1 - Theory

Summary

THE POLICY PROCESS

If, as many assume, the government as a whole, or its leaders, arrive at decisions through impartial analysis of logical problems, SDI might then be the result of a more or less rational decision taken by President Reagan.

In reality, the making of a military budget is not so simple. The government is seldom a unitary actor coherently synthesising issues to transcend sectional interest. The arms race is the sum of innumerable micro-decisions, each of which seems the almost inevitable response to a situation which is highly predetermined. It is often hard to pinpoint these decisions, or to distinguish between the formulation of a decision, the ‘decision’ itself and its implementation, which often alters the initial decision.

The process of weapons innovation passes through many stages, lasting 15–20 years. There is, for example, the discovery of new technological possibilities (the ‘technocratic initiative’); the process of consensus-building which engages the military-technical community in the new possibility; the promotion of the idea to military leaders, Congress and the Executive; the formulation of a strategic case for a new weapon and the discovery of new threats (the ‘open window’); and high-level endorsement. Implementation of the high-level decision starts another round of decision-making. The decisions involved in this lengthy process are themselves diffused across different organisations, with divergent priorities and perspectives. Decisions are taken or avoided through a complex organisational process, or through governmental politics, often lacking in control and accountability.