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Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 September 2019

Stefano Bertea
Affiliation:
University of Leicester
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Summary

Here I will be careful to clarify the specific question I intend to address in this book, so as to keep it distinct from other questions that similarly concern the obligatory component of the law. The specific object of this work is to construct a theoretical account of obligation as it applies to law, and hence to offer a conceptualization of legal obligation. I will thus be primarily concerned with the question: How should be legal obligation distinctively characterized? or, stated otherwise, How is the kind of obligation engendered by the law best conceived? I accordingly propose to contribute to the debate that has sprung up among those who are interested in systematically framing the fundamental features of legal obligation, understood as a notion with its own distinctive defining traits. Those engaged in this debate seek, for one thing, to identify and explore in detail the essential properties that define legal obligation and, for another thing, to establish what specifically distinguishes the specific sort of legal obligation from other kinds of obligation

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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  • Introduction
  • Stefano Bertea, University of Leicester
  • Book: A Theory of Legal Obligation
  • Online publication: 20 September 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216.001
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  • Introduction
  • Stefano Bertea, University of Leicester
  • Book: A Theory of Legal Obligation
  • Online publication: 20 September 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216.001
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Stefano Bertea, University of Leicester
  • Book: A Theory of Legal Obligation
  • Online publication: 20 September 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216.001
Available formats
×