Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction: Thought as Language
- Seeing through Language
- ‘The only sure sign…’: Thought and Language in Descartes
- Words and Pictures
- Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity
- The Explanation of Cognition
- Thought Without Language: Thought Without Awareness?
- Philosophy, Thought and Language
- The Flowering of Thought in Language
- Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats
- Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation
- How to Do Other Things With Words
- Bibliography: Twentieth-Century Philosophical Texts on Thought and Language
- Index
Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction: Thought as Language
- Seeing through Language
- ‘The only sure sign…’: Thought and Language in Descartes
- Words and Pictures
- Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity
- The Explanation of Cognition
- Thought Without Language: Thought Without Awareness?
- Philosophy, Thought and Language
- The Flowering of Thought in Language
- Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats
- Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation
- How to Do Other Things With Words
- Bibliography: Twentieth-Century Philosophical Texts on Thought and Language
- Index
Summary
Social Externalism and its Ramifications
Social externalism is a thesis about the individuation-conditions of thoughts. Actually, the thesis applies only to a special category of ‘trained’ thoughts, thoughts which issue from trained thinking. It isn't that the thinker of such a thought has to have had special training about the subject-matter. It is rather that he or she needs to have acquired certain basic linguistic skills and values. For trained thoughts are thoughts whose contents are tailored to the demands of communication. Social externalism, as I understand it, says that people who are competent in a public language are equipped to have certain thoughts whose contents are fixed (in part) by the lexical semantic norms of their language.
This restriction to trained thoughts has far-reaching consequences. It makes the thesis more modest and more compelling. Not all of a language-user's mental states have their contents fixed in this way, and the mental states of a non-language-user cannot be so fixed. There must be various primitive kinds of thinking which subserve and predate trained thinking. If prelinguistic children were not naturally endowed with the intelligence to construct cognitive maps of their surroundings, to imagine possibilities, to choose between alternatives, and so on, they would be incapable of learning any language and consequently would be unable to acquire the capacity for trained thinking.
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- Thought and Language , pp. 77 - 102Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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