Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction: Thought as Language
- Seeing through Language
- ‘The only sure sign…’: Thought and Language in Descartes
- Words and Pictures
- Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity
- The Explanation of Cognition
- Thought Without Language: Thought Without Awareness?
- Philosophy, Thought and Language
- The Flowering of Thought in Language
- Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats
- Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation
- How to Do Other Things With Words
- Bibliography: Twentieth-Century Philosophical Texts on Thought and Language
- Index
The Explanation of Cognition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction: Thought as Language
- Seeing through Language
- ‘The only sure sign…’: Thought and Language in Descartes
- Words and Pictures
- Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity
- The Explanation of Cognition
- Thought Without Language: Thought Without Awareness?
- Philosophy, Thought and Language
- The Flowering of Thought in Language
- Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats
- Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation
- How to Do Other Things With Words
- Bibliography: Twentieth-Century Philosophical Texts on Thought and Language
- Index
Summary
The Problem
What sorts of systematic explanations should we and can we seek in cognitive science for perception, language comprehension, rational action and other forms of cognition? In broad outline I think the answer is reasonably clear: We are looking for causal explanations, and our subject matter is certain functions of a biological organ, the human and animal brain.
As with any other natural science there are certain assumptions we have to make and certain conditions that our explanations have to meet. Specifically, we have to suppose that there exists a reality totally independent of our representations of it (in a healthier intellectual era it would not be necessary to say that) and we have to suppose that the elements of that reality that we cite in our explanations genuinely function causally.
Not all functions of the brain are relevant to cognition, so we have to be careful to restrict the range of brain functions we are discussing. Cognitive science is about the cognitive functioning of the brain and its relation to the rest of the organism and to the rest of the world in the way that nutrition science is about the digestive functioning of the digestive system and its relation to the rest of the organism and the rest of the world. Like other organs, and indeed like other physical systems, the brain has different levels of description and cognitive science is appropriately concerned with any level of description of the brain that is relevant to the causal explanation of cognition.
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- Thought and Language , pp. 103 - 126Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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