10 - Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space

Summary

In this chapter I will present and defend a theory of unity of consciousness. The theory that I will recommend has two features that set it apart from other theories about the same topic. First, it asserts that it is a mistake to think of unity of consciousness as having just one source. There are a number of different relations (hereafter called unity relations) that count as sources or forms of unity of consciousness. Second, my theory denies that all of the sources or forms of unity are compositional. Let us say that a relation R is compositional if it meets two conditions: First, the relata of R are sensations; second, there exists some other relation R′ such that if x and y stand in the relation R to one another, they do so because x and y both bear R′ to some other thing that is not itself a sensation. For example, having the same owner as is compositional: When two sensations bear this relation to one another, they do so because each of them stands in the relation being owned by to the same subject of experience. A relation is purely sensory if its relata are sensations and it is not compositional. I will defend the view that some unity relations are purely sensory.