Book contents
- Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning
- Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 Anatomy of a Muddle: Wittgenstein and Philosophy
- Chapter 2 Explaining What We Mean
- Chapter 3 Objectivity
- Chapter 4 The Methodological Significance of Intuitions in Philosophy
- Chapter 5 Wittgenstein on ‘Seeing Meanings’
- Chapter 6 Bringing the Phenomenal World into View
- Chapter 7 First Steps and Conceptual Creativity
- Chapter 8 Wittgenstein and Analytic Revisionism
- Chapter 9 Demystifying Meaning in Horwich and Wittgenstein
- Chapter 10 What Is Meaning? A Wittgensteinian Answer to an Un-Wittgensteinian Question
- Chapter 11 Meaning, Use, and Supervenience
- Chapter 12 Some Socratic Aspects of Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy
- References
- Index
- References
Chapter 12 - Some Socratic Aspects of Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 August 2019
- Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning
- Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 Anatomy of a Muddle: Wittgenstein and Philosophy
- Chapter 2 Explaining What We Mean
- Chapter 3 Objectivity
- Chapter 4 The Methodological Significance of Intuitions in Philosophy
- Chapter 5 Wittgenstein on ‘Seeing Meanings’
- Chapter 6 Bringing the Phenomenal World into View
- Chapter 7 First Steps and Conceptual Creativity
- Chapter 8 Wittgenstein and Analytic Revisionism
- Chapter 9 Demystifying Meaning in Horwich and Wittgenstein
- Chapter 10 What Is Meaning? A Wittgensteinian Answer to an Un-Wittgensteinian Question
- Chapter 11 Meaning, Use, and Supervenience
- Chapter 12 Some Socratic Aspects of Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter begins with an examination, testing the reader’s knowledge of Socrates and Wittgenstein. It goes on to consider the question of why the exam might be a difficult one, and the question of what this difficulty shows about Wittgenstein. The chapter further discusses, on a more general level, the questions of why the claim that a philosopher’s conception of philosophy bears a Socratic aspect was once a tautology and why the claim that Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy bears a Socratic aspect is no longer a tautology. Along the way, the chapter argues in favor of several claims of this latter, non-tautological sort. (All three parts of the exam are also provided, detached from the text, in the form of three appendices; a fourth appendix contains the correct answers.)
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- Chapter
- Information
- Wittgenstein on Philosophy, Objectivity, and Meaning , pp. 231 - 264Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
References
The Preliminary Exam
The Exam Proper
The Extra Credit Portion of the Exam
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