Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism
from THAILAND
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
Summary
Introduction
On the face of it, 2002 should be seen — in the parlance of political science — as the year of intensification of Thailand's democratic “consolidation”. The promulgation of a new Constitution in October 1997 had been the culmination of five years of political reforms designed to exorcise the ghosts of frequent military coups, patronage, “money politics”, and vote-buying that long plagued the country's politics of representation. Less than three years later, 200 senators were elected to the upper chamber for the first time. The election of the 500-member lower house followed suit in January 2001. Concurrently, a clutch of so-called democratic institutions, revolving around the Election Commission, the National Counter Corruption Commission, and the Constitution Court, were spun into action as mandated by the Constitution in an effort to promote transparency and accountability of the political system. The stability and effectiveness of the government were constitutionally enhanced by new electoral stipulations that induced a consolidation of the party system towards larger political parties and by “party- list” mechanisms that enabled capable individuals to enter Cabinet relatively untainted by the mud slinging of election campaigns. Given the eclectic design of the Constitution, its initial implementation in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis generated pervasive optimism both at home and abroad. The Thai economy may have lost a decade of growth, but at least Thai democracy was on its way to fulfilment. Or so it seemed.
As 2002 drew to a close, it has turned out that Thailand's democratic consolidation is less than meets the eye. The government of Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister who ushered his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party into power on a landslide victory in the January 2001 election, has arguably turned Thai democracy on its head. The TRT has monopolized the party system, marginalized the opposition, co-opted and coerced the media, extended its controlling tentacles over the military and the police, and shunned the dissenting voices of civil society groups.
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- Information
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2003 , pp. 277 - 290Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2003