Book contents
- The Stupidity of War
- The Stupidity of War
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Acknowledgements
- Additional material
- Prologue The Rise of War Aversion and the Decline of International War
- Part I Assessing the Threat Record
- Part II Evaluating Present Threats
- Afterword Aversion to International War as an Explanatory Variable
- Appendix: A Sardonic Litany
- Notes
- References
- Index
Prologue - The Rise of War Aversion and the Decline of International War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2021
- The Stupidity of War
- The Stupidity of War
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Acknowledgements
- Additional material
- Prologue The Rise of War Aversion and the Decline of International War
- Part I Assessing the Threat Record
- Part II Evaluating Present Threats
- Afterword Aversion to International War as an Explanatory Variable
- Appendix: A Sardonic Litany
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
It really seems time to take into account the consequences of the fact that countries, particularly leading or developed ones, reversing the course of several millennia, no longer envision international war as a sensible method for resolving their disputes. Indeed, the aversion to international war or the rise of something of a culture or society of international peace that has substantially enveloped the world should be seen as a causative or facilitating independent variable. International war seems to be in pronounced decline because of the way attitudes toward it have changed, roughly following the pattern by which the institution of formal slavery became discredited and then obsolete. Under the circumstances, there is potential virtue in the traditionally maligned diplomatic techniques of complacency and appeasement for dealing with international problems. The phenomenon asuggests that there is little justification for the continuing and popular tendency to inflate threats and dangers in the international arena—even to the point of deeming some of them to be “existential.” In addition, although problems certainly continue to exist, none of these are substantial enough to require the United States (or pretty much anybody) to maintain a large standing military force for dealing with them.
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- The Stupidity of WarAmerican Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, pp. 1 - 26Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021