Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction: Thought as Language
- Seeing through Language
- ‘The only sure sign…’: Thought and Language in Descartes
- Words and Pictures
- Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity
- The Explanation of Cognition
- Thought Without Language: Thought Without Awareness?
- Philosophy, Thought and Language
- The Flowering of Thought in Language
- Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats
- Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation
- How to Do Other Things With Words
- Bibliography: Twentieth-Century Philosophical Texts on Thought and Language
- Index
How to Do Other Things With Words
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction: Thought as Language
- Seeing through Language
- ‘The only sure sign…’: Thought and Language in Descartes
- Words and Pictures
- Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity
- The Explanation of Cognition
- Thought Without Language: Thought Without Awareness?
- Philosophy, Thought and Language
- The Flowering of Thought in Language
- Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats
- Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation
- How to Do Other Things With Words
- Bibliography: Twentieth-Century Philosophical Texts on Thought and Language
- Index
Summary
Nomina si nescis, perit et cognitio rerum.
(Lucretius, quoted by B. F. Skinner in Verbal Behavior, 1957, p. 441).John Austin's masterpiece, How to Do Things with Words, was not just a contribution to philosophy; it has proven to be a major contribution to linguistics, one of the founding documents of pragmatics, the investigation of how we use words to accomplish various ends in the social world. Strangely, not much attention has been paid by philosophers – or by psychologists and linguists – to how we use words in private, you might say, to think. As Wittgenstein (1967, p. 17e) once noted, ‘It is very noteworthy that what goes on in thinking practically never interests us.’
John Maynard Keynes was once asked if he thought in words or pictures. His reply was ‘I think in thoughts.’ This is in one way an admirable answer. It abruptly dismisses the two leading mistakes about what thinking might be. But it also encourages that lack of interest that Wittgenstein noted. What, then, are thoughts, if not words or pictures? And more particularly, what is the role of words in thinking? To this overdue question, I want to explore, very tentatively, a few neglected avenues.
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- Thought and Language , pp. 219 - 236Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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