Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Preface
- Translator's preface
- Part I Introduction: confrontation of analytical philosophy with traditional conceptions of philosophy
- Part II A first step: analysis of the predicative sentence
- 8 Preliminary reflections on method and preview of the course of the investigation
- 9 Husserl's theory of meaning
- 10 Collapse of the traditional theory of meaning
- 11 Predicates: the first step in the development of an analytical conception of the meaning of sentences. The dispute between nominalists and conceptualists
- 12 The basic principle of analytical philosophy. The dispute continued. Predicates and quasi-predicates
- 13 The meaning of an expression and the circumstances of its use. Dispute with a behaviouristic conception
- 14 The employment-rule of an assertoric sentence. Argument with Grice and Searle
- 15 Positive account of the employment-rule of assertoric sentences in terms of the truth-relation
- 16 Supplements
- 17 ‘And’ and ‘or’
- 18 General sentences. Resumption of the problem of predicates
- 19 The mode of employment of predicates. Transition to singular terms
- 20 What is it for a sign to stand for an object? The traditional account
- 21 The function of singular terms
- 22 Russell and Strawson
- 23 What is ‘identification’?
- 24 Specification and identification. Specification and truth
- 25 Spatio-temporal identification and the constitution of the object-relation
- 26 Supplements
- 27 Results
- 28 The next steps
- Bibliography
- Index of names
- Index of subjects
28 - The next steps
from Part II - A first step: analysis of the predicative sentence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2016
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Preface
- Translator's preface
- Part I Introduction: confrontation of analytical philosophy with traditional conceptions of philosophy
- Part II A first step: analysis of the predicative sentence
- 8 Preliminary reflections on method and preview of the course of the investigation
- 9 Husserl's theory of meaning
- 10 Collapse of the traditional theory of meaning
- 11 Predicates: the first step in the development of an analytical conception of the meaning of sentences. The dispute between nominalists and conceptualists
- 12 The basic principle of analytical philosophy. The dispute continued. Predicates and quasi-predicates
- 13 The meaning of an expression and the circumstances of its use. Dispute with a behaviouristic conception
- 14 The employment-rule of an assertoric sentence. Argument with Grice and Searle
- 15 Positive account of the employment-rule of assertoric sentences in terms of the truth-relation
- 16 Supplements
- 17 ‘And’ and ‘or’
- 18 General sentences. Resumption of the problem of predicates
- 19 The mode of employment of predicates. Transition to singular terms
- 20 What is it for a sign to stand for an object? The traditional account
- 21 The function of singular terms
- 22 Russell and Strawson
- 23 What is ‘identification’?
- 24 Specification and identification. Specification and truth
- 25 Spatio-temporal identification and the constitution of the object-relation
- 26 Supplements
- 27 Results
- 28 The next steps
- Bibliography
- Index of names
- Index of subjects
Summary
The analysis of the predicative form of sentence was only intended as a first step in an enquiry into foundations that concerned the meaning of all linguistic expressions; and that means: the semantic forms of all sentences. Measured against this aim we have not achieved much. Firstly we have not even arrived at a general theory of singular terms nor, consequently, at a general theory of predicative sentences. The next step would be an analysis of those predicative sentences whose singular terms stand for abstract objects. Secondly, the conception thus far reached of the mode of employment of assertoric sentences would have to be widened into a general theory of all forms of assertoric sentences. And, finally, we would have to remove the restriction to assertoric sentences so as to arrive at a general theory of all sentences with propositional content.
Each of these three steps relates to a new and extensive field of investigation and in none of them, least of all in the third, can we assume that the conceptuality so far worked out can be simply transferred to the extended field of investigation. Thus in these steps the field of investigation would not simply be extended; rather each of the three steps would represent a further step in the enquiry into the foundations. In each of them one would be concerned with a reexamination of the previous conceptuality and possibly with the working out of a new, more fundamental conceptuality.
The three steps would not necessarily follow one another. The analysis of those predicative sentences in which abstract objects are referred to is not a presupposition for the analysis of the other forms of assertoric sentence; and equally the investigation of non-assertoric kinds of sentence does not have to wait until we are in possession of a complete semantics of assertoric sentences. The three steps thus do not constitute a series; rather they represent so to speak three directions in which one could continue from the stage we have now reached. This shows that this first step, even if it does not go far enough, is nevertheless fundamental for the further enquiry into the foundations.
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- Traditional and Analytical PhilosophyLectures on the Philosophy of Language, pp. 406 - 426Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016