VI - VALUE AND MORAL REASONS

Summary

TWO RADICAL THEORIES

The orthodox view

In Part I, I defended five basic claims concerning the relation between, on the one hand, valuing and value judgments and, on the other, reasons for action, viz.:

1. (i) With very few exceptions, that one correctly values or disvalues X implies that one has reasons to act (§§9.2, 10.2).

2. (ii) That one soundly values X can provide one with reasons to act toward other things, persons, etc. in ways characteristic of valuing (§9.2).

3. (iii) One who soundly values X more than Y has reason to forgo promoting, protecting, or securing Y in order to promote, protect, or secure X (§§11.1, 14.1).

4. (iv) Sound impersonal value judgments provide one with reasons to act, unless one has grounds for concluding that one cannot grasp or appreciate the relevant value (§§10.3, 11.2).

5. (v) That another correctly values X (or grasps the value of X) does not necessarily imply that one has reason to promote or protect X, or to secure X for him or for oneself (§12).

Now the question arises as to whether (i)–(v) not only sum up the relation between value and reasons for action, but whether, indeed, it is also a summary of all our reasons to act. If we adopt what I shall call the orthodox view of value and reasons, (i)–(v) would seem to be a summary of all reasons for action, for on this view all reasons for action are concerned with promoting what is valued or is valuable.