Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2014
Introduction
That nations dwell in anarchy has been the mainstay lore of realists of different stripes. Yet even Hobbes realized that things are not that simple. He distinguished the “misery” of the state of nature among individuals from that which prevails among “persons of sovereign authority.” Contrary to the necessity of transcending the war of all against all, states can counteract the dangers that arise in the case of individual vulnerability. They can organize police forces and a military, and contract alliances, thereby providing at least a modicum of security. Moreover, through establishing a public order, states create incentives for the development of a “commodious living” that comes to a naught when no sovereign keeps all of his subjects “in awe.”
Those realists, who were not captured by certain “assumptions” by which the homo politicus has to maximize power analogous to the homo economicus’ amassing of revenue, but who were more historically inclined, as they were interested in the actual functioning of the (European) state system, paid close attention to the conventions and institutions facilitating the relations among “persons of sovereign authority.” Thus the institution of treaty making (bilaterally or in congresses), of the acquisition of titles and their transfers, and the attempts to regulate the use of force (ius ad bellum and in bello) emerged quickly as core concerns for a systematic analysis. Hume had already considered these norms and institutions as fundamental in the sense that without the establishment of certain normative expectations in regard to those concerns, no social system can reproduce itself.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.