2 - The failings of dualism and the double-aspect theory

Summary

My goal in Part 2 is to convince the reader that type materialism deserves to be taken seriously. I will work toward this goal by establishing three propositions. First, in this chapter I will show that, under certain assumptions, type materialism is to be preferred to two of its most significant rivals – dualism and a view that is often called the double-aspect theory. Second, in the next chapter, I will argue for the proposition that its other main rival, a view known as functionalism, suffers from serious defects. And finally, two chapters hence, I will establish that the main objections to type materialism are misguided.

When J.J.C. Smart and other materialists of the 1950s and early 1960s set out to defend their favorite doctrines, they were typically more concerned to answer objections than to construct positive supporting arguments. It seems to have been generally felt that materialism has a certain intrinsic plausibility that competing theories lack, and that as a result, once the objections to materialism were answered, the burden of proof would shift to the shoulders of the advocates of other theories. Thus, instead of giving carefully formulated positive arguments, the materialists of Smart's era relied mainly on sketchy appeals to simplicity and terse complaints about the obscurity and messiness of competing views.

This pattern has persisted to the present. Very little has been done to improve the arguments of the materialists of Smart's day.