Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
INTRODUCTION
Social behavior may be determined by both conscious and unconscious forces. Indeed, a first look at the dominant theories of motivation (Higgins & Kruglanski, 2000) suggests that this distinction lends itself to a meaningful classification of motivational mechanisms. Conscious accounts are based on the assumption that humans (and to some degree other primates) are endowed with reason and insight. What they do can therefore be construed as deliberate action, the mental precursor of which is a decision or a choice. As Ajzen (1996, p. 298) has put it, acting “involves a choice even if the alternative is no action.” It is therefore useful to study people's reflective judgments as precursors to their choices. Specifically, decisions are based on the perceived value of the outcomes of an action and the subjective probability that they can be achieved. This expectancy-value perspective has influenced many theoretical approaches (for a review, see Feather, 1982). Most prominently, perhaps, Fishbein and Ajzen's theories of reasoned action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) have invoked this model to specify the influence of attitudinal judgments on human behavior. Also, Bandura's (1977) theory of social learning has adopted central elements of the expectancy-value paradigm.
Another variant of the conscious approach to motivation invokes people's intentions in the context of goal pursuit (see also Aarts & Hassin, this volume). Specifically, actors are assumed to intentionally control and regulate their behavior in order to reach a specific end state.
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