Book contents
- The Transmission of Knowledge
- The Transmission of Knowledge
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Framework Presented
- 3 Joint Agency and the Role of Trust in Testimonial Knowledge
- 4 Social Norms and Social Sensibilities
- 5 A Unified Account of Generation and Transmission
- 6 The Framework Extended
- 7 Education and the Transmission of Understanding
- 8 Reductionism and Big Science
- 9 Social Religious Epistemology
- Appendix: The Garbage Problem
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Bibliography
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 August 2020
Book contents
- The Transmission of Knowledge
- The Transmission of Knowledge
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Framework Presented
- 3 Joint Agency and the Role of Trust in Testimonial Knowledge
- 4 Social Norms and Social Sensibilities
- 5 A Unified Account of Generation and Transmission
- 6 The Framework Extended
- 7 Education and the Transmission of Understanding
- 8 Reductionism and Big Science
- 9 Social Religious Epistemology
- Appendix: The Garbage Problem
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
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- The Transmission of Knowledge , pp. 200 - 210Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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