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Domestic Judicial Design by International Human Rights Courts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

David Kosař  and
Lucas Lixinski
David Kosař
Affiliation:
Masaryk University (Czech Republic). Professor Kosaš’s research for this article was funded, in part, by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic under grant agreement no. 13-07384P. Email: [email protected].
Lucas Lixinski
Affiliation:
UNSW Australia. Email: [email protected].
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Extract

Regional human rights courts in Europe and the Americas came into being in the wake of World War II. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) were established in order to adjudicate on alleged violations of the rights of individuals. Yet, since their inception these courts have also influenced other areas of international law. A part from their impact on general international law, their case law has had significant spill over effects on international criminal law, international refugee law, international environmental law, the law of armed conflicts, and the law of the sea.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 109 , Issue 4 , October 2015 , pp. 713 - 760
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2015

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References

1 See Caflisch, Lucius & Trindade, Antonio Canc¸ado, Les conventions américaine et européenne des droits de l’homme et le droit international général, 1 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 5 (2004)Google Scholar; Pitea, Cesare, Interpretation and Application of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Broader Context of International Law: Myth or Reality?, in Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the 21st Century 1 (Brems, Eva & Haeck, Yves eds., 2014)Google Scholar.

2 See, e.g., Huneeus, Alexandra, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 AJIL 1 (2013)Google Scholar (discussing primarily IACHR case law); Sonja C. Grover, The European Court of Human Rights as a Pathway Toimpunity for International Crimes (2010) (focusing primarily on ECHR case law); see also Lixinski, Lucas, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law, 21 Eur. J. Int’l L. 585 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See, e.g., Lambert, Hélène, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees: Limits and Opportunities, 24 Refugee Surv. Q. 39 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Un High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Manual on Refugee Protection and the European Convention on Human Rights (2007); Nuala Mole & Catherine Meredith, Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights (2010); Robin C. A. White & Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights 179–82 (2010).

4 See, e.g., Philippe Sands, Jacqueline Peel, Adriana Fabra & Ruth MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental Law 775–89 (2012); Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle & Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment 271–315 (2009); Loucaides, Loukis, Environmental Protection Through the Jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2005 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 249 Google Scholar; Pedersen, Ole W., European Environmental Human Rights and Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming?, 21 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 73 (2008)Google Scholar; Donald Anton & Dinah Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (2011).

5 See, e.g., Leach, Philip, The Chechen Conflict: Analysing the Oversight of the European Court of Human Rights, 6 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 732, 758–59 (2008)Google Scholar; Réparer les violations graves et massives des droits de l’homme: La Cour Interaméricaine, pionnièRe et Modèle? [Repair Serious and Massive Human Rights Violations: the Interamerican Court, Pioneer and Model?] (Elisabeth Lambert Abdelgawad & Kathia Martin-Chenut eds., 2010); Lixinski, supra note 2.

6 See Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Jasmine Coppens, The Law of the Sea and Human Rights in the Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, in Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the 21st Century, supra note 1, at 179.

7 See supra notes 1–6; see also Tzevelekos, Vassilis, Revisiting the Humanisation of International Law: Limits and Potential: Obligations Erga Omnes, Hierarchy of Rules and the Principle of Due Diligence as the Basis for Further Humanisation , 6 Erasmus L. Rev. 62 (2013)Google Scholar.

8 See, e.g., Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of Compliance (2013); Hawkins, Darren & Jacoby, Wade, Partial Compliance: A comparison of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, 6 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Rel. 35, 46 (2010)Google Scholar; Trachtman, Joel P., International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with Interna tional Law, 11 Chi. J. Intl. L. 127 (2010)Google Scholar.

9 See also Karen Alter, The new terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (2013).

10 See Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings 46 (2005) (an early claim that the right to an independent and impartial tribunal in European Convention Article 6, infra note 16, includes both the individual human right aspect and the institutional aspect). As we show in part I, however, Article 6 is not the only “vehicle” for addressing institutional aspects of judicial power.

11 On the jurisprudence of the IACHR in giving orders directly to judges, and on the efficacy of such orders, see Huneeus, Alexandra, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 Cornellint’l L.J. 493, 495, 502 (2011)Google Scholar (arguing that the IACHR could increase compliance byengaging judges more directly).

12 See, e.g., Popovic´, Dragoljub, European Court of Human Rights and the Concept of Separation of Powers, in Separation of Powers: Global Perspectives 194 (Prabhakar, M. ed., 2008)Google Scholar; Kosaš, David, Policing Separation of Powers: A New Role for the European Court of Human Rights?, 8 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 33 (2012)Google Scholar.

13 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 [hereinafter American Convention]; see, e.g., Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184 (Aug. 6, 2008). The United States is the only country that signed but did not ratify or accede to the convention.

14 See Basch, Fernando, Filippini, Leonardo, Laya, Ana, Nino, Mariano, Rossi, Felicitas & Schreiber, Barbara, The Effectiveness of the Inter-American System of Human Rights Protection: A Quantitative Approach to Its Functioning and Compliance with Its Decisions, 12 Surint’l J.Onhum. Rts. 9, 15 (2010)Google Scholar (empirical research on remedies ordered by the IACHR between 2001 and 2006 indicates that institutional and legal reform represents 8 percent of all remedies ordered by the IACHR).

15 Article 2 of the American Convention, supra note 13, provides:

Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.

16 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5, 213 UNTS 221 [hereinafter European Convention].

17 See, e.g., Helfer, Laurence R., Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 125, 146–49 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 See, e.g., Sadurski, Wojciech, Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalization of the European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments, 9 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 397 (2009)Google Scholar; Fyrnys, Markus, Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, 12 German L.J. 1231 (2011)Google Scholar; Dominik Haider, The Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights (2013) (regarding the pilot judgments).

19 See Décret n° 2009-14 du 7 janvier 2009 relatif au rapporteur public des juridictions administratives et au déroulement de l’audience devant ces juridictions, at http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/decrets-10181/.

20 See Kress v. France, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (Grand Chamber); Martinie v. France, 2006-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (Grand Chamber); see also Krisch, Nico, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law, 71 Mod. L. Rev. 183 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (for an overview of development of Echr case law on this issue); Lasser, Mitchel, The European Pas teurization of French Law, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1032 (2005)Google Scholar; Lemmens, Koen. But see Pasteur Was French: Comments on Mitchel Lasser’s ‘The European Pasteurization of French Law,’ in The Legitimacy of Highest Courts Rulings: Judicial Deliberations and Beyond 171 (Huls, Nick, Adams, Maurice & Bomhoff, Jacco eds., 2009)Google Scholar; Sudre, Frédéric, Conseil d’etat et Cour européenne des droits de l’homme: Vers la normalisation des relations entre le Conseil d’etat et la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, 22 Revue française de droit administrative 286 (2006)Google Scholar (for critical positions).

21 See section “Military Courts and Special Tribunals” in part I.

22 See, e.g., Hope, David, The Reform of the House of Lords, 60 Revue international de droit comparé 257, paras. 1.4, 3.1–.3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Woodhouse, Diana, The Constitutional Reform Act 2005—Defending Judicial Independence the English Way, 5 Int’l J. Const. L. 153, 154 (2007)Google Scholar.

23 We are aware, of course, that the twenty states that have opted to accept the IACHR’s contentious jurisdiction in accordance with American Convention Article 62 vary greatly in their levels of economic development and institutionalization of democracy.

24 One may persuasively argue that the European Union is unique in so many respects—especially because it comprises only liberal democracies—that the findings regarding this supranational judicial system are no transferrable to other contexts.

25 See American Convention, supra note 13, Arts. 8, 25.

26 See European Convention, supra note 16, Arts. 5, 6, 13.

27 One notable exception is Article 25(2) of the American Convention, supra note 13, which reads:

The States Parties undertake:

  1. a.

    a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state;

  2. b.

    b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and

  3. c.

    c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.

28 See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors 7–11 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that the meaning of the principle of the “natural judge” (sometimes also referred to as the principle of the “legal judge”) varies from one country to another); see also Philip M. Langbroek & Marco Fabri, the Right Judge for Each Case: A Study of Case Assignment and Impartiality in Six European Judiciaries (2007) (noting that this concept thus may set different requirements in different countries, with the most stringent set applicable in Germany).

29 American Convention, supra note 13, para. 8.

30 Berenson Mejía v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 119, para. 144 (Nov. 25, 2004); Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, para. 118 (Sept. 7, 2004); Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 52, para. 131 (May 30, 1999); Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 8, para. 30 (Jan. 30, 1987); Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)No. 9, para. 20 (Oct. 6, 1987) (all requiring the intervention of an independent and impartial judicial organ, having the power to determine the lawfulness of measures adopted in a state of emergency).

31 Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, para. 169 (July 2, 2004); Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, para. 112 (Feb. 6, 2001); Constitutional Court v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 71, para. 77 (Jan. 31, 2001); Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, supra note 30, paras. 130–31; Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, supra note 30, para. 20.

32 Berenson Mejía v. Peru, supra note 30, para. 143; Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, supra note 30, para. 129; 19 Merchants v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, para. 165 (July 5, 2004); Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 96, para. 51 (Nov. 26, 2002); Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, in Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 58, Un Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 (1985) (confirmed by Gares. 40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985) and Ga Res. 40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985)).

33 For a succinct summary of relevant Echr jurisprudence, see Trechsel, supra note 10, at 45– 80, and Kuijer, supra note 22, at 171–382.

34 See, e.g., Wille v. Liechtenstein, 1999-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 279; Kudeshkina v. Russia, App. No. 29492/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 26, 2009).

35 See, e.g., Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.), App. No. 47936/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 8, 2001).

36 See, e.g., Özpinar v.Turkey, App. No. 20999/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 19, 2010). For the IACHR, see Atala Riffo v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 147 (Feb. 24, 2012).

37 We revisit some of these issues in the first two sections of part II to show that the judicial design issues that have been addressed by both the Echr and IACHR represent only a small sample of the wide-ranging prescriptions that these two courts have made for domestic judiciaries.

38 The typical examples of judicial design issues that fall within this category are the role of advocates general and the incompatibility of the judicial office with other functions that are not part of Latin American tradition and that were therefore not challenged before the IACHR. By contrast, these issues have been heavily contested before the Echr.See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (regarding advocates general); Kosaš, supra note 12, at 41–46 (regarding incompatibility with the judicial function).

39 That is why we omit, for instance, a long strand of the Echr’s case law on improper case assignment and the role of court presidents; the IACHR has no equivalent case law.

40 We agree with Trechsel that the ECHR’s various definitions of the term tribunal have not become important factors in the case law and that the “essential point is that the [ECHR] does not give much importance to the [domestic] label which is attached to the institutions that function as a court.” Trechsel, supra note 10, at 48.

41 Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru, supra note 30, para. 167; Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 69, para. 127 (Aug. 18, 2000); Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, supra note 30, para. 148.

42 The cases involving enforced disappearances in Honduras, the very first ones before the IACHR, did not raise such issues, as there was no question whether the prosecutions would be pursued before ordinary courts.

43 Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 259, para. 158 (Nov. 30, 2012); see also Durand y Ugarte v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 68, paras. 116–17, 125, 126 (Aug. 16, 2000); Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, supra note 41, paras. 112–14; Las Palmeras v. Colombia, supra note 32, paras. 51–53; 19 Merchants v. Colombia, supra note 32, paras. 165–67, 173–74; Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru, supra note 30, paras. 141–45; “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 134, para. 202 (Sept. 15, 2005); Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, paras. 139, 143 (Nov. 22, 2005); Pueblo Bello Mas sacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, paras. 189, 193 (Jan. 31, 2006); Montero Aranguren v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, paras. 53–54, 108 (July 5, 2006); La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, para. 142 (Nov. 29, 2006); La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 163, para. 200 (May 11, 2007); Escué Zapata v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165, para. 105 (July 4, 2007); Zambrano Vélez v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 166, para. 66 (July 4, 2007); Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 190, paras. 118–20 (Nov. 26, 2008); Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 207, paras. 108–10 (Nov. 20, 2009); Radilla Pacheco v. México, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, paras. 272–73 (Nov. 23, 2009); Fernández Ortega v. México, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, para. 176 (Aug. 30, 2010); Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, para. 160 (Aug. 31, 2010); Caso Cabrera García v. México, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, paras. 197–99 (Nov. 26, 2010); Vélez Restrepo v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 248, para. 240 (Sept. 3, 2012).

44 Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 56, para. 194 (Sept. 29, 1999).

45 Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 31.

46 Yatama v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127 (June 23, 2005).

47 Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, supra note 13.

48 López Mendoza v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 233 (Sept. 1, 2011).

49 Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 31, para. 77.

50 Id.

51 Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, supra note 13.

52 Id., para. 2.

53 A writ of amparo, typical of Spanish-American countries, is a general remedy for cases concerning the denial of human rights.

54 Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, supra note 13, para. 77.

55 Id., para. 92.

56 Id., para. 103.

57 Id., para. 129.

58 Id., para. 130.

59 Id., para. 133.

60 Id., paras. 227–31.

61 Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order, at 3, 4 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Aug. 28, 2013) (“Considering,” paras. 5, 9).

62 YATAMA v. Nicaragua, supra note 46, paras. 149–50.

63 López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra note 48, para. 111.

64 Id., para. 149.

65 Id., para. 206.

66 We discuss this phenomenon in more detail in part II.

67 The applications concerning military courts were lodged against other countries, too. Most of these cases, however, are either old or decided by the European Commission of Human Rights, not the ECHR. See Maszni v. Romania, App. No. 59892/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 21, 2006) (an exception to these cases).

68 Incal v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1547, paras. 65–73 (Grand Chamber).

69 Id., para. 67 (cross-references omitted).

70 Id., para. 68 (cross-references omitted).

71 Id., para. 70. Note that in the Incal judgment itself, the Grand Chamber refused to consider this argument in abstracto, id., but the chamber judgment in Ciraklar v. Turkey did so just four months later: “It is understandable that a civilian. .. should be apprehensive about being tried by a bench of three judges which includes are gulararmy officer. .. .” Ęiraklar v. Turkey, 1998-Vii Eur. Ct. H.R. 3059, para. 39.

72 Incal v. Turkey, supra note 68, para. 72.

73 Note that in 2004, the National Security Courts were transformed into Specially Empowered Courts, which were abolished only in 2014. See Law no. 6526, Fifth Judicial Package (amending Anti-terrorism Act, Code of Criminal Procedure and other laws, entered into effect March 6, 2014) (Turkey); Directorate General for eu Affairs [Turkey], The Fifth Judicial Reform Package, at http://www.abgm.adalet.gov.tr/eng/absurecindeturkyargisi/judicalreform/thefifty.html; Hande Özhabeş, Assessment on Changes Regarding the Specially Empowered Judicial System in Turkey (Apr. 2014), at http://tesev.org.tr/en/yayin/assessment-on-changes-regarding-the-specially-empowered-judicial-system-in-turkey/.

74 See Şahiner v. Turkey, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, paras. 33–47. In fact, the ECHR went even further and held that the “fact that two civilian judges, whose independence and impartiality are not in doubt, sat in that court makes no difference in this respect.” Id., para. 46 (emphasis added); see also Alfatlı v. Turkey (regarding the applicant Mahmut Memduh Uyan), App.No.32984/96, paras. 34–46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2003); Ahmet Koç v. Turkey, App. No. 32580/96, para. 31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 22, 2004).

75 The competence to try military personnel for nonmilitary offenses was also restricted. See Turkey Military Court Law Passed, BBC News (July 9, 2009), a http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8142257.stm.

76 See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.

77 The Turkish case is Yavuz v. Turkey (dec.), App. No. 29870/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 25, 2000), and the Dutch case is Engel v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 89 (1976) (Grand Chamber).

78 Findlay v. United Kingdom, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, paras. 74–78; see also Coyne v. United Kingdom, 1997-V Eur.Ct. H.R. 1842, para. 58; Cable v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24436/94, para. 21 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 18, 1999); Wilkinson v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31145/96, 35580/97, para. 24 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2001); Mills v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35685/97, para. 25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 5, 2001).

79 See Armed Forces Act 1996 (UK).

80 Morris v. United Kingdom, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 387, paras. 59–72.

81 Id., para. 70.

82 Id., para. 72.

83 Id. The ECHR also made clear that “the position of the military members of the court martial cannot generally be compared with that of a member of a civilian jury, who is not open to the risk of such pressures.” Id.

84 Cooper v. United Kingdom, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 145 (Grand Chamber).

85 Grieves v. United Kingdom, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 247 (Grand Chamber).

86 Cooper v. United Kingdom, supra note 84, paras. 105–34. The concurring opinion of Judge Costa attests that it was a close call.

87 Id., paras. 123–25. The Grand Chamber also took into account that the members of a court-martial cannot be reported on in relation to their judicial decision making.

88 Grieves v. United Kingdom, supra note 85, paras. 74–91.

89 Id., paras. 81– 82, 85–90.

90 See the United Kingdom’s argument in Grieves v. United Kingdom, supra note 85, para. 88.

91 Apart from the Turkish cases, see Maszni v. Romania, supra note 67, para. 51.

92 This trend might reflect the general decline of military courts in Europe. For instance, the German Basic Law allows the establishment of federal military criminal courts “only during a state of defense or over members of the Armed Forces serving abroad or on board warships,” Basic Law, Art. 96(2), at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf, but no such statute has actually been enacted. France abolished military courts in times of peace in 1982 (la loi 82-261 du 21 juillet 1982), and Slovakia did so in 2009. The Czech Republic went even further and, in 1993, prohibited military courts altogether—that is, even in times of war.

93 See, e.g., X v. Ireland, App. No. 8299/78, 1981 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 132; Erdem v. Germany, 2001-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 15.

94 Fruni v. Slovakia, App. No. 8014/07, para. 142 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 21, 2011).

95 Id.

96 Id., paras. 135–49.

97 Ringeisen v. Austria, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 95–97 (1971).

98 Ettl v. Austria, 117 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 40 (1987).

99 See Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 67 (1988); Sramek v. Austria, 84 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 42 (1984).

100 See Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 67 (1988); Sramek v. Austria, 84 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 42 (1984).

101 See Olujić v. Croatia, App. No. 22330/05, para. 44 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 5, 2009); Volkov v. Ukraine, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 73, para. 91; see also Özpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36, paras. 77–78 (where the ECHR read the requirements of independence and impartiality of the tribunal into the right to a private and family life). For further details see section “Removal and Disciplining of Judges” below.

102 See Garoupa, Nuno & Ginsburg, Tom, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 103 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

103 See the consequences of the Volkov judgment discussed below in notes 181–89 and accompanying text.

104 See Trechsel, supra note 10, at 48 n.14; Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, para. 109 (regarding the ECHR).

105 See Trechsel, supra note 10, at 47–48.

106 Vallinder, Torbjörn, When the Courts Go Marching, in The Global Expansion of Judicial Power 13 (Tate, Neal & Vallinder, Torbjörn eds., 1995)Google Scholar; see also id. (noting that the other meaning of judicialization is “the spread of judicial decision-making methods”).

107 Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 31, paras. 80–84.

108 Id., para. 75.

109 Apitz Barbera (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 182 (Aug. 5, 2008).

110 Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 227, para. 50 (July 1, 2011).

111 Id., para. 54.

112 Comisión de funcionamiento y reestructuración del sistema judicial.

113 Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra note 110, para. 60.

114 Id., para. 69.

115 Id., para. 71.

116 Apitz Barbera, supra note 109, para. 43.

117 Id., para. 62.

118 Id., para. 66.

119 Id., para. 78 (citing Chaparro Álvarez v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 170, para.107 (Nov. 21, 2007)).

120 Id., para. 84.

121 Id., para. 86.

122 Id., para. 91.

123 Id., para. 253, operative para. 19.

124 Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 197 (June 30, 2009).

125 Id., para. 50.

126 Id., para. 55.

127 Id., para. 56.

128 Id., para. 67.

129 Id., para. 143.

130 Id., paras. 146–48.

131 Id., para. 127.

132 Id., operative para. 10.

133 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 268, para. 198 (Aug. 28, 2013).

134 Id., para. 199.

135 Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra note 110.

136 Apitz Barbera (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 109; Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 124.

137 Id., para. 79.

138 Id., para. 82.

139 Id., para. 80.

140 Id., para. 89.

141 Id., para. 67; see also Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra note 31, para. 171; Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, supra note 43, para. 145; Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 124, para. 67.

142 Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra note 110, para. 97; see also Apitz Barbera (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 109, para. 55; Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 124, para. 67.

143 Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra note 110, para. 104.

144 Id., paras. 105–06.

145 Id., para. 108.

146 Id., para. 142.

147 Id., paras. 162, 205(8).

148 Id., para. 172.

149 See section “Judicial Lawmaking” below.

150 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, supra note 133, para. 207.

151 Id., paras. 67–98.

152 Id., para. 211.

153 See also Lixinski, supra note 2.

154 Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 36.

155 Id., para. 214.

156 Id., para. 219.

157 Id., para. 220.

158 Id., paras. 221–22.

159 Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.), supra note 35.

160 See, e.g, Albayrak v. Turkey, App. No. 38406/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 31, 2008).

161 See N. F. v. Italy, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, paras. 26–34; Maestri v. Italy, 2004-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 183, para. 43 (Grand Chamber).

162 In the Pitkevich case, the applicant was dismissed for proselytizing on the bench. Before the ECHR she invoked freedom of religion (European Convention, supra note 16, Article 9), freedom of expression (Article 10), freedom of association (Article 11), and prohibition of discrimination (Article 14). In N. F. v. Italy the applicant was reprimanded by the National Council of the Judiciary for being a Freemason; the ECHR found that the reprimand violated his freedom of association (Article 11). In the Albayrak case, the applicant was relocated to rural areas and reprimanded for following Kurdistan Workers’ Party–related media—actions found to be in violation of his freedom of expression (Article 10).

163 See Olujić v. Croatia, supra note 101, para. 16.

164 Id., para. 16.

165 Id., para. 44.

166 Id., paras. 68, 76, 85, 91.

167 See the consequences of the Volkov judgment discussed below in notes 181–89 and accompanying text.

168 Olujić v. Croatia, supra note 101, paras. 35–37.

169 See Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, paras. 124 –29 (where the ECHR found that ordinary courts had insufficient scope to review judicial council decisions).

170 Özpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36.

171 See id., paras. 5–22.

172 Note that the composition of the Turkish High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (Hakimler ve savcılar yüksek kurulu) changed as a result of the 2010 constitutional amendment. The 22-member council now includes the minister of justice, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice, three members of the Court of Cassation, two members of the Council of State, one member from the Judicial Academy, ten members from the civil and administrative courts of first instance, and four members appointed by the president of the Turkish Republic from among experienced lawyers and lecturers.

173 Note that the council’s judicial members were nominated by the Plenary Sessions of the Court of Cassation and the Council of State to the president of the republic, who formally appointed them.

174 Id., para. 30. Relying on Apay v. Turkey (dec.), App. No. 3964/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 11, 2007), it arrived at the conclusion that the criteria for triggering the “civil law” limb in Article 6 of the European Convention, supra note 16, were not met; the Turkish Constitution explicitly prohibits judicial review of decisions of the Turkish High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors.

175 Özpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36, para. 47.

176 Id., para. 71.

177 Id., para. 74; see also K.A. v. Belgium, App. Nos. 42758/98, 45558/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 17, 2005).

178 Özpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36, paras. 77–78.

179 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101.

180 Due to the limited space, we cannot deal with the remaining two stages in the same detail. Regarding the parliamentary stage of the disciplinary proceedings with Volkov, see Id., paras. 118–22, and infra note 208 and accompanying text. Regarding the High Administrative Court stage of the disciplinary proceedings with Volkov, see Id., paras. 123–30, and supra note 169 and accompanying text.

181 Id., para. 109.

182 Council of Europe doc. DAJ/DOC (98) 23 (1998), at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/European-Charter-on-Statute-of-Judges_EN.pdf.

183 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, paras. 78, 109.

184 Id., para. 111.

185 Id., paras. 79, 112.

186 Id., para. 113.

187 Id.

188 Id., paras. 79, 114.

189 Id., para. 117.

190 This position is particularly contentious in transition-to-democracy scenarios. See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus, Judging the judges, Judging ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the apartheid Legal Order (2003) (on how South African judges from the apartheid era refused to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and fought back against any attempt to hold them to account); Hakeem Yusuf, Transitional Justice, Judicial Accountability and the Rule of Law (2010) (on how Nigerian judges managed to escape accountability after the fall of the military regime); Lisa Hilbink, Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile (2007) (discussing the limited accountability of the Pinochetera judges); Huneeus, Alexandra, Judging from a Guilty Conscience: The Chilean Judiciary’s Human Rights Turn, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 99 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (same); see also Kosaš, David, The Least Accountable Branch, 11 Int’l J. Const. L. 234 (2013)Google Scholar (recent scholarship on judicial accountability puts into question whether judges should be judged by judges even in established democracies).

191 See Bobek, Michal & Kosaš, David, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe 15 German L.J. 1257 (2014)Google Scholar (further details regarding this soft law).

192 See Parau, Cristina, The Drive for Judicial Supremacy, in Judicial Independence in Transition 619, 655 (Seibert-Fohr, Anja ed., 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bobek & Kosaš, supra note 191, at 1258–62.

193 This criticism spans virtually all the continents. See, e.g., Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 102; Parau, supra note 192; Seibert-Fohr, Anja, European Perspective on the Rule of Law and Independent Courts, 20 J. für Rechtspolitik 161 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin America (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Rule of Law Series, Working Paper No. 28, 2002); White, Brent T., Rotten to the Core: Project Capture and the Failure of Judicial Reform in Mongolia, 4 E. Asial. Rev. 209 (2009)Google Scholar; David Kosaš, Perils of Judicial Self Government Transitional Societies (2016).

194 Campbell v. United Kingdom, 80 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 80 (1984).

195 Id.

196 Sramek v. Austria, supra note 99, para. 38. However, the Court found a violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention, supra note 16, for another reason. See id., para. 42.

197 Bryan v. United Kingdom, 335-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 38 (1995) (emphasis added). The Court eventually held, however, that Article 6(1) of the European Convention, supra note 16, was not violated; the scope of review of the High Court was sufficient to comply with that article. But cf. British-American Tobacco Co. v. Netherlands, 331 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 77 (1995).

198 Ninn-Hansen v. Denmark (dec.), 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 321; see also Gubler v. France, App. No. 69742/01, para. 28 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 27, 2006).

199 See also Yavuz v. Turkey (dec.), App. No. 29870/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 25, 2000).

200 Brudnicka v. Poland, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 153.

201 Id., para. 41.

202 Luka v. Romania, App. No. 34197/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 21, 2009).

203 Id., para. 42.

204 Id., para. 47.

205 Id., para. 44.

206 Urban v. Poland, App. No. 23614/08, paras. 49–50 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 30, 2010).

207 Id., para. 53.

208 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, para. 122.

209 European Convention, supra note 16, Arts. 5 (right to liberty and security), 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion), 10 (freedom of expression), 11 (freedom of assembly and association), 12 (right to marry); Id., Protocol, Art. 1 (protection of property); Id., Protocol No. 4, Art. 2 (free dom of movement and residence).

210 American Convention, supra note 13, Arts. 12 (freedom of conscience and religion), 13 (freedom of thought and expression), 15 (right of assembly), 16 (freedom of association), 17 (rights of the family), 21 (right to property), 22 (freedom of movement and residence), 23 (right to participate in government). The American Convention also has a general clause on restrictions (Article 30), which is used, for instance, to make restrictions possible to the right to private life (Article 11). See Lixinski, Lucas, Comparative International Human Rights Law: An Analysis of the Right to Private and Family Life Across Human Rights “Jurisdictions,” 32 Nordic J. Hum. Rts. 99, 102 (2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (discussion of Article 11).

211 Note that the concept of law plays a critical role also in those articles that do not have an explicit limitation clause. See, for example, Article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the European Convention, supra note 16, which requires that tribunals be established by “‘law,” and Article 7 (punishment without law), in which “law” determines the foundation for criminal proceedings.

212 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 1), 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).

213 Id., para. 47.

214 Id.

215 Id.

216 See also the follow-up cases against the United Kingdom: Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 44 (1981), and Chapell v. United Kingdom, 152-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 53 (1989).

217 Kruslin v. France, 176-A Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) (1990).

218 Id., para. 28 (for the position France and the delegate of the European Commission of Human Rights).

219 Id., para. 29 (emphasis added).

220 See, e.g., Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 115, para. 88 (Grand Chamber); Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. Netherlands, App. No. 38224/03, para. 83 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 14, 2010) (Grand Chamber).

221 Kruslin v. France, supra note 217.

222 See, e.g., Larenz, Karl & Canaris, Claus-Wilhelm, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 133–262 (3d ed. 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (regarding Germany); Hugo Uyterhoeven, Richterliche Rechtsfindung und Rechtsvergleichung. Eine Vorstudie über die Rechtsvergleichung als Hilfsmittel der Richterlichen Rechtsfindung im Privatrecht (1959) (regarding Switzerland); Malaurie, Philipe & Morvan, Patrick, Droit civil: Introduction Générale 265 (2d ed. 2005)Google Scholar (regarding France).

223 Kruslin v. France, supra note 217, para. 28.

224 See Mitchel de S.-O.-L’E Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy 173 (2004); Komárek, Jan, Questioning Judicial Deliberations, 29 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 805, 809–10, 824 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (recent debate between Lasser and Komárek); see also Beaud, Olivier, Reframing a Debate Among Americans: Contextualizing a Moral Philosophy of Law, 7 Int’l J. Const. L. 53, 59 (2009)Google Scholar.

225 See supra note 222 and accompanying text.

226 See Lupo, Nicola & Piccirilli, Giovanni, European Court of Human Rights and the Quality of Legislation: Shifting to a Substantial Concept of ‘Law’?, 6 Legisprudence 229 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

227 Cass., Jan. 21, 2010, n. 18288 (Sezioni unite), at http://www.europeanrights.eu/public/sentenze/18288_05_10.pdf (in Italian); see also Lupo & Piccirilli, supra note 226, 240–41.

228 Mooren v. Germany, 2009 50 EHRR 554 (Grand Chamber).

229 Note that a defective detention order remains a valid basis for detention until the defect is remedied by the appeal courts in the course of the judicial review proceedings, whereas a void detention order—one containing a serious and obvious defect—provides no lawful basis for detention. See Id., para. 48.

230 Id., para. 90.

231 Id., para. 91.

232 Id., para. 92.

233 Id., para. 93.

234 Id.

235 Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, para. 124 (Sept. 26, 2006).

236 For more in-depth analysis of this notion and its evolution, see Dulitzky, Ariel A., El impacto del control de convencionalidad. ¿Un cambio de paradigma en el sistema interamericano de derechos humanos?, in Tratado de los derechos constitucionales 533 (Rivera, Julio Cesar ed., 2014)Google Scholar; Binder, Christina, The Prohibition of Amnes ties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 12 German L.J. 1203 (2011)Google Scholar; Ruiz-Chiriboga, Oswaldo, The Conventionality Control: Examples of (Un)successful Experiences in Latin America, 3 Interam. & Eur. Hum. Rts. J. 200 (2010)Google Scholar.

237 Dulitzky, supra note 236, at 534–35.

238 Id. at 535.

239 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight.

240 Boyce v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169 (Nov. 20, 2007).

241 Id., para. 78.

242 Dacosta Cadogan v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 2014 (Sept. 24, 2009).

243 Id., Sep. Op. Sergio García Ramírez, J., para. 12.

244 Kimel v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 177, paras. 63–67 (May 2, 2008).

245 Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 206, para. 76 (Nov. 17, 2009).

246 The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 6 (May 9, 1986).

247 Dulitzky, supra note 236, at 547.

248 See Sadurski, supra note 18, at 414–20 (who describes the cooperation between the ECHR and the Polish Constitutional Court that led to Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, 2006-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (Grand Chamber)); Shai Dothan, Reputation and Judicial Tactics: A Theory of National and International Courts 111–12 (2014) (showing other examples).

249 Dothan, supra note 248, at 111.

250 See A. v. United Kingdom, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137, para. 157 (where the ECHR observed that the “present situation is, undoubtedly, unusual in that Governments do not normally resort to challenging, nor see any need to contest, decisions of their own highest courts before this Court”).

251 See, for instance, the work of Alter, Karen, Altering Politics: International Courts and the Construction of International and Domestic Politics, in Political Representation in the Global Age (Hall, Peter A., Jacoby, Wade, Levy, Jonah & Meunier, Sophie eds., 2014)Google Scholar (arguing that human rights courts enhance their power by partnering with domestic institutions).

252 For a narrower argument along the same lines, see Helfer, supra note 17, at 146.

253 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, supra note 133; Campbell v. United Kingdom, supra note 194.

254 Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, supra note 13; Incal v. Turkey, supra note 68.

255 19 Merchants v. Colombia, supra note 32.

256 Lori Berenson Mejía v. Peru, supra note 30.

257 Sweet, Alec Stone & Brunell, Thomas L., Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, 1 J. L. & Cts. 61, 65 (2013)Google Scholar.

258 The bridging/bonding distinction was introduced by Robert Putnam in Bowling Alone: Collapse and Revival of American Community 22 (2000) and Paxton, Pamela in Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship, 67 Am. Soc. Rev. 254 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Essentially, bonding social networks are defined as bringing “together people who are like one another in important respects (ethnicity, age, gender, social class, and so on),” whereas bridging ones “bring together people who are unlike one another.” Putnam, Robert D. & Goss, Kristin A., Introduction, in Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society 1, 11 (Putnam, Robert D. ed., 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

259 See, mutatis mutandis, Helfer, Laurence R. & Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Toward a Theory of Effective Suprana tional Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273, 311–12 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

260 See Helfer, supra note 17, at 158 (arguing that “[w]here executive branch officials or legislators maintain substantial control over judicial appointments, retentions, or salaries, a judge’s interest in professional survival sharply diminishes his or her incentive to hold governments accountable for human rights abuses”).

261 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 259, at 297.

262 See Huneeus, supra note 11, at 495 (arguing that “the compliance gap between executives and justice system actors suggests that the Inter-American Court—and international human rights courts more generally—could increase compliance by more directly engaging national judges and prosecutors, deliberately cultivating national justice systems as partners incompliance”); Helfer, supra note 17, at 158 (arguing that “[t]he cooperation of national judiciaries is essential to maintaining and improving compliance with European human rights standards”).

263 On the importance of national courts in ensuring compliance with international human rights rulings more generally, see Nollkaemper, André, The Role of National Courts in Inducing Compliance with International and European Law—a Comparison, in Compliance and the Enforcement of eu Law 164–65 (Cremona, Marise ed., 2012)Google Scholar; Koh, Harold, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 Ind. L.J. 1401, 1413 (1998–99)Google Scholar; Hathaway, James, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469, 506, 520–25 (2005)Google Scholar; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 259, at 288–90, 310–11, 353.

264 Wille v. Liechtenstein, supra note 34; Kudeshkina v. Russia, supra note 34; Albayrak v. Turkey, supra note 160.

265 N. F. v. Italy, supra note 161.

266 Pitkevich v. Russia (dec.), supra note 35.

¨

267 Özpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36. See also Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 36, for the IACHR.

268 See, for example, Olujić v. Croatia, supra note 101, and virtually all of the other ECHR decisions discussed in part I.

269 Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 36.

270 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, para. 200.

271 Id., para. 208.

272 Jahn, Jannika, Ruling (In)directly Through Individual Measures?—Effect and Legitimacy of the ECHR’s New Remedial Power, 74 Heidelberg J. Int’l L. 1, 26 (2014)Google Scholar.

273 The inattention to local specifics may cause serious problems to the domestic authorities. For instance, the head of Ukraine’s High Council of Justice, Oleksandr Lavrynovych, stated in an interview on October 8, 2013, that according to Ukrainian legislation, Volkov could only be newly appointed to the post but not reinstated; the law on the “Judiciary and Status of Judges” limited the number of judges to forty-eight. See European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, Oleksandr Volkov Reinstated as Supreme Court Judge in Ukraine (Feb. 2, 2015), at http://www.ehrac.org.uk/news/oleksandr-volkov-reinstated-as-supreme-court-judge-in-ukraine/; see also Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101 (Yudkivska, J., concurring). Despite this problem, Volkov was reinstated to the Supreme Court of Ukraine in February 2015.

274 See Bell, John, Interpretative Resistance Faced with the Case-Law of the Strasbourg Court, 14 Eur. Pub. L. 134, 142 (2008)Google Scholar.

275 See, e.g., Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 36, paras. 281–84; López Mendozav.Venezuela, supra note 48, paras. 226–28; Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra note 110, paras. 164–72.

276 See, e.g., Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, supra note 44; Incal v. Turkey, supra note 68, para. 72; Grieves v. United Kingdom, supra note 85, para. 72.

277 See, e.g., Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Camposetal.) v. Ecuador, supra note 133; Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, para. 122.

278 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, paras. 109 –17.

279 See also Seibert-Fohr, Anja, European Perspective on the Rule of Law and Independent Courts, 20 J. für Rechtspolitik 161, 166 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (arguing, regarding judicial councils, that the problem with the Council of Europe’s recent pronouncements is that they have gradually shifted the emphasis from obligations of results to obligations of means).

280 See generally Shelton, Dinah, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2d ed. 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. But see Helfer, supra note 17, at 146–49.

281 Apitz Barbera (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 109, para. 253.

282 Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra note 124, para. 191.

283 Id., para. 193.

284 Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra note 110, para. 163.

285 Huneeus, supra note 2, at 24.

286 But note that this practice has begun to change toward more specific requirements for compliance. See Colandrea, Valerio, On the Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-monetary Measures: Some Remarks in Light of the Assanidze, Broniowski and Sejdovic Cases , 7 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 396 (2007)Google Scholar; Huneeus, supra note 2, at 24.

287 See notes 259–262 and accompanying text.

288 See note 275 and accompanying text.

289 See Findlay v. United Kingdom, supra note 78; Morris v. United Kingdom, supra note 80; Grieves v. United Kingdom, supra note 85.

290 See supra notes 217–27 and accompanying text.

291 See Benthem v. Netherlands, 97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 32–44 (1985) (Grand Chamber); see also van Dijk, P., The Benthem Case and Its Aftermath in the Netherlands, 34 Netherlands Int’l L. Rev. 5 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

292 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.

293 See supra note 22.

294 Incal v. Turkey, supra note 68; Şahiner v. Turkey, supra note 74.

295 Olujić v. Croatia, supra note 101; Özpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36; Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101.

296 Urban v. Poland, supra note 206; Luka v. Romania, supra note 202.

297 But see the caveat supra note 23.

298 It would be wrong to infer, however, that the maturity of democracy does not play any role in adjudicating domestic judicial design issues, at least before the IACHR. For instance, Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 154, suggests that the IACHR was less specific and more deferential in its remedial powers to Chile, an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member, than to Peru, as in Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, supra note 44, or Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 31.

299 On subsidiarity in international human rights law, see Carozza, Paolo, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AJIL 38 (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Neuman, Gerald, Subsidiarity, in The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law 360 (Shelton, Dinah ed., 2013)Google Scholar. On subsidiarity in international law more generally, see Føllesdal, Andreas, Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in International Law, 2 Global Constitutionalism 37 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Jachtenfuchs, Markus & Krisch, Nico, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 Law & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming 2016)Google Scholar. For the foundations and scope of the subsidiarity principle, see Chaplin, Jonathan, Subsidiarity: The Concept and the Connections, 4 Ethical Persp. 117 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Føllesdal, Andreas, Subsidiarity, 6 J. Pol. Phil. 231 (1998)Google Scholar.

300 That said, the IACHR is still more proactive.

301 See Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, para. 208; Apitz Barbera (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 109, para. 246.

302 See also M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational Legal World 125–29 (2008) (noting the development of the human rights regime in Europe and its impact on the eu trade regime, constituting a “school of democracies”).

303 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight.

304 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, para. 12(b) (Apr. 20, 2012), at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf; see also Helfer, Laurence, The Burdens and Benefits of Brighton, Esil Reflections (June 8, 2012)Google Scholar, at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/138; Christoffersen, Jonas & Madsen, Mikael Rask, Postscript: Understanding the Past, Present and Future of the European Court of Human Rights, in The European Court of Human Rights Between Law and Politics (Christoffersen, Jonas & Madsen, Mikael Rask eds., 2013)Google Scholar; Lambrecht, Sarah, Reforms to Lessen the Influence of the European Court of Human Rights: A Successful Strategy?, 21 Eur. Pub. L. 257 (2015)Google Scholar.

305 We discuss this issue in the section “The Quest for an Ideal or Minimal Judiciary?” in part II.

306 Jachtenfuchs and Krisch, supra note 299, observe that at least two versions of subsidiarity can be identified: a “weak” version characterized by “a presumption for the local that provides a low threshold and can be overcome by any reason that makes action on a higher level appear as advantageous,” and a “strong” version characterized “by a high threshold—a presumption that can be rebutted only by strong reasons in exceptional cases.”

307 See the cases discussed in the section “Military Courts and Special Tribunals” in part I, especially the follow ing: Yatama v. Nicaragua, supra note 46, López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra note 48, Belilos v. Switzerland, supra note 99, and Sramek v. Austria, supra note 99.

308 Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 31; Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, supra note 110; Olujić v. Croatia, supra note 101; Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101; Özpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36.

309 Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 31, para. 75.

310 For IACHR cases see Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, supra note 44, para. 194, and the cases cited supra note 43. For ECHR cases, see Incal v. Turkey, supra note 68, paras. 67–72, Maszni v. Romania, supra note 67, para. 51, Morris v. United Kingdom, supra note 80, paras. 70–72, Cooper v. United Kingdom, supra note 84, paras. 123–24, and Grieves v. United Kingdom, supra note 85, paras. 80–89. All of the cases referred to in this footnote are discussed in the section “Military Courts and Special Tribunals” in part I.

311 See Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra note 31, paras. 75–78; Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, supra note 133, para. 207.

312 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, para. 122.

313 By “retention-review mechanisms” we mean any mechanism of reappointment or reelection of judges. In other words, if a state opts for limited terms of judges and allows a renewal of that term, it stipulates a retention mechanism. See Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Clark, Tom S. & Park, Jee-Kwang, Judicial Independence and Retention Elections, 28 J. L. Econ. Org. 211 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (how retention mechanisms work in the United States).

314 See, e.g., Wille v. Liechtenstein, supra note 34; Gurov v. Moldova, App. No. 36455/02, para. 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 11, 2006); Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 40984/07, paras. 143–46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 22, 2010).

315 Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101, paras. 109–17; see also Özpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36; Olujić v. Croatia, supra note 101. All three of these case are discussed in more detail in the section “Removal and Disciplining of Judges” in part I.

316 See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.

317 Apitz Barbera (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra note 109, para. 253.

318 See Benthem v. Netherlands, supra note 291.

319 See IACHR judgments in Yatama v. Nicaragua, supra note 46, and López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra note 48.

320 See Yatama v. Nicaragua, supra note 46, and López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra note 48.

321 See Özpinar v. Turkey, supra note 36; Olujićv. Croatia, supra note 101; Volkov v. Ukraine, supra note 101.

322 See Kruslin v. France, supra note 217; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, supra note 220; Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. Netherlands, supra note 220.

323 See Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, supra note 235, para. 124; see also Boyce v. Barbados, supra note 240, para. 78; Dacosta Cadogan v. Barbados, supra note 243, Sep. Op. García Ramírez, J., para. 12 (the early signs of acknowledgment of judicial decisions as law in the first common-law cases before the IACHR).

32 Huneeus, supra note 11, at 526.

325 Carnota, Walter F., The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Conventionality Control 29 (July 24, 2012)Google Scholar, at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2116599.

326 Moreover, as several scholars have argued, there is far less convergence on separation-of-powers issues than on human rights issues among the members of the Council of Europe and Organization of American States. See, e.g., Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era 53, 59, ch. 8 (2009) (see also pages 53 and 67); Kosaš, supra note 12, at 58.

327 See, e.g., Hilbink, supra note 190.

328 See, e.g., Garoupa, Nuno & Maldonado, Maria, The Judiciary in Political Transitions: The Critical Role of U.S. Constitutionalism in Latin America, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l. & Comp. L. 593 Google Scholar (on Latin America); Benjamin Frommer, National cleansing: Retribution against nazi collaborators in post warczec hoslovakia 328, 333–34 (2005) (on Czechoslovakia).

329 See, e.g., Dyzenhaus, supra note 190; Hilbink, supra note 190; Yusuf, supra note 190.

330 See Dyzenhaus, supra note 190; Hilbink, supra note 190; Yusuf, supra note 190. The widespread purge of German Democratic Republic judges after the reunification of Germany was unusual. See Blankenburg, Erhard, The Purge of Lawyers After the Breakdown of the East German Communist Regime, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 223, 240–41 (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and more generally, Kosaš, David, The Least Accountable Branch, 11 Int’l J. Const. L. 234, 250–55 (2013)Google Scholar.

331 See, e.g., Buscaglia, Edgardo, Corruption and Judicial Reform in Latin America, 17 Pol’Y Stud. 273 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Popova, Maria, Why the Bulgarian Judiciary Does Not Prosecute Corruption?, 59 Probs. Post Communism 35 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (on Bulgaria); Hendley, Kathryn, ‘Telephone Law’ and the ‘Rule of Law’: The Russian Case, 1 Hague J. on Rule L. 241, 252–53 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (on Russia); Parau, Cristina, The Drive for Judicial Supremacy, in Judicial Independence in Transition 619, 639–43, 649–56 (Seibert-Fohr, Anja ed., 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (on Romania).

332 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight.

333 For a similar argument, see Bobek, Michal & Kosaš, David, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe, 15 German L.J. 1257 (2014)Google Scholar.

334 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.

335 See, e.g., Garoupa, Nuno & Ginsburg, Tom, Reputation, Information and the Organization of the Judiciary, 4 J. Comp. L. 228 (2009)Google Scholar.

336 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight.

337 We use the term superiors loosely to cover higher courts, judicial councils, senior judges, and court presidents.

338 Note that both the ECHR and IACHR have jurisdiction primarily over civil-law countries that place a strong premium on legal certainty. See Ferrerescomella, Constitutional courts and democratic values. A European Perspective, ch. 4 (2009).

339 See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (2001).

340 See, e.g., Komárek, Jan, The Place of Constitutional Courts in the Eu, 9 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 420 (2013)Google Scholar; Komárek, Jan, National Constitutional Courts and the European Constitutional Democracy, 12 Int’l J. Const. L. 525 (2014)Google Scholar; Pérez, Aida Torres, The Challenge for Constitutional Courts as Guardians of Fundamental Rights in the European Union, in The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Popelier, Patricia, Mazmanyan, Armen & Vandenbruwaene, Werner eds., 2012)Google Scholar.

341 See Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, supra note 235, para. 124. But note that the IACHR has backtracked on this bolder view of the doctrine, with the consequence that in some states, lower judges might not have the power.