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The OAU and the Mozambique Revolution
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 May 2019
Extract
One of the strongest impulses that led to the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 was the desire of free Africa to hasten independence in colonized Africa. When the leaders of independent Africa convened to inaugurate the first international regional organization of its kind in Africa, there seemed total agreement on the principle of self-determination. What Kwame Nkrumah had proclaimed six years earlier upon Ghana's accession to independence was echoed in the keynote address of the Ethiopian Emperor: “Our liberty is meaningless unless all Africans are free. Our brothers in the Rhodesias … Mozambique … cry out in anguish for our support and assistance.”
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- Copyright © African Studies Association 1973
References
Footnotes
1 As quoted in Woronoff, Jon, Organizing African Unity, (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 1970), p. 144.Google Scholar
2 Cervenka, Zdenek, The Organization of African Unity and Its Charter (N.Y.: F.A. Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 16.Google Scholar
3 Ibid., p. 17.
4 Ibid.
5 Woronoff, op. cit. p. 143.
6 Ibid., p. 143.
7 Mondlane, Eduardo, The Struggle for Mozambique (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1969), p. 119.Google Scholar
8 For details see Gibson, Richard, African Liberation Movements Contemporary Struggle Against White Minority Rule (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 287–288 Google Scholar and Chilcote, Ronald, Portuguese Africa (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), pp. 120–122.Google Scholar
9 See Yashpal Tandon, “The OAU and the Liberation of Southern Africa,” in Potholm and Dale (eds.) Southern Africa in Perspective, pp. 248-249 for a discussion of the strategies of Free Africa.
10 This classification has been adapted from Tandon, Ibid., pp. 251-255.
11 One observer has suggested three imprecise criteria for recognition: 1) demonstrated field success; 2) willingness to establish “common action fronts;” 3) political and ideological reliability. See Kenneth Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle In Africa: An Analysis and A Preview (N.Y.: Grossman Publishers, 1971), p. 138.
12 It is interesting to note that FRELIMO has arranged to have all aid transfers from China made officially to the ALC through Tanzania with the understanding that arms are passed on to FRELIMO. Thus FRELIMO avoids offending the Soviets or the West— while the ALC enhances its prestige by serving as the official channel of external resources for the liberation efforts. See Paul Whitaker, “Arms and the Nationalists: Where and on what terms do they obtain their support and how important is external aid to their revolution?” in Africa Report, Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1970, p. 14.
13 See interview with Major Mbita, Executive Secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee in Africa, a publication of Africa Journal Ltd., No. 15, Nov. 1972, p. 20.
14 See Ibid. Major Mbita indicates his satisfaction with the progress of FRELIMO without once mentioning COREMO.
15 See “Stop the COREMO ‘Massacre’ FRELIMO Warned” in the Times of Zambia, Saturday, March 4, 1972, reprinted in COREMO Newsletter, No. 3, September 1972.
16 Whitaker, op. cit, p. 14.
17 Tandon, op. cit, pp. 254-255. See also “Africa's Warring Liberators,” Sunday Telegraph (London), May 4, 1969, p. 6.
18 Claude, Innis, The Changing United Nations (New York, USA: Random House, 1967), p. 126.Google Scholar
19 Report of OAU Council of Ministers, 17th Ordinary Session, CM/380, Part 2, “Territories Under Portuguese Domination”, p. 23. Also see ‘Freedom Armies’ Win UN Backing; ‘Legitimacy’ of Anticolonial group is recognized” in The New York Times, Nov. 5, 1972, p. 10.