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The Delimitation of Lateral Seaward Boundaries Between States in a Domestic Context

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Jonathan I. Charney
Jonathan I. Charney*
Affiliation:
Vanderbilt University School of Law
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Extract

In 1976 the United States Congress established the Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP) for the purpose of giving financial assistance to those coastal states of the United States off whose shores resource development was being conducted on the outer continental shelf. The program was designed to alleviate the burden that offshore development was said to have placed on those coastal states. The enacting legislation stipulated that the states must comply with certain requirements of the Act in exchange for the distribution of federal funds. Although these funds were to be provided partly in the form of grants distributed on the basis of various statutory formulas, the largest amount of the grants was to be divided on the basis of adjacency. Thus, a coastal state would receive additional funds if the activity on the outer continental shelf took place in the area determined to be “adjacent” to that state. As a result, the geographical description of the areas “adjacent” to each coastal state had a direct impact on the amount of funds each state would realize from the program. Statutory provisions and the regulations required that adjacency be determined on the basis of lateral boundaries drawn in the ocean seaward from the coastal state. Those boundaries might already have been established on the basis of interstate agreements or court decisions. In the absence of such delimitations, the Assistant Administrator for Coastal Zone Management of the Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration was called upon to establish the “lateral seaward boundaries” on the basis of the international law applicable to lateral boundary delimitations. The “lateral seaward boundaries” so established by the Assistant Administrator would have no legal significance other than for CEIP purposes.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 75 , Issue 1 , January 1981 , pp. 28 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © The American Society of International Law 1981

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References

1 The Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP) was established under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, §308,86 Stat. 1280, as amended by Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, §7, 90 Stat. 1013 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §1451 (1979)).

2 16 U.S.C. §1456a(b)(2) (1979).

3 16 U.S.C. §1456a(b)(4)(B) (1979).

4 The status of those states’ boundaries is as follows. Texas/Louisiana: Supreme Court decision Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 93 S.Ct. 1215 (1973); 426 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 2155 (1976); Mississippi/Alabama: specific CEIP boundary agreement pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 1456a(b)(4) (B) (iii) (January 1978); Alabama/Florida: interstate compact, 1953, approved by Congress May 6, 1954 (68 Stat. 77); Florida/Georgia: interstate compact, 1970, approved by Congress October 22, 1970 (84 Stat. 1094); Georgia/South Carolina: presently in litigation before the Supreme Court, filed in the October 1977 term and docketed as No. 74, Original, Georgia v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 917, 98 S.Ct. 388 (1977); South Carolina/North Carolina: specific CEIP boundary agreement pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 1456a(b) (4) (B) (iii) (January 1978); North Carolina/Virginia: interstate compact, 1972, approved by Congress October 27,1972 (86 Stat. 1298); Virginia/Maryland: interstate compact, 1972, approved by Congress October 25, 1972 (86 Stat. 1180). For a complete description of the boundary lines between the states, as well as a historical analysis of how they were developed, see Geological Survey Professional Paper 909, Boundaries Of The United States And The Several States (Superseding U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 1212) (1976). See generallyChristie, Coastal Energy Impact Program Boundaries on the Atlantic Coast: A Case Study of the Law Applicable to Lateral Seaward Boundaries,19 V A . J . Int'll. 841 (1979).

5 16 U.S.C. §1456a(b)(B)(i) (1976).

6 The three consuLTAnts were the author of this article; the late Richard R. Baxter of the Harvard University School of Law; and Dr. Hyman Orlin, geodesist, Executive Secretary, Committee on Geodesy, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, and formerly Chief Scientist, National Ocean Survey.

7 The consultants issued decisions on five lateral boundaries that were contained in four reports. The first, “ConsuLTAnts’ Report on the Mississippi/Louisiana CEIP Delimitation Line,” dated May 24, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Miss.-La. Report), formed the basis for the decision by the Assistant Administrator entitled “Establishment of the Mississippi/Louisiana Coastal Energy Impact Program Delimitation Line,” which was transmitted to the states under cover of letters dated October 26, 1979. It was followed by three other reports: the “Report on the New York-New Jersey CEIP Delimitation Line,” dated November 13, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the N.Y.-N.J. Report), which formed the basis for the decision of September 15, 1980 by the Assistant Administrator; the “Report on New York-Rhode Island CEIP Delimitation Line,” dated November 13, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the N.Y.-R.I. Report), which formed the basis for the decision of July 24,1980 by the Assistant Administrator; and the “Report on New Jersey-Delaware-Maryland CEIP Delimitation Lines,” dated November 13, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the NJ.-Del.-Md. Report), which formed the basis for the decision of May 8, 1980 by the Assistant Administrator. These reports and decisions are unpublished.

8 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] Icj Rep. 3.

9 The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland And The French Republic Delimitation Of The Continental Shelf Decision Qf 30 June 1977, Under The Arbitration Agreement Of July 10, 1975, HMSO Cmnd. 7438, Misc. No. 15 (1978), reprinted in18 ILM 398 (1979).

10 16 U.S.C. §1456a(b)(4)(B) (1976). Seenote 1 supra.

11 16 U.S.C. §1456a(b)(4)(B) (1976).

12 43 Fed. Reg. 7456, 7543 (Feb. 23, 1978), §§931.80-931.85 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 29,580, 29,597 (May 21, 1979), §§931.80-931.85 (1979).

13 16 U.S.C. §1456a(b)(4)(B)(i) (1976).

14 16 U.S.C. §1456a(b)(4)(B)(ii) (1976).

15 Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 -1314 (1953). See generallyUnited States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975); United States v. Louisiana, 100 S.Ct. 1618 (1980), 420 U.S. 529 (1975), 394 U.S. 11 (1969), 389 U.S. 155 (1967), 363 U.S. 1 (1960), 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. California, 100 S.Ct. 1994 (1980), 436 U.S. 32 (1978), 381 U.S. 139(1965), 332 U.S. 19(1947).

16 43 U.S.C. §§1331-1343 (1953).

17 16 U.S.C. §1456a(b)(4)(B)(i) (1976).

18 16 U.S.C. §1456a(b)(4)(B)(ii) (1976).

19 Seethe decisions cited in note 15 supra.

20 See, e.g.,Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); Arkansas v. Tennessee, 310 U.S. 563 (1940); Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).

21 16 U.S.C. §1456a(b)(4)(B)(ii) (1976).

22 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 15 UST 1606, TI AS No. 5639, 516 UNTS 205 (in forceSeptember 10, 1964).

23 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 UST 471, TIAS No. 5578, 499 UNTS 311 (in forceJune 10, 1964).

24 Miss.-La. Report at 7.

25 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 15 UST at 1610.

26 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 UST at 474. A median or equidistance line between two states is a line that at all points is equally distant from the baselines of the two states. Thus, if one were to draw straight lines from any one point on the line to the nearest point on each nation's baseline, these lines would be of equal length. See1 A. Shalowitz, Shore And Sea Boundaries 230-35 (1962); and Hodgson & Cooper, The Technical Delimitation of a Modern Equidistance Boundary,3 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L. 361 (1975-1976).

27 Miss.-La. Report at 8-11.

28 Id.at 9 - 11 .

29 Specifically, the consultants found: [T]he delimitation of the continental shelf boundary between adjacent or opposite states, whether under the Geneva Conventions of 1958 or customary international law, is to be effected with considerable weight being given to the application of “equitable principles.” (North Sea Continental Shelf Casesat 1188; Anglo-French Arbitrationat 1245.) This is not to say that courts are called upon to decide such questions ex aequo et bono,freed of legal constraints. As the International Court of Justice stated in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, “in this field it is precisely a rule of law that calls for the application of equitable principles.” (At 1188.) Miss.-La. Report at 9.

30 Id.at 9-10.

31 The consultants observed that in the Anglo-Frencharbitration it was said: ”… the combined character of the equidistance-special circumstances rule means that the obligation to apply the equidistance principle is always one qualified by the condition ‘unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances.’ (At 1170.)” Consequently, the consuLTAnts stated “that the treatment of equidistance-special circumstances as one rule is sound,” and that they “have been guided by the view in [their] examination of lateral seaward boundaries.” Miss.- La. Report at 10.

32 Ibid.The consultants noted that the International Court of Justice specifically found: In fact, there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable procedures, and more often than not it is the balancing-up of all such considerations that will produce this result rather than reliance on one to the exclusion of all others. Miss.-La. Report at 10, quoting [1969] Icj Rep. 50, para. 93.

33 Miss.-La. Report at 10-11.

34 Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 AJIL 1, 19-23 (1980).

35 Convention on the Continental Shelf, supranote 23. The combined adjacency and exploitability test described in Article 1 of the Convention provides that a state's jurisdiction over the resources in its adjacent continental shelf ends at the point where the super adjacent waters no longer admit of exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil.

36 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 111331-1343 (1953).

37 Miss.-La. Report at 4. See generallyN.J.-Del.-Md. Report; N.Y.-N.J. Report; and N.Y.-R.I. Report.

38 Miss.-La. Report at 4.

39 See id.at 14-15 and 32-34. It runs due south from about point M’ on map 3, at p. 44.

40 Agreement between Maryland and Virginia, Pub. L. No. 92-565, 86 Stat. 1179 (1979). SeeN.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 23 and 27-28. See alsoline R-S on map 5, at p. 59.

41 The consuLTAnts reasoned: The Supreme Court has stated that the public international law of treaties between sovereign states is applicable to compacts between the states of the United States, Hinderlider v. La Plata Co.,304 U.S. 92, 106-107 (1938). Under public international law interstate agreements are not binding on third states not parties to the instrument (pacta tertiis nee nocent nee prosunt).Thus, a boundary agreed upon by two states, even if under an interstate compact approved by the Congress, is not binding on any other state. Specifically, if the boundary agreed upon by States A and B intersects with the boundary claimed by State C, State C is entitled to challenge that boundary from the point of intersection seaward. The CEIP legislation does not suggest any different conclusion. Miss.-La. Report at 4 - 5 . See alsoN.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 28 and n.18.

42 Miss.-La. Report at 33.

43 Id.at 5, 14, and 33. SeeNJ.-Del.-Md. Report at 23 and 27.

44 Agreement of October 12, 1887, between the Boundary Commissioners for New York and the Boundary Commissioners for New Jersey, N.Y. State Law Art. 2, §7, at 36 (McKinney 1952) [hereinafter cited as Agreement of 1887]. Seeline H-A-K on map 4, at p. 50.

45 Act of July 3, 1944, ch. 399, 58 Stat. 723 (1944); 1943 N.Y. Laws, ch. 355; 1942 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 1145. Seeline I-D on map 1 at p. 40.

46 N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 12-17. The agreement allegedly established a due east line. Seeline A-D on map 5 at p. 59.

47 There was no substantial issue over the facts that allegedly gave rise to the agreement. The consuLTAnts found that the official who was alleged to have bound New Jersey had no actual authority from the state to bind it and that the equitable doctrines of implied authority, acquiescence, or estoppel to be found in federal law would not support a conclusion that a binding agreement existed. N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 17-22. Dyer v. Simms, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); and Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (federal common law is applicable to boundary disputes between the states).

48 1942 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 1145, quoted in N.Y.-R.I. Report at 2.

49 N.Y. State Law Art. 2, §7, at 36 (McKinney 1952), quoted in N.Y.-N J . Report at 2.

50 295 U.S. 694 (1935); 291 U.S. 361 (1934).

51 202 U.S. 1 (1906).

52 N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 4 - 9 ; Miss.-La. Report at 17-18; N.Y.-N.J. Report at 8-10; N.Y.- R.I. Report at n.2.

53 Note 48 supra.

54 Note 49 supra.

55 Note 50 supra.

56 Note 51 supra.

57 N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 5, quoting New Jersey v. Delaware, 295 U.S. at 697-98.

58 Miss.-La. Report at 13, quoting Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. at 58.

59 The United States first claimed the right to use 24-mile lines to close juridical bays under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supranote 22. A 6-mile closing line was probably in use in 1887 at the time of the Raritan Bay agreement, while the 10-mile rule was certainly used in the 1930's and 1940's.

60 43 U.S.C. §§1301-1314 (1953).

61 N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 7.

62 See generallyN.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 6-8; Miss.-La. Report at 18; N.Y.-N.J. Report 8-9; N.Y.-R.I. Report at n.2. See alsothe Grisbadarna Case (Norway v. Sweden), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121, 127-29 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1909), reprinted in4 AJIL 226, 231-32 (1910); for the original French version, see Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 487,491-92, or 11 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 155, 159-60.

63 N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 7.

64 Id.at 6-7.

65 N.Y.-R.I. Report at 2, citing 1942 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 1145.

66 N.Y.-R.I. Report at n.2. New York and Rhode Island agree that their seaward boundaries extend 3 miles from a line drawn between Block Island and Montauk Point. (Seemap 1.) Contrarily, the United States asserts that the limits of the states’ seaward boundaries are measured from the low water line and certain closing lines around Block Island Sound. Ibid.

67 N.Y.-R.I. Report at 3.

68 N.Y.-N.J. Report at 9.

69 Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. at 58. Specifically, the Court found the real, certain and true boundary south of the State of Mississippi and north of the southeast portion of the State of Louisiana, and separating the two States in the waters of Lake Borgne and Mississippi Sound, to be … the deep water channel sailing line emerging from the most eastern mouth of Pearl River into Lake Borgne and extending through the northeast corner of Lake Borgne, north of Half Moon or Grand Island, thence east and south through Mississippi Sound, through South Pass between Cat Island and Isle a Pitre, to the Gulf of Mexico… . Ibid.

70 Miss.-La. Report at 23-24.

71 Id.at 19-21 and 24. Seediscussion of the thalweg at notes 76-86 infra.

72 16 U.S.C. §1465 a(b)(4)(B)(ii) (1979).

73 Miss.-La. Report at 6. See alsoN.Y.-N.J. Report at 16-17.

74 See, e.g., Agreement of 1887 at 36 (boundary described as going “at right angles with the last mentioned line to the main sea“), quoted in N.Y.-N.J. Report at 2; Marine Boundary Agreement of 1942 between New York and Rhode Island (boundary runs “thence in the samedirection out to sea to the limits of the territorial waters of the two states“), quoted inN.Y.-R.I. Report at 2; New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. at 698 (boundary runs “in a straight line S. 24° 06’ E True … seaward to the limits of the respective states“), quoted inN.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 2; Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906) (boundary runs “east and south … to the Gulf of Mexico, as delineated on the following map“), quoted inMiss.-La. Report at 13.

75 N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 9-10.

76 Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906).

77 New Jersey v. Delaware, 295 U.S. 694 (1935).

78 SeeN.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 2 and 11; Miss.-La. Report at 15.

79 SeeN.Y.-N.J. Report at 3-4.

80 Miss.-La. Report at 19. The consuLTAnts relied on Justice Cardozo's opinion in New Jersey v. Delawarein concluding that the thalweg was used as a means of obtaining basic equity. The consuLTAnts stated in their report: Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote: The underlying rationale of the doctrine of the Thalwegis one of underlying equality and justice. “A river,” in the words of Holmes, J. (New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342), “is more than an amenity, it is a treasure.” If the dividing line were to be placed in the centre of the stream rather than in the centre of the channel, the whole track of navigation might be thrown within the territory of one state to the exclusion of the other. Considerations such as these have less importance for commonwealths or states united under a general government than for states wholly independent. None the less, the same test will be applied in the absence of usage or convention pointing to another. Indeed, in 1783, the equal opportunity for use that was derived from equal ownership may have had a practical importance for the newly liberated colonies, still loosely knit together, such as it would not have today. They were not taking any chances in affairs of vital moment. Bays and rivers are more than geometrical divisions. They are the arteries of trade and travel. (New Jersey v. Delaware,291 U.S. 361, 380-81 (1934) (citations omitted).) The quoted passage makes clear that, as applied by the Supreme Court, the thalwegwas considered a means of achieving a more basic notion of equity: states were to have fair access to the arteries of commerce—in that case, navigable inland waters. The Supreme Court also observed in Arkansas v. Tennessee,310 U.S. 563, 571 (1940) that “[t]he rule of the thalwegrests upon equitable considerations and is intended to safeguard to each state equality of access and right of navigation in the stream.” Miss.-La. Report at 19-20.

81 People v. Central R.R. Co. of New Jersey, 42 N.Y. 283 (1870) (equated “middle” with thalweg). SeeN.Y.-N.J. Report at 10-11. The consuLTAnts stated: There is no indication whatsoever that the line seaward of the starting point followed the thalwegof the Bay, if indeed there can be such a thing asathalwegin a bay. The line starts out at an equidistance point, passes through a light (Great Beds Lighthouse) and then through a “granite and iron beacon” on a shoal (Dry Roamer Shoal). A permanent monument was erected in Raritan Bay at a cost of $10,000—a very substantial sum of money for those times—to mark the intersection of the Morgan No. 2-Roamer Stone Beacon line with the Great Beds Lighthouse-Wilson's Beacon line, at which intersection the boundary turned toward the mouth of the Bay… . It would be a very strange thalwegwhich ran through a lighthouse and two permanent beacons and over a shoal. Furthermore, we have been unable to locate data which would indicate the location of the principal tracks of navigation through Raritan Bay at the time of the negotiations. Apparently, much of the Bay was considered navigable. Similarly, there is no clearly identifiable deep water line… . There is virtually no correlation between [potential] deep water lines and the boundary agreement. Id.at 13.

82 Miss.-La. Report at 20-21. See also id.at n.8 and NJ.-Del.-Md. Report at 9.

83 202 U.S. at 50. See alsoWisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S. 455, 461-63 (1935).

84 Miss.-La. Report at 5; N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 9-10; N.Y.-N.J. Report at 16; N.Y.-R.I. Report at 4.

85 N.Y.-N.J. Report at 13, quoted supraat note 81.

86 See section III, “Delimitation of a Lateral Seaward Boundary,” supra.

87 N.Y.-N.J. Report at 14-15.

88 Id.at 15.

89 Id. at 16. SeeN.Y.-R.I. Report at 7.

90 See generallyA. Shalowitz, supranote 26; Hodgson & Cooper, supranote 26.

91 N.Y.-N.J. Report at 16; N.Y.-R.I. Report at 6-7.

92 N.Y.-R.I. Report at 6. Seemap 1, at p. 40. Comparelines I-D and I-C.

93 N.Y.-N.J. Report at 15-16. Seemap 4. Comparelines H-C and H-A.

94 Id.at 16; N.Y.-R.I. Report at 6.

95 Miss.-La. Report at 22-23.See text accompanying note 55 supra.The line connected points C and A depicted on map 3, at p. 44.

96 Seediscussion in text at note 30 supra.

97 Miss.-La. Report at 32.

98 Id.at 32-37. The court of arbitration in the Anglo-Frenchcase essentially did this by defining two regions for consideration, the Channel region and the Atlantic region. The description of the relevant geological and geographic situation is limited; no coasts not adjacent to the areas in dispute were considered. Anglo-French arbitration, supranote 9, paras. 2-12. No such limits were discussed in the North Seacases because the Court was not called upon todelimit any boundary; the question presented was limited to an identification of the “principles and rules of international law … applicable to the delimitation as between the Parties of the areas of the continental shelfin the North Sea which appertain to each of them… .” [1969] ICJ REP. 7and para. 2.

99 On a small-scale chart, it would appear that there is a straight coastline running between the western boundary of Louisiana to Florida. At a slightly larger scale, the curvature of the Louisiana underbelly and the Mississippi Delta appear to be dominant geographical features, overwhelming the significance of the short Mississippi coastline. At an even larger scale, the boundary in question appears to be between two states located on a curvature of the coast. SeeMiss.-La. Report at 26-27 and 32.

100 SeeN.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 22-28; N.Y.-N.J. Report at 16-18; N.Y.-R.I. Report at 7.

101 N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 22-28.

102 Mississippi supported its arguments for a favorable boundary on the gound that it was a very poor state, citing statistics on personal income, per capita income, tax burden, and proved recoverable natural gas reserves. While not denying these assertions, Louisiana argued that it had a heavy public burden to carry owing to the fact that it is used as the base for virtually all offshore hydrocarbon activities; while severance taxes had in the past been adequate, the depletion of hydrocarbons on and near the shore had diminished this source of income. Nevertheless, the consuLTAnts found: this data did not present a significant factual basis for evaluating the propriety of any line. Nor [did] it provide a rationale for delimiting the line in one way rather than another. Not only is the data not relevant, but the data does not appear to so differentiate the states as to justify a delimitation favoring one state over another. Miss.-La. Report at 24.

103 Id. at 25-26.

104 Id.at 25.

105 7d. at 26.

106 Id. at 27.

107 ld.at 28.

108 W. at 28-29.

109 Id.at 30-31.

110 W. at 35.

111 Id.at 37-39

112 W. at 38-39.

113 Ibid.

114 N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 23-24.

115 Id.at 24.

116 Id.at 24-25.

117 Id.at 25.

118 Ibid.

119 N.Y.-N.J. Report at 17-18. The consuLTAnts stated: It is our view that Long Island does not constitute a special circumstance and that no ‘ inequity results from the application of the equidistance principle. Long Island is 120 miles long, the same length as New Jersey's coastline; its area is over one-third of that of New Jersey. At New York City it is separated from the mainland by short distances… . Rather than jutting out into the sea, the axis of the Island is generally parallel to the mainland coast to the north. Long Island has, according to the New York memorandum (at 12), a population of over 7,000,000 constituting 40% of the population of the State of New York. We see no comparability between the Scilly Islands, a group of small, lightly-populated islands jutting out into the sea, with a heavily populated large island, fronting the coast and separated from the mainland by a sound of moderate width. In this case, Long Island is not a “special circumstance” as that term is employed in boundary delimitation, and our attention has been called to no other “special circumstance” or inequity that would call for a deviation from an equidistance line. Ibid.

120 Id.at 17. Roughly speaking, the coastlines of New Jersey and of New York's Long Island are at a 90° angle to one another. The geographical similarities of the ocean coastlines of the two states cause the equidistance line to proceed seaward in a relatively straight manner at approximately 45° from each state. Viewed another way, this situation could be considered a case of offsetting irregularities in the coastline referred to in the Anglo-Frenchaward (supranote 9, at para. 103).

121 N.Y.-R.I. Report at 7.

122 Miss.-La. Report at 39.

123 N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 26; Miss.-La.Report at 42.

124 Miss.-La. Report at 40-41; N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 26; Anglo-French award, supranote 9, para. 251.

125 Miss.-La. Report at 41-43; N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 26.

126 To put it simply, the modified equidistance line is generated from two lines. One is the normal equidistance line which is delimited by use of all baselines in the area. The second is a line that is extremely favorable to the state adversely affected by the special circumstances. That second line might be developed by substantially discounting the special circumstances. The next step is to generate a line that is equidistant from the two lines just described. On map 3, at p. 44, line A-A’ is the normal equidistance line; the baseline between points A and I, and line I-I’ is a series of lines deemed to be extremely favorable to Mississippi that discount those geographical features constituting the special circumstances; and line A-L is the line that is equidistant from the two baselines just identified. The latter line was recommended by the consuLTAnts in the Louisiana-Mississippi case. Miss.-La. Report at 41. On Map 6, at p. 60, the normal equidistance line in the case of the New Jersey-Delaware boundary is line A-C; the line that discounts the geographical features constituting special circumstances is line A-L; and the equidistance line between them is line A-W. In the case of the Maryland-Delaware boundary, the equidistance line is line E-Y-C; the line that discounts the geographical features constituting special circumstances is line E-M; and the equidistance line between them is line E-X. Lines A-W and E-X formed the bases for the consuLTAnts’ recommendations in the Delaware boundary matters. N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 27.

127 N.J.-Del.-Md. Report at 27-28; Miss.-La. Report at 41-43.

128 However, the linkage of the recommended line to previously established lines presented one final technical difficulty in the case of New York. Whereas all of the lines recommended by the consuLTAnts began at an equidistant point, neither of the New York boundaries that had previously been established by agreement ended exactly at such a point. In order to avoid a discontinuity, the consuLTAnts relied on the concept of simplification of the equidistance line for the purpose of convenience. This approach is inherent in current international practice and it was found to be one of the principles used by the negotiators who developed the original boundary agreements discussed above in section III. Thus, line segments connecting the end points of the agreed lines to a point on the equidistance line were chosen so that the line would conform to the general direction of the equidistance line. New York's extended CEIP boundary with New Jersey is illustrated as line K-D on map 2, at p. 41; the Rhode Island line is line D-G on map I, at p. 40. N.Y.-NJ. Report at 18-19; N.Y.-R.I. Report at 8-9.

129 State of Louisiana v. Luther Hodges, Jr., et al., Civil Action No. 79-601-B (M.D. La.); State of Mississippi v. Secretary U.S. Department of Commerce, et al., Civil Action No. 579-0634(R) (S.D. Miss.). A related action concerning the procedures followed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is State of Delaware v. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Civil No. 80-0565 (D.D.C.). The district court issued a decision on April 3, 1980, for NOAA and against Delaware, which was appealed by the plaintiff. On November 14, 1980, the case was dismissed by the court of appeals as moot upon the suggestion of the defendant.

130 Anglo-French award, supranote 9, paras. 183-203 and 248-252.

131 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3, Arts. 74 and 83 (1980).