4 - Our self-conception and the mind/body problem

Summary

One's knowledge of other minds

We have before us so far a broad epistemological thesis and the outlines of a semantic theory. We must now assess the consequences of these closely related positions as they bear on the philosophy of mind. In particular, we shall see what light they throw on the nature of our self-conception generally, and on the specific knowledge one has of oneself and others, qua persons. We shall find, I think, that the illumination is considerable.

There is a further reason for turning, at this point in the essay, to the philosophy of mind. The epistemological theses advanced to this point fall well short of a comprehensive theory of knowledge, since they do not include a solution to the methodological problem. Beyond some casual mutterings about coherence, explanatory power, and the like, no attempt has been made to explicate what rationality consists in, as it bears on theoretical evolution in general. The reason is simple. I am of the opinion that this fundamental problem will require for its solution, or even for its significant advancement, a revolution in our self-conception. I must therefore establish that there is room for a revolution in our self-conception, that our self-conception is as speculative as any other. Once this has been established, we can explore the shape of the revolution with confidence.

It has been argued at length that our common-sense conceptual framework for empirical reality is in all relevant respects a theoretical framework.