and a New Constitution,” under which Chileans would vote on a referendum to establish an assembly to replace the 1980 Constitution. For a general description of the Agreement and its main legal implications, see Fernando Muñoz, Pablo Contreras & Domingo Lovera, Definiendo las reglas para lo constituyente [Defining the Rules for the Constituent], La Tercera (Nov. 15, 2019), at https://www.latercera.com/opinion/noticia/definiendo-las-reglas-lo-constituyente/902502. For a defense of the constitutional process, see Fernando Atria, Constanza Salgado & Javier Wilenmann, El proceso constituyente en 138 preguntas y respuestas [The Constituent Process in 138 Questions and Answers] (2020).

25 Cepeda Espinosa, supra note 11, at 24–28.

26 César A. Rodríguez Garavito & Diana Rodríguez-Franco, Radical Deprivation on Trial: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in the Global South (2015).

27 Country-specific studies on constitutional amendment toward democratic enhancement in the 1990s in the region include: In Venezuela: Edward Jonathan Ceballos Méndez, Participación Ciudadana en el marco de la Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y los Consejos Comunales [Citizen Participation in the Framework of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Communal Councils], 21 Provincia 43, 43–60 (2009). Also: Luis Salamanca, La Constitución Venezolana de 1999: De la representación a la hiper-participación ciudadana [The Venezuelan Constitution of 1999: From Representation to Citizen Hyper-participation], 82 Rev. Derecho Público 85, 85–105 (2000). Chile, Colombia, and Guatemala: María Antonieta Huerta Malbrán et al., Descentralización, municipio y participación ciudadana: Chile, Colombia y Guatemala [Decentralization, Municipality, and Citizen Participation: Chile, Colombia, And Guatemala] (2000). In Perú: Víctor Cuesta López, Juan Fernando López Aguilar & Juan Rodríguez-Drincourt Álvarez, Participación directa e iniciativa legislativa del ciudadano en democracia constitucional [Direct Participation and Legislative Initiative of the Citizen in a Constitutional Democracy] (Doctoral Thesis, Univ. Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, 2007). Democracia y ciudadanía: Problemas, promesas y experiencias en la Región Andina [Democracy and Citizenship: Problems, Promises, and Experiences in the Andean Region] (Martha Lucía Márquez Restrepo, Eduardo Pastrana Buelvas & Guillermo Hoyos Vásquez eds., 2009). Ecuador and Argentina: Yanina Welp, La participación ciudadana en la encrucijada. Los mecanismos de democracia directa en Ecuador, Perú y Argentina [Citizen Participation at the Crossroads. Direct Democracy Mechanisms in Ecuador, Peru, Argentina], 31 Íconos Rev. Cienc. Soc. FLACSO-Ecuador 117, 117–30 (2008).

28 For a seminal text, see Eduardo Novoa Monreal, El derecho como obstáculo al cambio social [The Law as an Obstacle to Social Change] (1975).

29 Uprimny, Rodrigo, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends and Challenges, 89 Tex. Law Rev. 1587 (2011)Google Scholar. Many of the lawyers behind these changes were trained in the United States. For the background of many of those acting in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, see Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States (2002). In Colombia: César A. Rodríguez Garavito, La globalización del estado de derecho: El neoconstitucionalismo, el neoliberalismo y la transformación institucional en América Latina [The Globalization of the Rule of Law: Neoconstitutionalism, Neoliberalism and Institutional Transformation in Latin America] (2009).

30 Chile's 1989 amendment (which can be read as an outlier in this trend) merely established the “duty of the organs of the State to respect and promote [essential] rights, guaranteed by this Constitution, as well as by international treaties,” without any specific reference to their status. See Francisco Cumplido Cereceda, Alcances de la Modificación del Artículo 5° de la Constitución Política Chilena en Relación a los Tratados Internacionales [Scope of the Modification of Article 5 of the Chilean Political Constitution in Relation to International Treaties], 23 Rev. Chil. Derecho 255, 255–58 (1996). In contrast, other constitutions in the region have become much more open. On Bolivia, see: Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Arts. 257, 410; José Ismael Villarroel Alarcón, El tratamiento del derecho internacional en el sistema jurídico Boliviano [The Treatment of International Law in the Bolivian Legal System], in De anacronismos y vaticinios: Diagnóstico sobre las relaciones entre el derecho internacional y el derecho interno en Latinoamérica [Of Anachronisms and Predictions: Diagnosis on the Relations Between International Law and Internal Law in Latin America] 29 (Paola Acosta Alvarado, Juana Inés Acosta López & Daniel Rivas Ramírez eds., 2017). On Ecuador, see Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, Art. 424; Danilo Alberto Caicedo Tapia, El bloque de constitucionalidad en el Ecuador. Derechos Humanos más allá de la Constitución [The Constitutional Block in Ecuador. Human Rights Beyond the Constitution], Foro Rev. Derecho 5 (2009). For Brazil, see Constitution of the Federal Republic of Brazil, Art. 5, as amended by Enmienda Constitucional No. 45. This overview of the main “open” constitutional clauses in the region is based on René Urueña, Domestic Application of International Law in Latin America, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law 565 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019).

31 See Manuel Eduardo Góngora Mera, Inter-American Judicial Constitutionalism. On the Constitutional Rank of Human Rights Treaties in Latin America Through National and Inter-American Adjudication (2011).

32 Christina Binder, Hacia una Corte Constitucional Latinoamericana? La jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos humanos con enfoque especial sobre las amnistias [Towards a Latin American Constitutional Court? The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights with a Special Focus on Amnesties], in La justicia constitucional y su internacionalización [Constitutional Justice and Its Internalization] 156 (Armin von Bogdandy, Eduardo Ferrer MacGregor & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi eds., 2010).

33 Kathryn Sikkink & Margaret Keck, Activists Beyond borders (1998).

34 Alejandra Azuero Quijano, Redes de diálogo judicial trasnacional: Una aproximación empírica al caso de la corte constitucional [Transnational Judicial Dialogue Networks: An Empirical Approach to the Constitutional Court Case], 22 Rev. Derecho Publico - Univ. Los Andes (2009).

35 The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, para. 114 (Oct. 1, 1999).

36 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 4, para. 155 (July 29, 1988); Case of Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5, para. 155 (Jan. 20, 1989).

37 Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, para. 272 (Nov. 28, 2012)

38 Case of Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, para. 152 (July 1, 2006).

39 Case of the “Street Children” (Villagran-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, paras. 191–98 (Nov. 19, 1999); Case of the Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, paras. 164–67 (July 8, 2004).

40 Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, para. 148 (Aug. 31, 2001).

41 Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 239, paras. 83, 91 (Feb. 24, 2012).

42 Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 26, 2006). On the doctrine, see generally Mac-Gregor, Eduardo Ferrer, Conventionality Control the New Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 109 AJIL Unbound 93 (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Miriam Henriquez Viñas & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, El control de convencionalidad: Un balance comparado a 10 años de Almonacid Arellano v. Chile [Control of Coventionality: A Comparative Balance to Ten Years ofAlmonacid Arellano v. Chile ] (2017).

43 Conventionality control can be thought of as the international equivalent of the constitutional control (control de constitucionalidad), which is used by national courts to review national laws on the basis of the Constitution. The analogy between constitutional control and conventionality control was elaborated by Inter-American Judge García Ramírez in his concurring opinion in the Case of Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 114, para. 3 (Sept. 7, 2004) (García-Ramírez, J., concurring).

44 See Case of Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221, para. 193 (Feb. 24, 2011); Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro et al.) v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 158 (Nov. 24, 2006).

45 For a comparison of the two courts, see Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, The Added Value of the Inter-American Human Rights System: Comparative Thoughts, in Transformative constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence of a New Ius Commune 377 (Armin von Bogdandy, Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, Flavia Piovesan & Ximena Soley eds., 2017)

46 Seminal Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, 11 et seq. On the Court of Justice's expanded jurisdictions, see Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AJIL 1 (1981).

47 Néstor Pedro Sagüés, Obligaciones internacionales y control de convencionalidad [International Obligations and “Conventionality Control”], 8 Estud. Const. 117, 120 (2010); Claudio Nash Rojas, Control de convencionalidad. Precisiones conceptuales y desafíos a la luz de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Conventionality Control. Conceptual Clarifications and Challenges in Light of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights], 19 Anu. Derecho Const. Latinoam. 489, 491–92 (2013).

48 See Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, para. 189 (Nov. 29, 2006). In his separate opinion to this decision, Sergio García Ramírez argues that domestic laws that violate the Convention are “basically invalid.” Id. (García Ramírez, J., sep. op.). See also Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001).

49 Even the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) only recently dared to declare a national measure as void. Joined Cases C-202/18 and C-238/18, Rimšēvičs/ECB v. Latvia, ECLI:EU:C:2019:139, paras. 69 et seq. (2019). See on the judgment, Hinarejos, A., The Court of Justice Annuls a National Measure Directly to Protect ECB Independence: Rimšēvičs, 56 Common Market L. Rev. 1649 (2019)Google Scholar.

50 Mac-Gregor, Eduardo Ferrer, Conventionality Control the New Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 109 AJIL Unbound 93 (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51 See generally Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America, supra note 45.

52 Kirk Semple, Costa Rica Election Hands Presidency to Governing Party Stalwart, N.Y. Times (Apr. 1, 2018). For the position of his adversary, see Tatiana Gutiérrez Wa-Chong, Fabricio Alvarado: “Corte Interamericana no puede legislar en el país” [Fabricio Alvarado: “Inter-American Court of Human Rights Cannot Legislate in the Country”] La Republica (Mar. 26, 2018), at https://www.larepublica.net/noticia/fabricio-alvarado-corte-interamericana-no-puede-legislar-en-el-pais-para-eso-estan-los-diputados; Fernanda Romero, Fabricio Alvarado dispuesto a salirse de la Corte IDH para que no le “impongan” agenda LGTBI [Fabricio Alvarado Willing to Leave the Inter-American Court of Human Rights so that They Do Not “Impose” LGBTI Agenda], El Mundo (Jan. 11, 2018), at https://www.elmundo.cr/costa-rica/fabricio-alvarado-dispuesto-salirse-la-corte-idh-no-le-impongan-agenda-lgtbi. The Costa Rican presidential elections of 2018 are a clear example of how the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has a transformative ambition, that triggers controversy.

53 The seminal text is Jean Lave & Étienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (1991).

54 Étienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity 83 (1998).

55 Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations 15 ( 2005).

56 Stephen J. Toope & Jutta Brunnée, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (2010).

57 Id. at 115

58 Adler, supra note 55, at 22. The notion of communities of practice has been criticized as remaining silent on the issue of power unbalances; for example, in Alessia Contu & Hugh Willmott, Re-embedding Situatedness: The Importance of Power Relations in Learning Theory, 14 Org. Sci. 283 (2003). However, our reading of the Latin American community of human rights practice takes power differences into account, as it considers many actors and not only states and intergovernmental organizations.

59 Community is a term that comes with many meanings, see Brint, Steven, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept, 19 Sociological Theory 1 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60 For example, by arguing that the transformative could imply an unjustifiable expansion of the Court's powers. See Jorge Contesse, The Final Word? Constitutional Dialogue and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 15 Int'l J. Const. L. 414 (2017).

61 For example, when conservative Evangelical groups reject the Court's case law expanding LGBTI rights. See René Urueña, Evangelicals at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 113 AJIL Unbound 360 (2019).

62 On this, see Manuel Góngora Mera, Interacciones y convergencias entre la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y los tribunales constitucionales nacionales [Interactions and Convergences Between the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the National Constitutional Courts], in Direitos humanos, democracia e integração jurídica: Emergência de um novo direito público 312 (Armin von Bogdandy, Flávia Piovesan, & Mariela Morales Antoniazzi eds., 2017), Diana Guarnizo-Peralta, ¿Cortes pasivas, cortes activas, o cortes dialógicas?: Comentarios en torno al caso Cuscul Pivaral y otros v. Guatemala [Passive Courts, Active Courts, or Dialogical Courts?: Comments on the Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala], in Interamericanizacio´n de los DESCA. El caso Cuscul Pivaral de la Corte IDH [Inter-Americanization of DESCA. The Cuscul Pivaral Case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights] 429 (Mariela Morales Antoniazzi, Liliana Ronconi & Laura Clérico eds., 2020).

63 See the contributions by Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea (Mexico), Carmen María Escoto (Costa Rica), and Dina Ochoa Escribá (Guatemala) at the Inter-American Court in occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Inter-American Convention, to be published on the Court's website.

64 Poder Judicial - República de Costa Rica, Presidenta de la Corte en ejercicio destaca labor de la Corte IDH [Acting President of the Court Highlights Work of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights] (2018), at https://pj.poder-judicial.go.cr/index.php/prensa/389-cme-corteidh.

65 Gender Identity, and Equality and Nondiscrimination with Regard to Same-Sex Couples. State Obligations in Relation to Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights Deriving from a Relationship Between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18, and 24, in Relation to Article 1, of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 24, para. 4 (Nov. 24, 2017). The following description of the Costa Rican case is based on René Urueña, Reclaiming the Keys to the Kingdom (of the World): Evangelicals and Human Rights in Latin America, 49 Neth. Y.B. Int'l L. 174 (2018).

66 Id.

67 Case of Artavia Murillo, supra note 37.

68 Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Costa Rica [Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica], Sentencia No. 2016–01692 [Judgment No. 2016-01692], Nexus PJ (Feb. 3, 2016).

69 Aarón Sequeira, PUSC se mete de lleno en lucha contra decreto de Luis Guillermo Solís sobre la FIV [PUSC Is Fully Involved in the Fight Against the Decree of Luis Guillermo Solís on IVF], La Nación (Sept. 22, 2015).

70 Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Resolution on Compliance (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Feb. 26, 2016) (in particular, see paras. 26 and 36). See, however, Judge Vio Grossi's strong dissenting opinion, in which he questions the IACtHR's jurisdiction to adopt such a decision, especially in paragraph 52

71 Manuel Avendaño Arce, Magistrado Luis Fernando Salazar: Es momento de que la sala IV se haga a un lado [Magistrate Luis Fernando Salazar: “It Is Time that the Constitutional Chamber Steps Aside”], La Nación (Mar. 1, 2016), at https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/salud/magistrado-luis-fernando-salazar-es-momento-de-que-la-sala-iv-se-haga-a-un-lado/KXMCQE7VEZGW7PQPFTGDR25JKU/story.

72 Patricia Recio, Mario Redondo: La resolución de la Corte IDH es una atrocidad [Mario Redondo: “The IACtHR's Decision Is an Atrocity”], La Nación (Mar. 1, 2016), at https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/politica/mario-redondo-la-resolucion-de-la-corte-idh-es-una-atrocidad/FF5M5WY4M5EHHABRXE6TRRHVEM/story.

73 Ramón Ruiz, Bloque cristiano con pocas opciones de limitar la FIV [Christian Block with Few Options to Limit In Vitro Fertilization (IVF)], La Nación (Mar. 3, 2016), at https://www.nacion.com/el-pais/politica/bloque-cristiano-con-pocas-opciones-de-limitar-la-fiv/SKBCLWYIDJDPJNJOH6DSGUI2KA/story.

74 Latin America's Human-Rights Court Moves into Touchy Territory, Economist (Feb. 1, 2018), at https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/02/01/latin-americas-human-rights-court-moves-into-touchy-territory. The following discussion of the Costa Rican elections is based on Urueña, supra note 65.

75 Álvaro Murillo, El matrimonio no parece ser un derecho para homosexuales [Marriage Does Not Seem to Be a Right for Homosexuals], El País (Mar. 26, 2018), at https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/03/26/america/1522024297_765736.html.

76 David Alire García, Costa Rica Vote Halts March of Religious Conservatism, Reuters (Apr. 2, 2018), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-costarica-election-evangelical/costa-rica-vote-halts-march-of-religious-conservatism-idUSKCN1HA081.

77 Supreme Court of Justice (Costa Rica), Constitutional Chamber, Exp: 15-013971-0007-CO. Res. No. 2018012782, Aug. 8, 2018, Boletín Judicial No. 219, 18.

78 Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters, supra note 41.

79 Duque v. Colombia, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 310 (Feb. 26, 2016).

80 See Supreme Court of Justice (Costa Rica), supra note 77, at 23–26

81 Karen J. Alter & Laurence R. Helfer, Transplanting International Courts: The Law and Politics of the Andean Tribunal of Justice 230–33 (2017). The authors argue that, while the jurist's movement was pivotal for the promotion of European integration, they remain largely absent from the process of supporting Andean economic integration.

82 In game-theory parlance, the interaction implicit in the social dimension of the Inter-American human rights community of practice is a dynamic evolution game. In detail, Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 679 (2003).

83 Alexander E. Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory, 41 Int'l Org. 335 (1987); Adler, supra note 55, at 5–6

84 Thomas Innes Pegram, National Human Rights Institutions in Latin America: Politics and Institutionalization, in Human Rights, State Compliance, and Social Change: Assessing National Human Rights Institutions 210 (Ryan Goodman & Thomas Innes Pegram eds., 2012).

85 IACtHR Rules, Procedure for Monitoring Compliance with Judgments and Other Decisions of the Court, Art. 69(2). (“The Court may require from other sources of information relevant data regarding the case in order to evaluate compliance therewith. To that end, the Tribunal may also request the expert opinions or reports that it considers appropriate.”)

86 See Case of Artavia Murillo, supra note 37; Vélez Loor v. Panama, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 218 (Nov. 23, 2010).

87 This understanding applies methodologies of literary critique. See Sahib Singh, Narrative and Theory: Formalism's Recurrent Return, 84 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 304, 307–13 (20014). Diego López has, in turn, applied Harold Bloom's “anxiety of influence” to the appropriation of transnational legal theories in Latin America. Diego Eduardo López Medina, Teoría impura del derecho: La transformación de la cultura jurídica Latinoamericana [Impure Theory of Law: The Transformation of the Latin American Legal Culture] 22–70 (2004). Our discussion, though is not primarily interested in legal theory as a literary artifact but instead focuses on how Inter-American human rights law is deployed in domestic settings. For this approach in international law in general, see Urueña, supra note 61, at 403–09

88 See American University, Academy of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, Inter-American Human Rights Competition 2020, at https://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/initiatives-programs/hracademy/academia/concurso.

89 See generally René Urueña, Indicators as Political Spaces, 12 Int'l Org. L. Rev. 1 (2015).

90 See San Salvador Protocol of the American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 19.1; see also Laura Cecilia Pautassi, Monitoreo del acceso a la información desde los indicadores de derechos humanos [Monitoring Access to Information from Human Rights Indicators], 18 Sur - Int. J. Hum. Rts. 59 (2013).

91 A classic reflection of the role of the Ford Foundation in the creation legal knowledge in Latin America in the 1970s is David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1062 (1974).

92 Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 92–97 (2012).

93 Bernard Duhaime, Subsidiarity in the Americas: What Room Is There for Deference in the Inter-American System?, in Deference in International Courts and Tribunals: Standard of Review and Margin of Appreciation 289 (Wouter G. Werner & Lukasz Gruszczynski eds., 2014).

94 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J. L. Soc'y 279, 287 (1987).

95 González and Others (“Cotton Field”) v. México. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).

96 Id., para. 127.

97 Lina M. Escobar Martínez, Vicente F. Benítez-Rojas & Margarita Cárdenas Poveda, La influencia de los estándares interamericanos de reparación en la jurisprudencia del Consejo de Estado Colombiano [The Influence of Inter-American Reparation Standards in the Colombian Council of State Case Law], 9 Estud. Const. 165 (2011). See generally Salvador Herencia Carrasco, Las reparaciones en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Reparations in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Case Law], in Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Penal Internacional [Inter-American System of Human Rights and International Criminal Law] 381 (Kai Ambos, Ezequiel Mallarino & Christian Steiner eds., 2011).

98 Sally Merry has explored the political and discursive implications of this process in Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (2006).

99 In detail, Sheila Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-Production, in States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order 1 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004).

100 See Colombian Victims Unit at the Ministry of Interior, at https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co.

101 Nadia Tapia Navarro, The Category of Victim “From Below”: The Case of the Movement of Victims of State Crimes (MOVICE) in Colombia, 20 Hum. Rts. Rev. 289 (2019).

102 See Roddy Brett, La voz de las víctimas en la negociación: Sistematización de una experiencia [The Victims’ Voice in the Negotiation: Systematization of an Experience] 12–17 (2017).

103 See Natalia Arenas, El viaje de las víctimas a La Habana desnuda el mayor problema de la Ley de Víctimas [The Victims’ Journey to La Habana Exposed the Major Problem of the Victims Act], La Silla Vacía (Aug. 14, 2014), at https://lasillavacia.com/historia/el-viaje-de-las-victimas-en-la-habana-desnuda-el-mayor-problema-de-la-ley-de-victimas-48419. The selection process was controversial, as the victims of the acts of each actor in the conflict did not necessarily felt represented by organizations representing victims of other actors. Thus, for example, victims of human rights violation by state agents were often at odds with victims of the FARC, thus creating a difficult (and painful) landscape of conflicting victimhood.

104 The registry was established by Article 155 of Law No. 1448/11, 2011 J.O. 48.096 (Colom.)—called, in turn, “Victims’ Act.”

105 For a review of the impact of the notion of “victim,” see Angelika Rettberg, Ley de víctimas en Colombia: Un balance [Victims’ Act in Colombia: A Balance], 54 Rev. Estud. Soc. 185 (2015). For a textured discussion of the mobilization structures of civil society around the notion, see Julieta Lemaitre Ripoll, Diálogo sin debate: La participación en los decretos de la Ley de Víctimas [Dialogue Without Debate: Participation in the Decrees of the Victims’ Act], 31 Rev. Derecho Publico - Univ. Los Andes 1 (2013).

106 Matter of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó Regarding Colombia, Precautionary Measure, at 9(i); 16, considering clause 7 (Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Nov. 24, 2000). See also Matter of the Communities of Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó Regarding Colombia, Precautionary Measure, at 9, considering clause 8 (Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Feb. 7, 2006).

107 On the “comunidades de paz” in Colombia, see Nadia Tapia Navarro, A Stubborn Victim of Mass Atrocity: The Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, 50 J. Leg. Plur. Unoff. L. 188 (2018). John Gregory Belalcázar Valencia, Las comunidades de paz: Formas de acción colectiva en resistencia civil al conflicto armado Colombiano [The Peace Communities: Forms of Collective Action in Civil Resistance to the Colombian Armed Conflict], 7–8 Rev. Entorno Geográfico 196 (2011). Roland Anrup & Janneth Español, Una comunidad de paz en conflicto con la soberanía y el aparato judicial del Estado [A Peace Community in Conflict with the Sovereignty and the State Judicial System], 35 Diálogos Saberes 153 (2011).

108 For analyses on compliance, Fernando Basch, Leonardo Filippini, Ana Laya, Mariano Nino, Felicitas Rossi & Bárbara Schreiber, The Effectiveness of the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection: A Quantitative Approach to its Functioning and Compliance with its Decisions 7 Sur - Int'l J. Hum. Rts. 9 (2010); Damián A. González-Salzberg, La implementación de las sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en Argentina: Un análisis de los vaivenes jurisprudenciales de la Corte Suprema de la Nación [The Implementation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Judgments in Argentina: An Analysis of Jurisprudential Swings of the Supreme Court] 8 Sur - Int'l J. Hum. Rts. 117 (2011). For a more nuanced view of compliance, see James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AJIL 768 (2008); regarding the Commission, Ariel Dulitzky, Derechos humanos en Latinoamérica y el sistema Interamericano: Modelos para desarmar [Human Rights in Latin America and the Inter-American System: Models to Take Apart] 299 (2017); regarding orders against Colombia, Sergio Iván Anzola, Beatriz Eugenia Sánchez & René Urueña, Después del fallo: El cumplimiento de las decisiones del Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, Una propuesta de metodología [After Ruling: The Compliance with the Inter-American System of Human Rights Decisions, a Methodological Proposal], 11 Documentos Justicia Global 447 (2015).

109 Bertha Santoscoy Noro, Las visitas in loco de la Comisión Interamericana de Protección de los Derechos Humanos [In Loco Visits by the Inter-American Commission of Protection of Human Rights], in El sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos en el umbral del siglo XXI [The Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights in the XXI Century Threshold] 606 (2003).

110 See Felipe González, La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Antecedentes, funciones y otros aspectos [The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights: Background, Functions, and Other Aspects], 5 Anu. Derechos Hum. 35, 39–41, 54 (2009).

111 See Celeste Kauffman & César Rodríguez-Garavito, De las órdenes a la práctica: Análisis y estrategias para el cumplimiento de las decisiones del sistema interamericano de derechos humanos [From Orders to Practice: Analysis and Strategies for Compliance of the Decisions of the Inter-American System of Human Rights], in Desafíos del Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. Nuevos tiempos, viejos retos [Challenges of the Inter-American System of Human Rights. New Times, Old Challenges] 276 (2015).

112 For a map, see Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 Mich. J. Int'l L. 345 (1998). For a critique, see also Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really Matters, 1 Glob. Pol'y, 127 (2010).

113 Eric A. Posner & A. O. Sykes, Economic Foundations of International Law 198–208 (2013).

114 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law 69–78 (2014).

115 Case of the Fontevecchia and D'amico v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 238, para. 137 (Nov. 29, 2011).

116 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation], Feb. 14, 2017, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto s/ informe sentencia dictada en el caso “Fontevecchia y D'Amico vs. Argentina” por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Foreign Affairs Ministry Report on the Inter-American Court Ruling “Fontevecchia y D'Amico v. Argentina”], consideration 12 (Arg.).

117 See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation], Dec. 23, 2004, Espósito, Miguel Ángel s/ incidente de prescripción de la acción penal promovido por su defensa [Miguél Ángel Espósito, Incident of Prescription of the Criminal Action Raised by His Defense], “considering” 6, 10 (Arg.); Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation], Nov. 29, 2011, Derecho, René Jesús s/ incidente de prescripción de la acción penal – causa n° 24.079 [René Jesús Derecho, Incident of Prescription of the Criminal Action, Case No. 24,079], “considering” 4, 5 (Arg.).

118 Case of Fontevecchia and D'Amico v. Argentina, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, para. 21 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Oct. 18, 2017).

119 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation], Dec. 5, 2017, Resolution No. 4015 (Arg.).

120 On the impact of domestic adjudication, see Rodríguez Garavito & Rodríguez Franco, supra note 15. For wider impacts of Inter-American adjudication, see Oscar Parra Vera, The Impact of Inter-American Judgments by Institutional Empowerment, in Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence of a New Ius Commune, supra note 44. For a review of the relevant literature on these wider impacts, see Par Engstrom, Introduction: Rethinking the Impact of the Inter-American Human Rights System, in The Inter-American Human Rights System: Impact Beyond Compliance 1 (Par Engstrom ed., 2019).

121 Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 108. Ximena Soley, The Transformative Dimension of Inter-American Jurisprudence, in Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence of a New Ius Commune, supra note 44, at 337; Howse and Teitel, supra note 112.

122 Cavallaro and Brewer, supra note 108.

123 Alexandra Huneeus, Compliance with International Judgments, in The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication 437 (Yuval Shany, Karen J. Alter & Cesare P.R. Romano eds., 1st ed. 2013). A similar argument proposing the effect of the Inter-American system as a function of the relative strength of domestic constituencies of constitutional lawyers, see Alexandra Huneeus, Constitutional Lawyers and the Inter-American Court's Varies Authority, 79 L. & Contemp. Probs. 179 (2016).

124 See Case of the 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, at 132 (July 5, 2004) (English translation).

125 Parra Vera, supra note 120.

126 Rodríguez Garavito & Rodríguez Franco, supra note 15.

127 Acosta Alvarado, supra note 19.

128 René Urueña, Double or Nothing: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in an Increasingly Adverse Context, 35 Wis. Int'l L.J. 398 (2017).

129 Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 Cornell Int'l L.J. 493 (2011); Ariel E. Dulitzky, El impacto del control de convencionalidad. Un cambio de paradigma en el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos? [The Conventionality Control Impact. A Change of Paradigm in the Inter-American System of Human Rights?], in Tratado de los derechos constitucionales [Constitutional Rights Treatise] 533 (Julio César Rivera ed., 2014); Soley, supra note 121, at 338, 344.

130 For a seminal reconstruction of international legal scholarship as participating in larger projects, cf. Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (2001); Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as a Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and Globalization, 8 Theoretical Inquiries L. 9 (2007).

131 See Roberto Gargarella, Democracy and Rights in Gelman v. Uruguay, 109 AJIL Unbound 115, 118 (2015).

132 Par Engstrom, The Inter-American Human Rights System and US-Latin American Relations, in Cooperation and Hegemony in US-Latin American Relations: Revisiting the Western Hemisphere Idea 209, at 215–21 (Juan Pablo Scarfi & Andrew R. Tillman eds., 2016). Juan Pablo Scarfi, The Hidden History of International Law in the Americas: Empire and Legal Networks 179–190 (2017). On the previously unimagined potential of the Convention, as well as the unexpected evolution that led to innovative outcomes, see Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 Hum. Rts. Q. 510 (1997).

133 See Part I.B supra.

134 Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2009).

135 José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers 92–95, 139–43 (2005); Henry G. Schermers & Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity, at paras. 206–36 (2011); Enzo Cannizzaro & Paolo Palchetti, Ultra Vires Acts of International Organizations, in Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations 365 (Jan Klabbers & Asa Wallendahl eds., 2011); Armin von Bogdandy, General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research Field, in The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional Law 727 (Armin von Bogdandy, Rüdiger Wolfrum, Jochen von Bernstorff, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann eds., 2010); René Urueña, Derecho de las organizaciones internacionales [International Organizations Law] 209–25 (2008).

136 Jan Klabbers, The EJIL Foreword: The Transformation of International Organizations Law, 26 Eur. J. Int'l L. 9 (2015). The International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (UN Doc. A/66/10, 2011) provide good evidence of the limitations of the narrow functionalist approach, which has been highlighted by most commentators. See, e.g., Arnold N. Porto, Reflections on the Scope of Application of the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, in Responsibility of International Organizations: Essays in Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie 147 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2013).

137 Sikkink & Keck, supra note 33; see also Kathryn Sikkink, The Transnational Dimension of the Judicialization of Politics in Latin America, in The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America 263 (Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden & Alan Angell eds., 2005).

138 See Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name?: A Public Law Theory of International Adjudication 131–33 (2014).

139 For examples in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Peru, see Protección multinivel de derechos humanos [Multilevel Protection of Human Rights] 327–416, 449–69 (René Urueña, George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo & Aida Torres Pérez eds., 2013).

140 See generally Olivier Duhamel & Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, Las democracias: Entre el derecho constitucional y la política [Democracies: Between Constitutional Law and Politics] (1997).

141 For this same observation outside Latin America, see Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AJIL 241 (2008).

142 Parra Vera, supra note 120, at 376.

143 República Argentina, la República Federativa del Brasil, la República de Chile, la República de Colombia y la República del Paraguay [Republic of Argentina, Federal Republic of Brazil, Republic of Chile, Republic of Colombia, and Republic of Paraguay], supra note 1.

144 See The Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity – Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 23, para. 45 (Nov. 15, 2017). However, the Court has on occasion relied on soft norms to base important decisions, without giving enough explanation as to the specific role of their legal status in its reasoning. For example, see Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra note 65, paras. 174, 206–13. Highlighting this problem with nonbinding legal sources in the majority opinion, see the dissenting opinion of Judge Vio Grossi, paras. 66–69.

145 For example, the Court's persistent view that the principle of equality and nondiscrimination is a jus cogens norm, because it “is applicable to all States, regardless of whether or not they are a party to a specific international treaty” (Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, para. 173.4 (Sept. 17, 2003)) seems to confuse standard customary international law with peremptory rules and lacks, moreover, a strong basis in general international law. The Court has repeated this argument in Yatama v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, para. 184 (June 23, 2005); Case of “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, para. 178 (Sept. 15, 2005); Case of Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, para. 141 (Sept. 8, 2005); López Álvarez v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 141, para. 170 (Feb. 1, 2006); Servellón García et al. v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 152, para. 97 (Sept. 21, 2006); and Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters, supra note 41, para. 79. On the narrow concept of jus cogens, see Jochen A. Frowein, Obligations Erga Omnes, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at paras. 6–8 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2008); Jochen Frowein, Jus Cogens, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at paras. 6–8 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed. 2013).

146 See von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 138, at 117. In a similar vein, the ECtHR held that “while it is not formally bound to follow any of its previous judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases. Since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must, however, have regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved.” See Chapman v. United Kingdom, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 70. On how decisions of the ECtHR have influenced domestic policies across Europe on most sensitive issues, see Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 Int'l Org. 77 (2014).

147 See contributions in International Judicial Lawmaking: On Public Authority and Democratic Legitimation in Global Governance (Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke eds., 2012).

148 For examples of domestic use of Inter-American standards in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, see De anacronismos y vaticinios: Diagnóstico sobre las relaciones entre el derecho internacional y el derecho interno en Latinoamérica [Of Anachronisms and Predictions: Diagnosis on the Relations Between International Law and Internal Law in Latin America] 29–46, 327–416, 449–69 (Paola Acosta Alvarado, Juana Inés Acosta López & Daniel Rivas Ramírez eds., 2017).

149 Contesse, supra note 60, at 430; Jorge Contesse, Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 79 L. & Contemp. Probs. 123, 135–44 (2016); Roberto Gargarella, La democracia frente a los crímenes masivos: Una reflexión a la luz del caso Gelman [Democracy in the Face of Mass Crimes: A Reflection in Light of the Gelman Case], Rev. Latinoam. Derecho Int. (2015); Gargarella, supra note 131.

150 See, e.g., Juana Inés Acosta-López, The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Colombian Peace: Redefining the Fight Against Impunity, 110 AJIL Unbound 178 (2016); Contesse, supra note 60, at 141–42. The concept comes from the ECtHR, see Marckx/Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 58 (1979); Dean Spielmann, Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?, 14 Cam. Y.B. Eur. Legal Stud. 381–401 (2011–2012); Josephine Asche, Die Margin of Appreciation (2018).

151 Gelman v. Uruguay, supra note 44.

152 Thomas M. Antkowiak, Truth as Right and Remedy in International Human Rights Experience, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 977 (2002).

153 Pasqualucci, supra note 92, at 230–88.

154 Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note 48; see generally Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 12 Ger. L.J. 1203 (2011).

155 Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, supra note 48.

156 Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note 48, paras. 41–44, Res. 4. In his separate opinion to La Cantuta v. Peru, Sergio García Ramírez argues even more forcefully that domestic laws that violate the Convention are “basically invalid” (paras. 4–5).

157 The Peruvian amnesty laws were adopted by a Congress put together by Alberto Fujimori, after he closed the democratically elected Congress in the so-called “auto-coup” of 1992. See generally Steven Levitsky, Fujimori and Post-party Politics in Peru, 10 J. Democracy 78 (1999).

158 Gelman v. Uruguay, supra note 44, paras. 232, 246, 312.11.

159 Id., para. 312.11

160 Id., paras. 238–39.

161 República Argentina, la República Federativa del Brasil, la República de Chile, la República de Colombia y la República del Paraguay [Republic of Argentina, Federal Republic of Brazil, Republic of Chile, Republic of Colombia, and Republic of Paraguay], supra note 1.

162 Contesse, supra note 60.

163 Gargarella, supra note 131.

164 Id.

165 See generally Gráinne de Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 221 (2008). For a summary of the skeptical arguments, see Steven Wheatley, A Democratic Rule of International Law, 22 Eur. J. Int'l L. 525 (2011). For the other side, see Armin von Bogdandy, The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9–12 EU Treaty for International Organizations, 23 Eur. J. Int'l L. 315 (2012).

166 Due Process of Law Foundation, Fundación para el debido proceso, expertos y expertas independientes evalúan postulantes a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Independent Experts Evaluate Applicants to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights] (2019), at http://www.dplf.org/es/news/expertos-y-expertas-independientes-evaluan-postulantes-la-comision-interamericana-de-derechos.

167 Michael J. Camilleri & Fen Osler Hampson, No Strangers at the Gate: Collective Responsibility and a Region's Response to the Venezuelan Refugee and Migration Crisis (2018).

168 Letícia Casado & Ernesto Londoño, Under Brazil's Far-Right Leader, Amazon Protections Slashed and Forests Fall, N.Y. Times (July 28, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/28/world/americas/brazil-deforestation-amazon-bolsonaro.html.

169 For a summary, see Nicholas Casey & Andrea Zarate, Corruption Scandals with Brazilian Roots Cascade Across Latin America, N.Y. Times (Feb. 13, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/13/world/americas/peru-colombia-venezuela-brazil-odebrecht-scandal.html.

170 For the radical indeterminacy thesis in general international law, see Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 60–66 (2006). In human rights in particular, see Martti Koskenniemi, Human Rights, Politics, and Love, 4 Mennesker Rettigheder 33, 83–84 (2001).

171 Gargarella, supra note 131, at 118

172 Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. Legal Educ. 518 (1986).

173 Flávia Piovesan, Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: Context, Challenges, and Perspectives, in Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence of a New Ius Commune, supra note 44, at 50–51.

174 Alexandra Huneeus, Reforming the State from Afar: Structural Reform Litigation at the Human Rights Courts, 40 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (2015). Víctor Abramovich, De las violaciones masivas a los patrones estructurales: Nuevos enfoques y clásicas tensiones en el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos [From Massive Violations to Structural Patterns: New Approaches and Classic Tensions in the Inter-American System of Human Rights], 6 Rev. Sur 7 (2009).

175 Soley, supra note 121.

176 On reparations and transformative constitutionalism, see id. at 346–48; Antoniazzi, supra note 23, at 267–75. For a view acknowledging some of the challenges to the legitimacy of the Court's reparations practice, see David L. Attanasio, Extraordinary Reparations, Legitimacy, and the Inter-American Court, 37 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. 813 (2016).

177 See von Bogdandy and Venzke, supra note 138, at 156.

178 See, for example, the strict scrutiny of the 2019 elections of Inter-American Commissioners by civil society organizations. Center for Justice and International Law, Panel independiente de expertos-as evalúa candidaturas a la CIDH y recomienda a los Estados de la OEA nominar personas idóneas e independientes [An Independent Panel of Experts Assesses Candidacies for the IACHR and Recommends that OAS States Nominate Suitable and Independent Persons] (June 7, 2019), at https://www.cejil.org/es/panel-independiente-expertos-evalua-candidaturas-cidh-y-recomienda-estados-oea-nominar-personas. In part due to the lobbying of civil society, the Colombian candidate to the Commission failed to be elected. See Everth Bustamante no sería apto para ser comisionado ante la CIDH, dice panel de universidad [Everth Bustamante Would Not Be Eligible to Be Commissioner Before the IACHR, Says University Panel], El Espectador (June 10, 2019), at https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/el-mundo/everth-bustamante-no-seria-apto-para-ser-comisionado-ante-la-cidh-dice-panel-de-universidad-articulo-8651693.

179 Case of Barrios Altos and Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., paras. 44–45 (May 30, 2018).

180 In a similar sense, see Paula Baldini Miranda da Cruz, Trackers and Trailblazers: Dynamic Interactions and Institutional Design in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 11 J. Int. Dispute Settlement 69 (2020), arguing that “one of the reasons why the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is more creative than other similar tribunals is because its Member States encourage it to do so by complying with its judgments” (at 70).

181 Case of Cabrera García and Montiel-Flores v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, para. 225 (Nov. 26, 2010).

182 For an insider's view of the Court's shift, see Diego García-Sayán, Cambiando el futuro [Changing The Future] (2017). García-Sayán was a judge at the Inter-American Court from 2004 to 2015, and was president from 2010 to 2014, when the main shift took effect. For a scholarly overview of the critiques, see Ariel E. Dulitzky, An Inter-American Constitutional Court-The Invention of the Conventionality Control by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 50 Tex. Int'l L.J. 45, 60–64, 71–79 (2015).

183 Gelman v. Uruguay, supra note 44, para. 193.

184 The discussion of this dimension of conventionality control is based on René Urueña, Domestic Application of International Law in Latin America, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law, supra note 30, at 565.

185 Compare, regarding concerning refugee rights, Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Feb. 13, 2012) with ND and NT v. Spain, App. Nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Feb. 12, 2020). On the ECtHR and the challenges to its decisions, see Madsen, Mikael Rask, The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 L. & Contemp. Probs. 141 (2016)Google Scholar.

186 Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252 (Oct. 25, 2012).

187 Id., paras. 284–286. Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Concurrent Vote, Diego García-Sayán, paras. 10, 18, 20, 37–38 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.).

188 Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Judgment, supra note 186, para. 283; Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Concurrent Vote, Diego García-Sayán, supra note 187, para. 9.

189 Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, supra note 41, paras. 83–93.

190 Alma Luz Beltrán-Puga, Karen Atala vs. La Heteronormatividad: Reflexiones más allá de la discriminación por orientación sexual [Karen Atala v. Heteronormativity: Reflection Beyond Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation], 1 Anu. Derecho Público - Univ. Diego Portales 259 (2011).

191 Duque v. Colombia, supra note 79, paras. 126, 137.

192 See Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 340 (Aug. 31, 2017); Poblete Vilches and Others v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 349 (Mar. 8, 2018); Cuscul Pivaral and Others v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 359 (Aug. 23, 2018); Case of the Indigenous Communities of the Lhaka Honhat Association (Our Land) v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 400 (Feb. 6, 2020).