6 - The politics of influence

Summary

The previous chapter described a constituency with both motive and means to influence policy on SDL. Before assessing how much influence was in fact wielded, this chapter must describe the making of SDI policy. On 25 March 1983, Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 85 (NSDD–85):

I direct the development of an intensive effort to define a long term research and development program aimed at an ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles.

The programme was to be consistent with the ABM Treaty and ‘recognizing the need for close consultations with our allies’. On 18 April, NSDD 6–83 commissioned three panels to investigate BMD: the Fletcher, Hoffman and Miller panels. The Fletcher panel studied technological feasibility. A declassified summary emphasised the need for strong, central management, multi-tiered defence and good survivability. It pointed out that ‘significant demonstrations’ could be performed over the next ten years, giving visible evidence of progress. The panel reported that ‘by taking an optimistic view … we concluded that a robust BMD system can be made to work eventually’. The notes of caution – ‘by taking an optimistic view’ and ‘eventually’ – were later overlooked.

Completed in October 1983, the studies were sent to the National Security Council, to be condensed for the President.