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  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Truth and Truthmakers
  • Cited by 419
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
September 2009
Print publication year:
2004
Online ISBN:
9780511487552
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487552
Subjects:
Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
Series:
Cambridge Studies in Philosophy
Information

Book description

Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is a recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book, first published in 2004, D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal truths, truths about the past and the future, and mathematical truths. In a clear, even-handed and non-technical discussion he makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in analytical philosophy.

Reviews

'Armstrong's systematic contribution in this book to the truth maker style of metaphysical enquiry is a very major one; we may well learn more from suggestions he makes … covers much more ground than its length would suggest.'

Source: Journal of Philosophy

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Contents

Contents
References
References
References
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