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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 January 2010
In this chapter and the next I will develop an account of our first-person authority over one of the most central of our propositional attitudes: belief. It will transpire that this account cannot be readily extended to other propositional attitudes. Nevertheless, it will provide a basis for one that is more general in scope.
THE BASIC ACCOUNT
Gareth Evans comments:
… in making a self ascription of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward – upon the world. If someone asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’, I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’ I get myself into a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.
I will articulate an account of our ability to non-observationally self ascribe beliefs suggested by Evans' comments. I will entitle this account the basic account. After stating some objections to the basic account, I will compare it with an alternative put forward by Christopher Peacocke.
G. E. Moore famously identified a central feature of belief. He did so in calling our attention to what has subsequently come to be known as Moore's Paradox. Consider the following statements:
(1) I believe that it is raining, but it is not raining.
(2) It is raining, but I believe that it is not raining.
(3) It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining.
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