4 - Models of Veto Bargaining

Summary

This chapter develops three models of veto bargaining. I begin with the second face of power, introduced in the first chapter, and develop it into a model of the veto as a presidential capacity. This model, the famous Romer-Rosenthal model of take-it-or-leave-it bargaining, supplies the theme on which all the subsequent models in this book are variations. The first variation examines the politics of veto overrides. The second explores full-blown sequential veto bargaining.

Each model in this chapter tells a story, the story of a causal mechanism. The mechanism in the first model is the power of anticipated response. The model explores how the president's veto power affects the balance of power in a separation-of-powers system. The mechanism in the second model is uncertainty. The model shows how uncertainty tempers congressional action, allows actual vetoes to take place, and shifts the balance of power somewhat toward the president. However, this model misses an important part of the politics of the veto for it cannot explain how vetoes wrest policy concessions from Congress. The mechanism in the third model is strategic reputation building, the deliberate manipulation of beliefs through vetoes. This model addresses the veto and congressional policy concessions.

Why do I present three midlevel models of veto bargaining rather than one grand model encompassing everything? To tell its story, each model isolates one or two elements of veto bargaining and then examines them extremely carefully. I could yoke several of these stories together into a kind of megamodel, much as a writer might do in a novel.