Book contents
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- Preface
- Acronyms
- Introduction
- Part I A Political Theory of Criminal Violence
- Part II The Outbreak of Inter-Cartel Wars
- 2 Why Cartels Went to War
- 3 Fighting Turf Wars
- Part III The State’s War Against the Cartels
- Part IV The Rise of Criminal Governance: Subverting Local Democracy in War
- Appendix A Criminal Violence in Mexico Database (CVM)
- Appendix B Criminal Attacks Against Political Actors in Mexico (CAPAM) Database
- Appendix C Chapter 2. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix D Chapter 4. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix E Chapter 4. Natural Experiment (Additional Information)
- Appendix F Chapter 6. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix G Chapter 6. Natural Experiments (Additional Information)
- References
- Index
- Other Books in the Series (continued from page iii)
3 - Fighting Turf Wars
Cartels, Militias, and the Struggle for Drug Trafficking Corridors
from Part II - The Outbreak of Inter-Cartel Wars
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 September 2020
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
- Votes, Drugs, and Violence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Tables
- Preface
- Acronyms
- Introduction
- Part I A Political Theory of Criminal Violence
- Part II The Outbreak of Inter-Cartel Wars
- 2 Why Cartels Went to War
- 3 Fighting Turf Wars
- Part III The State’s War Against the Cartels
- Part IV The Rise of Criminal Governance: Subverting Local Democracy in War
- Appendix A Criminal Violence in Mexico Database (CVM)
- Appendix B Criminal Attacks Against Political Actors in Mexico (CAPAM) Database
- Appendix C Chapter 2. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix D Chapter 4. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix E Chapter 4. Natural Experiment (Additional Information)
- Appendix F Chapter 6. Multivariate Regression Models (Robustness Checks)
- Appendix G Chapter 6. Natural Experiments (Additional Information)
- References
- Index
- Other Books in the Series (continued from page iii)
Summary
Drawing on extensive interviews with subnational elites and focusing on six Mexican states (Baja California, Chihuahua, Jalisco, Nuevo León, Michoacán, and Guerrero), this chapter analyzes how party alternation and opposition governors’ decisions to remove top- and mid-level officials in the state attorneys’ offices and the state judicial police led to the breakdown of informal government protection networks for drug cartels in the 1990s and early 2000s. Cartels created private militias in response to this political uncertainty in Mexico’s gray zone of criminality, which allowed drug lords to defend their turf and challenge rival territory. Using a sequential analysis, we show how every new party alternation, starting in Baja California in 1989 up to Guerrero in 2005, stimulated an arms race among cartels and led to the proliferation of increasingly lethal dyadic conflicts in the northwest, northeast, and south of the country. By 2006, Mexico’s drug trafficking industry had experienced dramatic transformations: cartels used powerful private militias to settle disputes and the death toll surpassed the 1,000 murders threshold used to classify a conflict as a civil war.
Keywords
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- Information
- Votes, Drugs, and ViolenceThe Political Logic of Criminal Wars in Mexico, pp. 113 - 140Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020