Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Chapter 1 Introduction: societal constitutionalism as critical theory
- Section I Conceptual foundations of societal constitutionalism
- Chapter 2 Social integration and social control: the importance of procedural normative restraints
- Chapter 3 Liberalism and the Weberian Dilemma: from restraints on government to restraints on civil society
- Chapter 4 Conceptual foundations of societal constitutionalism: from internal restraints on government to external restraints on drift
- Section II Origins of the analytical distinctions and conceptual foundations: retracing steps taken by Habermas, Fuller, and Parsons
- Section III Implications of the analytical distinctions and conceptual foundations
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- Other books in the series
Chapter 2 - Social integration and social control: the importance of procedural normative restraints
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Chapter 1 Introduction: societal constitutionalism as critical theory
- Section I Conceptual foundations of societal constitutionalism
- Chapter 2 Social integration and social control: the importance of procedural normative restraints
- Chapter 3 Liberalism and the Weberian Dilemma: from restraints on government to restraints on civil society
- Chapter 4 Conceptual foundations of societal constitutionalism: from internal restraints on government to external restraints on drift
- Section II Origins of the analytical distinctions and conceptual foundations: retracing steps taken by Habermas, Fuller, and Parsons
- Section III Implications of the analytical distinctions and conceptual foundations
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index
- Other books in the series
Summary
Social order and social control
It is useful to begin by characterizing social order in positive terms rather than leaving it a residual category, whether as an antonym of entropy or randomness (Parsons 1937a: 752; 1968c; Alexander 1978, 1982a, 1987). Researchers may say that any social unit is ordered when members' behavior typically falls within acknowledged ranges of acceptable behavior. The latter is that entire set of behavior that other members typically acknowledge is acceptable rather than either exemplary or deviant (see Brennan and Buchanan 1985: 98-104: Ridgeway and Berger 1986 on expectation states theory). Indeed, this behavior is so unambiguously acceptable, that, if anything, the questioning of such behavior by any member of the group runs a greater risk of being labeled deviant (as, for example, nosey, intrusive, or prelusive) than the behavior questioned.
With this in mind, a staid religious congregation may be ordered at one moment in time, and then become disordered, as actors' behavior no longer meets members' acknowledged ranges of expectations regarding ritual, dress, or donations. Similarly, a criminal motorcycle gang may be just as ordered in its own way, and then become disordered, as actors' behavior fails to meet members’ acknowledged ranges of expectations regarding, drug-running, tatooing, or fighting. Nudist camps or concentration camps may be ordered or disordered in their own ways (see Kaplan 1980 for an application to juveniles' behavior).
This view of social order is indeed positive rather than residual, and yet it is also disconcertingly relativist rather than critical.
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- Information
- Theory of Societal ConstitutionalismFoundations of a Non-Marxist Critical Theory, pp. 23 - 39Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991