Book contents
- The Shifting Landscape of Global Trade Governance
- The Shifting Landscape of Global Trade Governance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- Part I New and Old Challenges
- Part II Trade Policy and Trade-Related Concerns
- 7 Reconceiving Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion
- 8 Our Alarming Climate Crisis Demands Border Adjustments Now
- 9 The Multilateralization of PTAs’ Environmental Clauses
- 10 The Trend to More and Stricter Non-Trade Issues in Preferential Trade Agreements
- Part III Development Angles
- Part IV Diffusion across Economic Treaties
- Index
- References
10 - The Trend to More and Stricter Non-Trade Issues in Preferential Trade Agreements
from Part II - Trade Policy and Trade-Related Concerns
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2019
By
Book contents
- The Shifting Landscape of Global Trade Governance
- The Shifting Landscape of Global Trade Governance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- Part I New and Old Challenges
- Part II Trade Policy and Trade-Related Concerns
- 7 Reconceiving Trade Agreements for Social Inclusion
- 8 Our Alarming Climate Crisis Demands Border Adjustments Now
- 9 The Multilateralization of PTAs’ Environmental Clauses
- 10 The Trend to More and Stricter Non-Trade Issues in Preferential Trade Agreements
- Part III Development Angles
- Part IV Diffusion across Economic Treaties
- Index
- References
Summary
Sixty-two percent of the 162 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed between 1945 and 1989, and 81 percent of the 654 post-1990 PTAs, include at least one clause on a non-trade issue (NTI). Using a novel dataset that covers 262 data points on NTIs in 644 PTAs,shows three major trends of NTIs in trade deals: first, the NTIs agenda is broadening, with ever more aspects included in trade agreements. Modern PTAs move beyond clauses on national security, a general call on environmental protection, and labor rights. Instead, these progressive agreements cover aspects ranging from gender to waste management, to the fight against terrorism. Second, the style of regulating such issues converges. No longer are there different approaches to deal with NTIs in PTAs. Now, the gold standards seem to be the installation of a court system dealing with potential NTI violation and combining this with a formal dialog between policy makers and domestic stakeholders on NTIs. Third, developing countries have been catching up and increasingly commit to NTIs. The proliferation of NTIs in PTAs is likely to continue, where societal pressure is prone to push this process even further.
Keywords
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- Information
- The Shifting Landscape of Global Trade GovernanceWorld Trade Forum, pp. 233 - 252Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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