This article reports results of an inquiry into the composition and policies of the leaders of the Chicago Bar Association. The leadership cadre was partitioned into three status groups on the basis of background characteristics and law school attended. Outside educational elites, dominating the board during the early 1950s, pursued policies that defended prestigious areas of legal work from other encroaching professionals and sought to constrain the plaintiff side of the personal injury bar. Local ethnic elites obtained a share of the leadership during the mid-1960s and transformed the judicial politics of the CBA to conform to local Democratic party objectives. At the center of the leadership cadre was a group of local aristocrats, well connected to major corporate and civic organizations, whose participation in the leadership roles fluctuated less dramatically than that of the other groups. A review of policies suggests that the local aristocrats were responsible to some extent for integrating the various specialized projects pursued by disparate segments of the Chicago bar. Detailed examination of the composition and policies of this local bar leads to the conclusion that associations of the legal profession are capable of accommodating diverse interests to an extent not previously measured or assessed.

This article is concerned with the accountability of the civil advocate for results obtained for a client. It distinguishes the criminal trial by arguing that for effective implementation the adversary system, as it is commonly understood, requires that the professional advocates be equally competent and equally adversary and that because it does not meet these criteria, the criminal trial cannot be looked to as a model either of the adversary system or of the behavior of advocates in the civil trial. Rules of behavior for the civil litigator should be drawn with the primary objective of ascertaining truth. Moreover, the civil litigator cannot claim immunity from moral accountability by reference to the lawyer's role; he or she is personally accountable for an immoral result obtained for a client. Seeking to avoid this accountability all lawyers might reject an immoral but lawful cause, so that persons with such causes would be deprived of professional representation. The conflict between the lawyer's personal morality and the social value of professional assistance is resolved by reference to a formula for assigning counsel similar to those in Mathews v. Eldridge and Lassiter v. Department of Social Services. The author analyzes the moral dilemma of a lawyer who is so assigned and proposes a solution.

This article provides an overview of an empirical study of a civil trial court and the environment of indigenous law and conflict resolution in which the court operates. The article combines an analysis of civil cases and litigants with an investigation of alternative nonjudicial approaches used by residents of the community. The first section of the article examines the emergence of legal conflicts from the fabric of social relationships in the community and compares cases and parties in the court with those that gravitate toward nonjudicial settings. The second section compares processes and outcomes available in the court with those that may be obtained nonjudicially. The article concludes that different categories of cases emerge from different kinds of social relationships and for this reason are associated with fundamentally dissimilar patterns of values, norms, procedures, and outcomes. It also emphasizes the benefits to be obtained from investigating the complex relationships and interchanges that link local level trial courts to their communities.

When a bidding corporation succeeds in obtaining voting control of a target corporation through a hostile tender offer, many commentators argue that it is unfair to allow the bidder to exercise its voting power to set the price terms of a second-step takeout merger in which the bidder purchases the shares of the remaining target shareholders. This concern is inappropriate because it treats a unitary acquisition between adversaries as if it were two separate transactions–the second of which involves abuse of power by fiduciaries–and also because it assumes that shareholders of the target corporation are incapable of protecting themselves from the power of a successful bidder. Moreover, imposition of fiduciary rules may impose either prohibitive costs or absolute barriers to some takeovers, even if such transactions would be wealth producing. While there is a risk that some takeovers may exploit the “prisoner's dilemma” facing target shareholders threatened with an unattractive takeout threat, target shareholders are capable of responding to that threat with devices to coordinate their response. So-called “shark repellent” amendments that raise the proportion of votes required to approve second-step mergers or that limit the terms of such mergers can function as coordination devices to alleviate the prisoner's dilemma. Commentators' fears that such devices may unduly burden the market for corporate control appear to depend to a large extent on unfounded assumptions that all takeovers are wealth producing and that takeovers are never motivated by potential gains flowing from exploitation of the lack of coordination among target shareholders. However, empirical studies indicate that adoption of such coordination rules can benefit target shareholders and that it is unlikely that shareholders will approve voting rules so restrictive that they would preclude wealth-creating acquisitions. The usual notions of shareholder apathy are simply inapplicable to takeout mergers.

Many of the unified bars—public bodies to which all lawyers must belong and pay dues in order to practice—have been embroiled in legal and political disputes recently. Focusing on the history of the unified bar in Wisconsin, this article accounts for these disputes in terms of contradictions inherent in the very concept of a unified bar. Across a wide range of issues, the author argues, decision makers have been unsure whether to treat a unified bar as a public agency, a compulsory membership organization, or a private voluntary association, and thus unable to determine when public accountability, the protection of dissident members, or associational autonomy should be the dominant policy in unified bar affairs. The author concludes that disputes over questions of unified bar governance are unlikely to subside and that the unified bars should therefore be terminated in favor of a combination of private voluntary state bar associations and administrative agencies independent of the organized bar.

In corporate law the appraisal remedy gives shareholders the right to dissent from types of corporate transactions and to obtain payment for their shares from the corporation. While the remedy is typically viewed as a form of protection for minority shareholders, the author argues that it is best understood as an implied contractual term that increases the value of all shares.

In this article, the author describes his experience as an active participant on a central review board designed to hear appeals by prisoners front adverse decisions made by local prison grievance and disciplinary boards. The invitation to serve as “citizen member” on this appellate board came to the author as a result of his earlier work on inmate grievance procedures, reported in a previous Journal article. The present article gives a close-up account of the types of inmates and inmate problems encountered while serving on such a board and of the difficult role conflicts that the board members face in trying to make decisions that are both fair and realistic. The article also gives a first-hand impression of the flavor of prison life.

Growth and bureaucratization have begun to transform patterns of recruitment and career development in large law firms. Based on a case study of four large Chicago firms, this article examines these changes and their implications. The findings indicate that the social composition of large firms has become substantially more heterogeneous with respect to the status of law school attended, gender, and ethnoreligious background. However, data on lawyers' careers suggest that associates entering firms today face an increasingly bureaucratic organizational context marked by higher levels of turnover, earlier and more intensive specialization, decreased levels of client responsibility, and more frequent assignment to large-scale litigation. The article also addresses the dynamics of individual choice over type of work performed in firms. Lawyers initially working in litigation fields are far more likely to change fields of practice than are lawyers who begin in office practice fields, reflecting the increased tendency for firms to assign new associates to litigation as well as the alienating propensity of large-firm litigation for many associates. Paradoxically, a greater proportion of lawyers in traditionally organized, general service firms than in bureaucratically organized, specialty firms report that their choice of work was dictated by the firm. Also, somewhat surprisingly, the frequency with which firms explicitly direct lawyers into particular fields has not increased from earlier periods. The article concludes that these anomalies result from the fact that firms control the career choices of lawyers, and always have, but that the way such control is exercised varies across firms and historical periods.

The author concludes that federal judges who want to appoint special masters to perform duties related to civil discovery may not look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for authority to do so. By examining the historical backdrop against which the original rules were written, as well as the minutes of the proceedings of the first Advisory Committee, Brazil demonstrates that neither Rule 53 nor any other rule was designed to grant federal trial courts power to assign pretrial discovery tasks to special masters. In fact, the evidence the author marshalls shows that the original Advisory Committee explicitly rejected the idea that the Federal Rules should authorize even a limited role for special masters in connection with discovery depositions.

Finding no authority for such appointments in the Federal Rules, the author turns to the judiciary's “inherent power.” Drawing principles from the seminal Supreme Court opinion in this area, Brazil infers that in some circumstances the courts' inherent authority is a sufficient premise for delegating discovery tasks to special masters. Noting that the reported cases contain no clear guidelines about when or how federal judges should use this authority in making pretrial appointments, Brazil concludes by calling for a new federal rule covering this important subject.

A key criticism that has emerged in the debate over the search and seizure exclusionary rule is that it exacts heavy societal costs in the form of lost prosecutions and that such costs outweigh any demonstrated social benefits. This article examines the costs of three exclusionary rules using data collected for 7,500 cases in a nine-county study of criminal courts in three states. It emphasizes motions to suppress physical evidence but for comparative purposes also includes motions to suppress confessions and identifications. The results show that the various exclusionary rules exact only marginal social costs. Motions to suppress physical evidence are filed in fewer than 5% of the cases, largely drug and weapons cases, while serious motions to suppress identifications and confessions are filed in 2% and 4% of the cases. The success rate of motions to suppress is equally marginal. Successful motions to suppress physical evidence occur in only 0.69% of the cases, while successful motions to suppress identifications or confessions occur much less often. Moreover, not all who successfully suppressed evidence escaped conviction, especially when only an identification or a confession was suppressed. In all, only 46 cases—less than 0.6% of the cases studied—were lost because of the three exclusionary rules combined, most of them involving offenses that would have incurred less than six months’ imprisonment or first offenders. Finally, the impact of unsuccessful motions on subsequent plea bargaining was found to be marginal; only unsuccessful motions to exclude confessions resulted in any real sentencing concessions.

The controversy over a “good faith mistake” exception to the exclusionary rule and the 1982 National Institute of Justice study of the effects of the rule in California have focused attention on the “costs” of the rule. This article reviews the NIJ study and seven other relevant studies and concludes that the NIJ study's claim that the rule has a “major impact” on the disposition of felony arrests is misleading and exaggerated. California data show that prosecutors reject only 0.8% (8 in 1,000) of felony arrests because of illegal searches. The effect of the rule is concentrated in drug cases in which the rejection rate by prosecutors is 2.4% (not 30%, as suggested by the NIJ study), but the rejection rate for non-drug arrests is less than 0.3%, and the rate is even lower for violent crimes. Even if one looks at the cumulative effect of the rule through all stages of the felony process in California, only about 2.35% of felony arrests are lost because of illegal searches, and this is a high-side estimate based on potentially atypical samples. Moreover, studies of “lost arrests” have not differentiated between arrests resulting from bona fide crime investigations and arrests that resulted from arbitrary searches or arrests that were made to seize contraband, for harassment, or for purposes other than obtaining a conviction. The author concludes that available data show the cost of the rule is marginal, especially in view of the ambiguous nature of the lost arrests. Moreover, it is doubtful that a good faith mistake exception would save any substantial proportion of the arrests lost following illegal searches. In particular, an exception for searches conducted under an improper warrant would save only a negligible proportion of lost arrests.