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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 February 2010
THE TRUTHMAKER ARGUMENT
The need for a truthmaker
At this point the central actors in our metaphysical drama finally take the centre of the stage: states of affairs or facts. One may well wonder why it is, if they are as central as I and some others allege, more has not been seen of them in Western philosophy. The answer, as suggested in 1.2, lies in the substance-attribute metaphysic inherited from Aristotle, together with the corrosive scepticism which later thinkers, no doubt in response to real difficulties, directed towards that model for the world.
To recapitulate this important point. One starts with substances having attributes. Relations are left hanging in limbo, or perhaps treated as attributes of particulars of a peculiar sort. What should be done is to interpret the substance/attribute distinction as the recognition of monadic states of affairs. That would clear the way to recognize relations as constituents of polyadic states of affairs. But at this point a failure of insight or nerve occurs. There is not sufficient understanding of relations, and the way ahead is abandoned. Instead the tradition tries to retrace its steps and to reject even monadic states of affairs, or, as the tradition puts it to itself, to reject the substance/attribute distinction.
Problems are developed about substance, about attributes, and about how the two stand to each other. Substance seems unknowable and ungraspable.
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