Preface

Summary

Events in the Horn of Africa in the 1970s were even more striking than those of the Italian–Ethiopian War in the 1930s and at least as far-reaching in their international repercussions. In the space of just four years, the USSR concluded a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Somalia, Ethiopia experienced a revolution in 1974 that was as thoroughgoing as any African upheaval, the Soviet Union dramatically shifted massive support from Somalia to Ethiopia and then played a key part in the military defeat of its former ally in the Ogaden conflict of 1977–8. For much of the following decade, these historic events broadly determined the shape of Soviet policy in the region.

The purpose of this study is to analyse the paradoxes of Soviet involvement in the Horn. This concern grew out of a nagging question: if the Soviet Union was one of the most powerful states in the world, and able to project military force in distant places like Ethiopia, why did it find it necessary to disengage in Somalia, a country where Soviet interests had apparently been firmly established? The search for an explanation involves a detailed examination of the interaction of Soviet power and influence in the Horn of Africa.

The structure of the book reflects this central objective. It is divided into four parts. The introductory section provides the theoretical framework in which the substance of Soviet involvement is cast. It explores, in general terms, the concepts of intervention and disengagement in international politics, distinguishing between the motive to intervene and the opportunity to do so.