Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Series editors' preface
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction: the new collective security
- PART I Law and politics in United Nations reform
- 1 Things fall apart: the concept of collective security in international law
- 2 Reflections on the politics of institutional reform
- 3 Great Powers then and now: Security Council reform and responses to threats to peace and security
- PART II Defining “threats” to collective security
- PART III Prevention and responses
- PART IV Perspectives on the ground
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - Reflections on the politics of institutional reform
from PART I - Law and politics in United Nations reform
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Series editors' preface
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction: the new collective security
- PART I Law and politics in United Nations reform
- 1 Things fall apart: the concept of collective security in international law
- 2 Reflections on the politics of institutional reform
- 3 Great Powers then and now: Security Council reform and responses to threats to peace and security
- PART II Defining “threats” to collective security
- PART III Prevention and responses
- PART IV Perspectives on the ground
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Whenever there are goods to be allocated, human beings devise institutions to do the allocating. Whether it concerns the distribution of donor kidneys among kidney patients, the allocation of scholarships among PhD students, the organization of social security in the welfare state, or the maintenance of peace in an anarchic world, some institution will be devised to organize, implement, manage, or oversee the activity. Leaving it to a single individual, à titre personnel, to decide on scholarships is, after all, not terribly satisfactory; she might decide to sponsor nieces and nephews first, or people working in the same discipline, or people of the same ethnic descent. In short, we tend to think that leaving such decisions to an individual is usually not a good idea. When such issues, like the allocation of goods, cannot be settled judicially, an institution offers better guarantees for fairness in the decision-making process, than leaving things to the whims and preferences of individuals.
By the same token, giving a single state the responsibility (or privilege) to maintain or restore international peace is bound to provoke outcries of protest. What if the state ignores aggression by its allies? Or only acts upon aggression committed by some, but not by others? Or, worst of all perhaps, uses its elevated position to commit aggression itself? Again, creating an institution is deemed to be the most obvious way to prevent abuse.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security , pp. 76 - 93Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010
- 5
- Cited by